Bd. of Com'Rs v. Rieth-Riley Const. Co.

Decision Date25 June 2007
Docket NumberNo. 32A05-0610-CV-585.,32A05-0610-CV-585.
PartiesHENDRICKS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Appellant, v. RIETH-RILEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Gregory E. Steuerwald, Steuerwald, Zielinski & Witham, Danville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Jan M. Carroll, Mark J. Crandley, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Respondent, The Board of Commissioners of The County of Hendricks, (the County Commissioners), appeals the trial court's Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, awarding partial summary judgment to Appellee-Petitioner, Rieth-Riley Construction Co. (Rieth-Riley). In its Order, the trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of Rieth-Riley whereby it held that the Hendricks County Zoning Ordinance is invalid and illegal, and issued a writ of mandate at Rieth-Riley's request, ordering the Area Plan Commission of Hendricks County to approve Rieth-Riley's Development Plan and Minor Subdivision Plat.1

We affirm.

ISSUES

The County Commissioners raise one issue on appeal which we restate as the following two issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in declaring the Hendricks County Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance) void and unenforceable because the Ordinance's development requirements conflict with the Local Planning and Zoning Enabling Act (Zoning Enabling Act); and

(2) Whether the County Commissioners have standing to appeal the trial court's writ of mandate, directing the Area Plan Commission of Hendricks County (Area Plan Commission) to approve Rieth-Riley's Development Plan and Minor Subdivision Plat.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rieth-Riley leases approximately thirteen acres of land in an unincorporated portion of Center Township, located in Danville, Hendricks County, Indiana on which it plans to build a hot-mix asphalt plant. The Ordinance classifies the real estate as major industrial. Other land surrounding Rieth-Riley's property is similarly classified and is actively put to an industrial use. Immediately to the north of the property is an active railroad line, and north of the railroad line is a concrete plant. To the east is a municipal airport, and to the west is a police shooting range. To the south is a landfill. There is no residential use in the immediate vicinity.

Sometime in 2005, Rieth-Riley submitted a detailed development plan (Development Plan) for the construction of the asphalt plant to the Area Plan Commission in accordance with Chapter 52 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance mandates the Area Plan Commission to review development plans for new construction involving permitted industrial uses and sets forth application requirements for the development plan that includes traffic and circulation plans. In conducting its review, the Area Plan Commission will evaluate a development plan's consistency with:

a. [] the intent and purpose of this Ordinance;

b. [w]hether the proposed development advances the general welfare of the community and the neighborhood; and

c. [w]hether the benefits, combination of various land uses, and the interrelationship with the land uses in the surrounding area justify the deviation from standard district regulations.

(Ordinance, Ch. 52.04(A)(3)).

The Area Plan Commission conducted public hearings on Rieth-Riley's Development Plan on May 12 and 31, 2005. At the initial hearing, the Area Plan Commission's Secretary informed the Area Plan Commission that in addition to its Development Plan, Rieth-Riley had submitted a Minor Subdivision Plat. The Area Plan Commission's Staff also submitted drafts of written findings for the Area Plan Commission's review of Rieth-Riley's Development Plan: positive findings, to be entered if the Development Plan were approved and negative findings, to be entered in case of rejection of the Development Plan.

At the conclusion of the May 31, 2005 hearing, the Area Plan Commission voted five members to one to adopt the Staff's draft negative findings. No action was taken concerning the Minor Subdivision Plat. The draft findings concluded that while Rieth-Riley's Development Plan "is not consistent with the adopted land use element of the Comprehensive Plan . . . [t]here is no reasonable expectation that the land use element's recommended residential land use will be found appropriate for the area given the historical industrial zoning and longstanding industrial character of the area." (Appellant's App. p. 262). Accordingly, the draft findings found that the Development Plan "can be considered consistent with the established zoning and compatible with existing and anticipated land use." (Appellant's App. p. 262). Nevertheless, the draft findings concluded that even though the Development Plan satisfies the requirements of the Ordinance, it "does not (A) promote the public heath, safety, welfare, comfort, and general welfare; and (B) conserve and protect property and property values." (Appellant's App. pp. 262-63).

Following the Area Plan Commission's vote at the May 31, 2005 hearing, the Secretary prepared the Findings of Fact/ Law, which were approved during the June 14, 2005 meeting. These Findings of Fact/Law concluded that while the traffic to be generated by the Rieth-Riley construction did "not represent[ ] a significant decrease in the level of service on affected roads," it still "constitutes an unreasonable threat to public safety, unnecessarily degrades the quality of life for residents, and negatively influences property values in the area." (Appellant's App. p. 293).

On July 12, 2005, Rieth-Riley filed its Amended Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandate, and Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Ind.Code §§ 36-7-4-1003 and 36-7-4-1016. In its Petition, Rieth-Riley raised a four-Count allegation, requesting in Count I that the trial court issue a Writ of Certiorari declaring the Area Plan Commission's decision to be illegal. In Count II, Rieth-Riley demanded a Writ of Mandate, directing the Area Plan Commission to approve its Development Plan and Minor Subdivision Plan. Count III sought declaratory relief to invalidate the Ordinance because it contained factors that are not allowed under the Zoning Enabling Act; while Count IV requested the trial court to void the Findings of Fact/Law. Thereafter, on May 22, 2006 and June 26, 2006 respectively, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On September 19, 2006, following a hearing, the trial court issued its Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment finding, in pertinent part:

[T]he [c]ourt now GRANTS in part and DENIES in part [Rieth-Riley's] motion for summary judgment and DENIES in part and GRANTS in part the cross motion filed by the [County Commissioners and the Area Plan Commission].

The [c]ourt therefore ORDERS that JUDGMENT be and hereby is entered in favor of Rieth-Riley and against the [County Commissioners and the Area Plan Commission] on Counts I, II, and III of [Rieth-Riley's] Complaint as follows:

A. Pursuant to Ind.Code § 36-7-4-1009, the [c]ourt REVERSES the [Area Plan Commission's] decision denying approval of Rieth-Riley's Development Plan and REMANDS the matter with directions to the [Area Plan Commission] to approve, as submitted, Rieth-Riley's Development Plan and the Minor Subdivision Plat;

B. Pursuant to Ind.Code § 34-27-1-1, the [c]ourt issues a Writ of Mandate ordering the [Area Plan Commission] to approve, as submitted, Rieth-Riley's Development Plan and Minor Subdivision Plat;

C. The [c]ourt enters a declaratory judgment that (a) the [ordinance] is invalid and illegal because Chapter 52.04(A)(3) purports to permit the [Area Plan Commission] to deny approval of development plans based on factors other than those specified in the [Zoning Enabling Act] or on development standards not specified with particularity in the Ordinance; and (b) the [Area Plan Commission] has no right, power or authority under the [Zoning Enabling Act] to deny approval of development plans based on factors other than those compliant with the comprehensive plan and development standards adopted in the Ordinance as authorized by the [Zoning Enabling Act].

The [c]ourt furthers ORDERS that JUDGMENT be and hereby is ENTERED in favor of the [County Commissioners] and the [Area Plan Commission] and against [Rieth-Riley] on Count IV of [Rieth-Riley's] Amended Complaint.

(Appellant's App pp. 13-14).

The County Commissioners now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The County Commissioners dispute the trial court's Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, contending in essence that (1) as the County Commissioners did not enact an Ordinance that exceeds the scope of review awarded under the Zoning Enabling Act and Home Rule Act, the trial court erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unenforceable; and (2) the County Commissioners have standing to appeal the trial court's Writ of Mandate, which directed the Area Plan Commission to approve Rieth-Riley's Development Plan and Minor Subdivision Plat.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or reverse summary judgment. AutoXchange.com, Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 47 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Thus, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has correctly applied the law. Id. In doing so, we consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this court that the trial court's ruling was improper. Id....

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