Bd. of Com'rs of Huntington Cnty. v. Heaston

Citation144 Ind. 583,41 N.E. 457
PartiesBOARD OF COM'RS OF HUNTINGTON COUNTY v. HEASTON.
Decision Date10 October 1895
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Huntington county; J. W. Adair, Judge.

Action by the board of commissioners of Huntington county against Israel H. Heaston. A demurrer to the answer was overruled, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Elliott & Elliott and Milligan, Cook & Whitlock, for appellant. Kenner & Lesh, for appellee.

JORDAN, J.

This was an action against the appellee by the appellant, the board of commissioners of Huntington county, to recover of the former the sum of $7,221.90, alleged to have been allowed him as auditor of said county by its commissioners, in violation of the statutes. Upon a trial had there was a judgment rendered, in effect that the appellant take nothing by the action, and that appellee recover his cost, and to reverse this judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal. The complaint alleges substantially the following facts: That the appellee, Heaston, was elected and served as auditor of Huntington county from the 1st day of November, 1887, to November 1, 1891. That he was paid and received for said term as such officer all salary and compensation allowed by law. That during his term, notwithstanding the fact that he had been paid, and received from the county all of his salary and compensation allowed him by law, he, under the color of said office, illegally taxed up fees, and in violation of law demanded, extorted, and received payment of the same in his official capacity from the county; the said fees not being allowable under the statutes of the state. Here follows a particular itemized list of fees so taxed and received by appellee from the county, amounting in the aggregate to $7,221.90, for which judgment is demanded. This schedule, filed as an exhibit, and made a part of the complaint, shows, among other things, certain sums of money received by the appellee from the county arising out of fees taxed and charged by him in highway cases, gravel-road matters, and ditch proceedings before the board of commissioners, and for filing papers in his office, etc. A demurrer being overruled to the complaint, appellee then filed an answer in two paragraphs, the first of which was a denial. By the second paragraph he admitted that he had received the sums of money as charged in the complaint, but averred the facts that he presented the claims in an itemized and verified account as due and owing to him by the county to its board of commissioners while in legal session for the transaction of business, and that the said board allowed the same against the county, and by an order of record directed that the money be paid out of the county treasury, and that it was so paid to him upon a warrant drawn upon the treasurer thereof. He further alleged therein that the claims were allowed and the money paid to him in good faith, and that the orders of the board allowing the same were not appealed from, and are in full force and effect, and that the sums of money so allowed and paid to him are the identical ones and upon the same accounts described in the complaint, and for which a recovery is sought; and that said orders or judgments so made and entered by the board of commissioners were a full, final, and complete adjudication of all the matters alleged in the complaint between the same identical parties herein, and that plaintiff is thereby estopped from recovering anything in this action. A demurrer to this paragraph for insufficiency of facts as a defense to the action was overruled and excepted to, and the plaintiff was ruled to reply.

The action of the court in overruling the demurrer to this paragraph of the answer is the first error assigned and presented by the appellant, and is virtually treated as the chief question for the consideration of this court. The contentions of the learned attorneys for appellant are, in the main, that these allowances were made by the county commissioners in defiance of law; that the latter were guilty of a crime in so doing; that appellee received the county's money and converted the same to his own use without authority of law; and that the county is not bound by this unauthorized or forbidden act, nor precluded from recovering the money back from the appellee; and among their citations they refer to sections 2105, Rev. St. 1894 (section 2018, Rev. St. 1881), and sections 6543, 6544, 6548, 6549, Rev. St. 1894, the latter being sections2, 3, 7, and 8 of an act in force June 5, 1883 (Acts 1883, p. 48); also section 7853, Rev. St. 1894 (section 5766, Rev. St. 1881). They further insist that, conceding that the commissioners allowed the claims to appellee, as he alleges, however, in doing so, they acted in their administrative or ministerial capacity, and not as a court, and that the principle of res adjudicata does not apply, and the county is not estopped to inquire into the illegality of these allowances. They further contend that, conceding that they acted in the matter as a court, the claims allowed were forbidden by law, and hence there was an absence of jurisdiction; while upon the side of appellee his learned counsel contend that in allowing these claims in the manner and form as shown by this paragraph of the answer the board of commissioners of Huntington county acted as a court, and in passing upon, and allowing these claims in favor of appellee it exercised its judicial powers, and that it had jurisdiction in the premises, and that its judgments rendered under the alleged facts are valid, and a complete bar and estoppel against the county. They also insist that, the board having the power to judicially act and decide in the matter, its judgments, right or wrong, are binding upon the county, and cannot be collaterally called in question. The contentions and argument of appellee's counsel from their standpoint are to some extent supported by authorities cited, among which are decisions of this court. The manifest theory of the cause of defense as outlined by the facts alleged in this answer is that of res judicata. It is a confession of appellant's cause of action, but seeks to avoid it upon the ground that the claims mentioned in the complaint have been adjudicated between the parties in the commissioners' court, and that appellant is thereby estopped from contradicting in this action the verity and binding force of the alleged judgment rendered. The trial court, in overruling the demurrer to this answer, in effect adjudged that the facts therein averred were sufficient to constitute this defense.

Boards of commissioners, under the law, in the discharge of their duties have, at least, a dual character. In some respects they act judicially, and the law regards them as a court, and from their decision an appeal lies in this state, under section 5772, Rev. St. 1881 (section 7859, Rev. St. 1894), by a party aggrieved, to a higher court. In other respects they act in an administrative capacity, as the representative of the county. See section 197, Elliott's Gen. Prac., and cases there cited. When they rightfully exercise their powers as a court, it is settled by the authorities that they are to be treated as such, and their judgments rendered or orders made cannot be collaterally impeached, and the principles of former adjudication are applicable thereto. But if, upon the contrary, the commissioners of Huntington county did not, under the law, in allowing the claims of appellee, act as a court, but were simply in the discharge of administrative duties, and the orders so made can be said to be but quasi judicial, then, we think, it must follow as a legal consequence that the appellee cannot, by virtue of his defense alleged, shield himself from liability as against appellant's right to recover the money which he, as it is averred, has extorted and received in defiance of law.

The next inquiry is: In what character did the commissioners act, and what functions were they discharging, when they allowed the claims or demands of appellee, in controversy? By section 7815, Rev. St. 1894 (section 5731, Rev. St. 1881), the board of commissioners seems to be created, in the first place, for “transacting county business.” However, it is well settled that these boards have such other powers and duties, judicial and otherwise, as may be lodged in them by the legislature. Section 7830, Rev. St. 1894 (section 5745, Rev. St. 1881), prescribes their duties, among which are: (2) To allow all accounts chargeable against such county.” (4) To perform all other duties that may be enjoined on them by any law of this state.” It is true, as we have said, that under this last provision, in the discharge of duties enjoined upon them by statute, the commissioners, in many cases not necessary here to mention, act as a court, and their decisions are regarded as judgments, from which an appeal will lie under section 5772, Rev. St. 1881 (section 7859, Rev. St. 1894), which grants appeals generally to the circuit court. It is likewise true that, when administrative duties are enjoined upon these boards by law, from their action thereon no appeal can be taken, unless especially authorized by statute. Board v. Davis, 136 Ind. 503, 36 N. E. 141. The statutes relative to the collection or allowance of claims against a county have in later years undergone some changes, and such a construction has been placed upon this procedure by the courts of the state that indicate a holding to the effect that, at least as the law now stands, the commissioners, in hearing the claims of a creditor of the county, do not act in their judicial capacity. By an act of 1879 provisions were made for the filing and allowance of claims. The first section of that act, which is section 7845, Rev. St. 1894 (section 5758, Rev. St. 1881), provides: “That any person or corporation having a ‘legal claim’ against any county, shall file it with the auditor to be presented by him to the board.”...

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