Bazzo v. Doe, 357178

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Parties: KATHERINE LYNN BAZZO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN DOE I, JOHN DOE II, JOHN DOE III, MOHAMMED WASEEM QURESHI, FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, PRIORITY HEALTH, PRIORITY HEALTH CHOICE, INC, PRIORITY HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, doing business as CHESAPEAKE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and SUREBRIDGE, MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY, Defendants, and GROULX AUTOMOTIVE, INC, Defendant-Appellee.
• Docket Number: 357178
• Decision Date: 02 June 2022

KATHERINE LYNN BAZZO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN DOE I, JOHN DOE II, JOHN DOE III, MOHAMMED WASEEM QURESHI, FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, PRIORITY HEALTH, PRIORITY HEALTH CHOICE, INC, PRIORITY HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, doing business as CHESAPEAKE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and SUREBRIDGE, MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY, Defendants,

and GROULX AUTOMOTIVE, INC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 357178

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 2, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Monroe Circuit Court LC No. 20-143143-NI

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Cameron and Patel, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Katherine Lynn Bazzo appeals as of right the trial court's April 27, 2021 order, which dismissed plaintiff's claim against defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's March 17, 2021 order, which granted summary disposition in favor of defendant Groulx Automotive, Inc. (Groulx), under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Groulx operates an automobile sales dealership in Monroe County. In 2018, Groulx obtained 60 dealer plates from the State of Michigan. The dealer plates were assigned to Groulx salespeople and other employees to utilize during the course of their employment. At all relevant times, Sam Liechti (Liechti) was a "salesman assistant" at Groulx.

In July or August of 2018, Liechti met Mohammad Waseen Qureshi (Qureshi) at a car show where Qureshi was showing his Dodge Viper. Liechti and Qureshi formed a "loose business relationship" because Qureshi was interested in purchasing a new motor vehicle from Groulx. In the months that followed, Qureshi test drove several vehicles. Before the vehicles were provided to Qureshi, either Liechti or another Groulx employee affixed a dealer plate to those vehicles. At some point, a dealer plate that belonged to Groulx was affixed to Qureshi's Viper.

On December 15, 2018, plaintiff was a passenger in the Viper, which was being driven by Qureshi. Qureshi lost control of the Viper, ran off the roadway, and struck a tree. Plaintiff was injured and underwent extensive medical treatment. One of Groulx's dealer plates was affixed to the Viper at the time of the accident.

Plaintiff filed suit against Qureshi, several unknown individuals, and several insurance companies, including Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan. The claims appeared in plaintiff's original complaint and first-amended complaint.^[1] After discovering that the dealer's plate that was on the Viper at the time of the accident belonged to Groulx, plaintiff moved to file a second-amended complaint. The motion was granted, and plaintiff filed claims against Groulx, alleging violations of MCL 257.256(1) and MCL 257.244(9) and (10) and violations of the Michigan Department of State Dealer Manual (the Dealer Manual).^[2] Plaintiff also alleged that Groulx was liable for common-law negligence.

Discovery commenced, and Liechti was deposed. Liechti denied that he had permitted Qureshi to keep a dealer plate, and he speculated that Qureshi had removed it during one of the test drives. Liechti indicated that he was not aware that Qureshi had kept the plate until after the second-amended complaint had been served.

Groulx moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Groulx argued that plaintiff could not establish that it had violated MCL 257.256(1) or MCL 257.244(9) and (10) and that the Dealer Manual did not have the force and effect of law. Finally, Groulx argued that it was entitled to summary disposition on the negligence claim because "Groulx neither owed nor breached any legal duty to Plaintiff with regard to Groulx's dealer's registration plate,

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and because as a matter of law no action by Groulx was the proximate cause of the subject accident."

Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that a material question of fact existed. To support this, plaintiff presented an affidavit that Qureshi executed on June 5, 2020. In the affidavit, Qureshi averred that "Groulx . . . allow[ed] [him] to use the Groulx Automotive Dealer Plate for [his] use on the car as [he] saw fit." Specifically, Qureshi averred that Liechti "knowingly allowed [him] to use the Groulx Automotive Dealer Plate on" the Viper. Qureshi denied that he stole the dealer plate from Groulx or that he had ever "received a demand or a request to return the dealer plate. . . ." Qureshi averred that he would not have driven the Viper without the dealer plate.

On March 17, 2021, the trial court granted Groulx's motion for summary disposition following oral argument. Plaintiff now challenges that decision.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW

A trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich.App. 222, 229; 964 N.W.2d 809 (2020).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), on the other hand, tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159-160; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019) (quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted).]

This Court "review[s] de novo a trial court's interpretation and application of a statute." City of Grand Rapids v Brookstone Capital, LLC, 334 Mich.App. 452, 457; 965 N.W.2d 232 (2020). "The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted." Mich Head & Spine Institute, PC v Mich. Assigned Claims Plan, 331 Mich.App. 262, 272; 951 N.W.2d 731 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The use of the word 'shall' denotes mandatory action." Wolfenbarger v Wright, 336 Mich.App. 1, 31; 969 N.W.2d 518 (2021).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. CLAIMS OF STATUTORY AND DEALER MANUAL VIOLATIONS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of Groulx on her statutory violation claims and her claim that Groulx violated provisions of the Dealer Manual. We disagree.

1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF MCL 257.256(1)

Plaintiff alleged that Groulx violated MCL 257.256(1), which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A person shall not lend to another person, or knowingly permit the use of, any certificate of title, registration certificate, registration plate, special plate, or permit issued to him or her if the person receiving or using the certificate of title, registration certificate, registration plate, special plate, or permit would not be entitled to the use thereof.

Therefore, MCL 257.256(1) prohibits a person who has been issued a special plate from lending or knowingly permitting the use of that special plate to another person who is not entitled to use it.

"[G]enerally speaking, a plaintiff cannot make a viable claim for money damages based strictly on violation of a statute unless the Legislature provides for a private statutory cause of action." Randall v Mich. High Sch Athletic Ass'n, 334 Mich.App. 697, 717; 965 N.W.2d 690 (2020). "[A] plaintiff has no private cause of action to enforce [a statutory] right unless (1) the statute expressly creates a private cause of action, or (2) a cause of action can be inferred from the fact that the statute provides no adequate means of enforcement of its provisions." Lane v Kindercare Learning Ctrs, 231 Mich.App. 689, 695-696; 588 N.W.2d 715 (1998). We conclude that MCL 257.256 does not expressly create a private statutory cause of action. Additionally, a cause of action cannot be...