Bd. of Comm'rs of Wabash Cnty. v. Pearson

• Decision Date: 05 November 1891
• Citation: 28 N.E. 1120,129 Ind. 456
• Parties: Board of Commissioners of Wabash County v. Pearson.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

129 Ind. 456

28 N.E. 1120

Board of Commissioners of Wabash County

v.Pearson.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 5, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Huntington county; J. S. Dailey, Judge. Reversed.

Action for damages by Milo Pearson against the board of commissioners of Wabash county, Indiana. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Messrs. Sayre, Cowgill, Shively, and Pettit, for appellant. John L. Farrar, for appellee.

MILLER, J.

The appellee brought this action against the appellant to recover for personal injuries occasioned by the fall of one span of a bridge. The evidence shows that the accident happened on the 24th of January, 1884. One span of the bridge remained standing in the month of March, 1884. when it was examined by the board of commissioners of the county, and an order made for the building of an entirely new bridge. On the trial of this cause, the court, over the objection of the defendant, permitted the plaintiff to read in evidence the following record of the board referring to this bridge: “And now the board take a recess to visit the bridge at Rich Valley, and, on their return, are of the opinion that the south span of said bridge now standing is unsafe, and entirely too flimsy a structure on which to trust a heavy load, and they therefore conclude to build a new bridge entire,-two spans, of 137 1/2 feet each,-and do now award the contract for the same to the Wrought-Iron Bridge Co., of Canton, Ohio, for the sum of $6,200 cash, and the old bridge delivered to said company as it is.” We are satisfied that the admission of this evidence was error, for which the judgment will have to be reversed. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 23 N. E. Rep. 965, decided during the pendency of this appeal, it was held, after an extensive review of the authorities, that such evidence was not admissible. The reasons given for the exclusion of such evidence are various. One is that subsequent acts ought not to be given in evidence to show antecedent negligence; that it is that which occurs prior to the accident, and not that which has happened afterwards, that determines whether there has or not been a negligent discharge of duty. Another, and we think a better, reason is given in the following quotation from the opinion in Railroad Co. v. Clem, supra: “True policy and sound reason require that men should be encouraged to improve or repair, and not be deterred from it by the fear that if they do so their acts will be...