Bazuaye v. U.S.

Decision Date22 March 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 93-1767 (JHG).,Civ.A. 93-1767 (JHG).
Citation41 F.Supp.2d 19
PartiesJoromi H. BAZUAYE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Joromi H. Bazuaye, New York City, pro se.

Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, Nancy R. Page, U.S. Attorney's Office, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOYCE HENS GREEN, District Judge.

On remand, the only remaining issue in this case is whether plaintiff Joromi H. Bazuaye ("Bazuaye") is entitled to a trial on his claim that a Postal Inspector's "seizure" of $11,000 from him was wrongful and amounted to the tort of conversion.

It is undisputed that a Postal Inspector obtained the $11,000 from a bailbondsman to whom Bazuaye had entrusted it. After obtaining the funds, the Postal Service commenced administrative forfeiture proceedings. Bazuaye received notice of these proceedings but chose not to contest them in a timely fashion. The Postal Service declared the $11,000 forfeited to the United States. Bazuaye filed this suit.

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that although the declaration of forfeiture did not deprive Bazuaye of his claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., concerning how the United States took possession of the funds, the unique aspects of forfeiture law operate to establish as a fact that Bazuaye had no right to possess the money at the time of the "seizure." As a result, by operation of law, Bazuaye is unable to prove a fact necessary to his conversion claim. Judgment must be entered in favor of the United States.

BACKGROUND

The lengthy history of this dispute has been recounted in a number of prior opinions. See Order of May 12, 1998 ("May 1998 Order"); Memorandum Opinion of Mar. 30, 1998 ("Mar.1998 Op." or "the March 1998 Opinion"); Memorandum Opinion of June 11, 1997 ("June 1997 Op." or "the June 1997 Opinion"); Bazuaye v. United States, 83 F.3d 482 (D.C.Cir.1996); Order of Feb. 2, 1995 ("Feb.1995 Or." or "the February 1995 Order").

Summarized here are the following relevant facts. On October 16, 1991, Secret Service agents arrested Bazuaye in Washington, D.C., for engaging in a scheme of credit card fraud. On October 17, 1991, a criminal complaint was filed against Bazuaye in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029.

To secure his pretrial release, Bazuaye alleges that he arranged for his relatives and friends to provide $11,000 "for the purpose of using the money to help in his criminal defense," and that he decided to use this money to post his bail bond and to obtain counsel of his choice. June 1997 Op. at 2. The $11,000 consisted of cash, Western Union money transfers, and postal money orders.

The Government opposed Bazuaye's bond request, arguing that the $11,000 did not derive from a legitimate source. On November 1 and 7, 1991, Bazuaye attended a hearing held pursuant to United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.1966), before Magistrate Judge Sewell to determine the legitimacy and source of the money for Bazuaye's bond. Bazuaye alleges that on November 6, 1991, the day before the Nebbia hearing resumed, U.S. Postal Inspector Glenn Clark ("Clark") unlawfully seized the $11,000 from the bondsman, Mardis M. Mitchell ("Mitchell") to whom Bazuaye had entrusted it. On November 7, 1991, Magistrate Judge Sewell denied, from the bench, Bazuaye's request to use the money for a bail bond:

Defendant [Bazuaye] has caused proposed bond collateral and monies to be used for bond collateral to be presented falsely and for the purpose of misleading the Court as to the sources of these monies. Specifically, the Western Union transfers of money originating in New York, Brooklyn, New York, where the purchaser was alleged to be a person who did not purchase those — or did not pay for those transfers of funds.

Hearing Transcript at 156, United States v. Jeromi1 Bazuaye, Crim. No. 91-1305-M (E.D.Va., Nov. 7, 1991).

In February 1992, Bazuaye pled guilty to one count of credit card fraud, i.e., possessing, with the intent to defraud, 15 or more counterfeit or unauthorized access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). He was sentenced to 37 months' incarceration. See United States v. Bazuaye, 991 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.1993) (Table) (unpublished op. at 1993 WL 102576).

During the same time period that Bazuaye was convicted pursuant to his plea, the Postal Service initiated procedures to administratively forfeit the $11,000 that was seized and was the subject of the Nebbia Hearing in November 1991. On January 13, 1992, the Postal Service found probable cause to forfeit the funds. Bazuaye received personal notice of the forfeiture proceeding on February 10, 1992. See Def.'s Further Mot. for Summ.J. Ex. C. A timely petition for mitigation of forfeiture was filed on behalf of Edwin Obazuaye, one of the relatives alleged to have contributed to the $11,000.2 That petition was denied. At no time during its pendency did Bazuaye challenge the forfeiture in the administrative proceeding, and the funds were declared administratively forfeited on May 6, 1993. On May 10, 1993, the Postal Service received a challenge from Bazuaye, which was denied as untimely.

On May 15, 1993, Bazuaye filed a Standard Form ("SF") 95 claiming damages of $14,200 arising from the seizure of the $11,000. This claim was denied by the Department of Justice on July 6, 1993. Bazuaye then filed the instant suit. In February 1995, the Court rendered judgment on all claims in favor of the United States. Bazuaye appealed only the dismissal of his FTCA claim that the postal inspector unlawfully seized the $11,000. This issue was one of first impression in this Circuit. See Schreiber v. United States, 1997 WL 563338, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1997) (describing circuit split). This Court held that Clark's actions fell within the law enforcement exception to the FTCA. The Court of Appeals disagreed. See Bazuaye v. United States, 83 F.3d 482, 486-87 (D.C.Cir.1996). But; cf. United States v. Espy, 145 F.3d 1369, 1370-72 (D.C.Cir.1998).

On appeal, the Government also challenged, for the first time, this Court's jurisdiction over Bazuaye's FTCA claim, relying on United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1511 (D.C.Cir.1990).3 The Bazuaye Court distinguished Price on the ground that Bazuaye's FTCA claim was not for return of the $11,000 but for damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful conversion of that sum.4 This case was remanded with the following instructions:

That is not to say that Bazuaye's damages claim is a cognizable one under the FTCA. We do not reach that question here. Rather we hold only that neither Price nor § 2680(c) precludes Bazuaye from pursuing his FTCA claim, and we remand this case to the district court so that he may make the attempt.

Bazuaye, 83 F.3d at 487.

This Court then set a briefing schedule, see Order of Sept. 25, 1996, and the United States later renewed its motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The June 1997 Opinion resolved that motion, leaving only the very narrow issue of whether Clark's seizure of the $11,000 was a conversion of Bazuaye's alleged right to possess those funds. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed and were denied in the March 1998 Opinion. However, after the Court reviewed the parties' respective pretrial statements, and reflected further on the merits, it appeared that judgment as a matter of law may have been warranted after all.5 The Government's renewed motion for judgment is pending and is granted herein.

DISCUSSION

Under the FTCA, the United States has agreed to be liable in tort "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). It has long been understood that the "law of the place" is the law of the State where the conduct occurred, and thus, as a matter of federal law, state law supplies the rule of decision in FTCA cases. Postal Inspector Clark obtained the $11,000 in Virginia, and it is that law that governs Bazuaye's FTCA claim for conversion.

This Court has previously explained:

Liability for conversion may arise where there is an unlawful interference with the right to immediate possession of property, including money. See Curaflex Health Serv. Inc. v. Bruni, 877 F.Supp. 30, 32 (D.D.C.1995); 7 SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 24:6 (1990). A claim for conversion is not defeated by non-ownership if the plaintiff has an immediate right to possession. See Curaflex, 877 F.Supp. at 32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 224A & cmt. b (1965); id. § 225 & cmts. b & d; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 15, at 103 (5th ed.1984); 7 SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra § 24:11. See generally Warren, Qualifying as Plaintiff in an Action for a Conversion, 49 HARV. L.REV. 1084 (1936). The normal measure of damages is "the full value [of what] he was entitled to ... at the time of the conversion," PROSSER & KEETON, supra § 15, at 105, and damages may include interest. See 7 SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra § 24:12.

June 1997 Op. at 15-16.

The Government has steadfastly maintained that no trial is necessary because once the administrative forfeiture became final, by operation of law, title to the $11,000 vested in the United States. The Court previously ruled that the final declaration of forfeiture served to cut off any right of possession Bazuaye may have had as of the date the forfeiture became final. This was because Bazuaye had failed to mitigate his damages by contesting the forfeiture. Cf. Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d 591, 599-600 (D.C.Cir.1982). The Court's ruling left open the question of whether Bazuaye had a right to possess the funds at the time of seizure. The Government contended then, and does so again, that, by...

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3 cases
  • Brown v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 21, 2015
    ...Brown lacks standing to challenge the forfeiture.The District finds support for the first prong of its argument in Bazuaye v. United States, 41 F.Supp.2d 19 (D.D.C.1999). There, the Postal Service seized $11,000 that an arrestee had on deposit with his bail bondsman. After the arrestee fail......
  • Dulaney v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
    • December 20, 2006
    ...rise to this case occurred in Missouri, the substantive law governing Plaintiffs' claims is Missouri law. See Bazuaye v. United States, 41 F.Supp.2d 19, 23 (D.D.C.1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)) ("Under the FTCA, the United States has agreed to be liable in tort `under circumstances ......
  • Dickerson v. United States, Case. No. 2:15-cv-0114-JMS-MJD
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • August 5, 2015
    ...he was incarcerated in U.S. Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. Further, Illinois law will govern this action. See Bazuaye v. United States, 41 F.Supp.2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)) ("Under the FTCA, the United States has agreed to be liable in tort 'under circumstances......

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