Bd. of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County v. City of Park City

• Decision Date: 09 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 100,157.,100,157.
• Citation: 293 Kan. 107,260 P.3d 387
• Parties: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, Kansas, Appellee,v.CITY OF PARK CITY, Kansas, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

293 Kan. 107

260 P.3d 387

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, Kansas, Appellee,

v.CITY OF PARK CITY, Kansas, Appellant.

No. 100,157.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Sept. 9, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The right to appeal is entirely statutory and not a right vested in the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution. Kansas appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only if the appeal is taken within the time limitations and in the manner prescribed by the applicable statutes.

2. If the record shows that an appellate court does not have jurisdiction, it is the duty of the appellate court to dismiss the appeal.

3. The appellant's argument that an appellate court may exercise jurisdiction over a late appeal if the appellant can show unique circumstances, i.e., that the appellant reasonably relied on some judicial action that purportedly extended the time period for bringing an appeal, is rejected. An appellate court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements and, therefore, the use of the unique circumstances doctrine to save an untimely appeal is illegitimate. Accordingly, Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 243 Kan. 291, 758 P.2d 206 (1988), and Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 750 P.2d 405 (1988), are overruled to the extent they authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.

Timothy J. Finnerty, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Ryan D. Weltz, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.Michael L. North, assistant county counselor, argued the cause, and Robert W. Parnacott, assistant county counselor, was on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by LUCKERT, J.:

This case involves the determination of whether the unique circumstances doctrine applies to save the untimely appeal filed by the City of Park City, Kansas (Park City). The effect of the doctrine's application would be to permit an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over a late appeal if the appellant reasonably relied on some judicial action—an action taking place before the deadline for filing a notice of appeal—which purportedly extended the time period for bringing an appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded the doctrine did not save the untimely appeal, and it dismissed the appeal. Park City filed a petition for review, which this court granted.

The appeal brings into question the continued viability of the unique circumstances doctrine in situations where it is used to extend a jurisdictional deadline. This question arises because the United States Supreme Court, in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007), rejected the continued use of its own unique circumstances doctrine when applied to jurisdictional deadlines. Following the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, we conclude the doctrine cannot be used to extend a statutory deadline that is jurisdictional.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is from an August 15, 2007, order granting summary judgment to the Board of Sedgwick County Commissioners (Board) regarding its challenge to the annexation of certain land by Park City. Five days after the district court filed its journal entry, Park City requested an extension of time to file a postjudgment motion under two avenues of relief—K.S.A. 60–259(f) (motion to alter or amend judgment) and K.S.A. 60–260(b) (relief from judgment). The district court granted Park City's motion and extended the deadline to August 31, 2007.

On August 30, 2007, Park City asked the district court for another extension. The court granted the motion and set September 4, 2007, as the new deadline. On that date, Park City returned to the district court and once again requested additional time in which to file its postjudgment motion. The district court permitted Park City to have one additional day for filing. All three motions for extension of time were approved by counsel for both parties.

Park City filed its motion for postjudgment relief on September 5, 2007. In its motion, Park City invoked both K.S.A. 60–259(f) and K.S.A. 60–260(b). However, Park City has not continued to pursue relief under both provisions. Rather, in its petition for review Park City stated that “an appeal based on K.S.A. 60–260[b], is not a subject of this petition.” Hence, Park City has abandoned all issues related to K.S.A. 60–260(b). See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(a)(5)(c) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 69) (“Issues not presented in the petition, or fairly included therein, will not be considered by the court.”). Consequently, we will not discuss the parties' arguments or any court rulings relating to that provision.

As to the alternative argument, the Board argued to the district court that Park City's K.S.A. 60–259(f) request for relief was untimely filed because, under the version in effect at that time, such a motion had to be filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment and K.S.A. 60–206(b) prohibited the district court from extending this time period. In reply, Park City argued that the doctrine of unique circumstances should apply in this case and that the deadline extensions should be honored in light of Park City's “good faith and reasonable reliance” on the district court's grants of extension.

After conducting hearings on Park City's postjudgment motion, the district court denied the motion, as memorialized in two written orders, which were filed on February 1, 2008, and February 26, 2008, respectively. With regard to Park City's request to alter or amend the judgment under K.S.A. 60–259(f), the district court observed that a motion under K.S.A. 60–259(f) must be filed within 10 days after entry of judgment, and K.S.A. 60–206(b) (regarding enlargement of time) specifically prohibits a district court from extending this time period. The district court concluded “[t]here is no clear authority from a Kansas Appellate Court to allow this Court to ignore and find exception to the language of K.S.A. 60–206(b). To apply the ‘unique circumstances doctrine’ in this matter is beyond the authority of the District Court.” Thus, despite having granted the extensions of time, the district court denied Park City's K.S.A. 60–259(f) motion as untimely.

At that point, the 30–day time limitation for filing a notice of appeal had expired. See K.S.A. 60–2103(a). Nevertheless, Park City filed a notice of appeal and docketing statement, appealing the summary judgment ruling.

Court of Appeals' Decision

After issuing a series of show cause orders aimed at determining if there was appellate jurisdiction and considering responses and motions filed by the parties, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in which it dismissed the appeal in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's decision in part. See Board of Sedgwick County Commr's v. City of Park City, 41 Kan.App.2d 646, 204 P.3d 648 (2009). As the ruling pertains to Park City's arguments under K.S.A. 60–259(f), the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In doing so, the Court of Appeals discussed the applicable time limitations, summarized the chronology of procedural events, and concluded it lacked “jurisdiction over Park City's appeal of the underlying case because it was filed more than 30 days after the trial court's entry of judgment, which is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived or forfeited.” Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 41 Kan.App.2d at 650, 204 P.3d 648.

The Court of Appeals then considered Park City's argument that the Court of Appeals should apply the unique circumstances doctrine and find that it had jurisdiction to determine the merits of the summary judgment order. The Court of Appeals discussed the history of the unique circumstances doctrine and its subsequent “erosion” that culminated in Bowles, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96. The Court of Appeals also questioned the precedential value of two lead Kansas cases applying the unique circumstances doctrine, Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 243 Kan. 291, 758 P.2d 206 (1988), and Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 750 P.2d 405 (1988), because of their reliance on federal case law which has since been overruled. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 41 Kan.App.2d at 654–58, 204 P.3d 648.

However, the Court of Appeals questioned whether this court would reject application of the unique circumstances doctrine in light of this court's decision in Finley v. Estate of DeGrazio, 285 Kan. 202, 170 P.3d 407 (2007), where this court discussed Bowles briefly but still analyzed whether the doctrine applied to the facts of the case. This led the Court of Appeals to apply the doctrine as stated in Finley. The Court of Appeals concluded the doctrine did not apply to these facts where “a careful reading of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 60–206(b) would have given Park City notice that the trial court lacked authority to grant an extension of time to file a K.S.A. 60–259(f) motion.” Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 41 Kan.App.2d at 659, 204 P.3d 648.

Park City petitioned this court for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Park City contends that the unique circumstances doctrine should apply to save the appeal. This court granted Park City's petition for review, and our jurisdiction arises under K.S.A. 20–3018(b).

Analysis

It is this court's longstanding rule that “ ‘the right to appeal is entirely statutory and not a right vested in the United States or Kansas Constitutions; Kansas appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only if the appeal is taken within the time limitations and in the manner prescribed by the applicable statutes.’ ” Jones v. Continental Can Co., 260 Kan. 547, 550, 920 P.2d 939 (1996) (quoting Little Balkans Foundation, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 247 Kan. 180, 188, 795 P.2d 368 [1990] ); see Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476,...