Bd. of Dirs. v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., D.C. Civil App. No. 2005-180.

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of the Virgin Islands
• Citation: 52 V.I. 611
• Docket Number: D.C. Civil App. No. 2005-180.
• Parties: BOARD OF DIRECTORS, BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE HILLTOP VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members; Board of Directors, Bluebeard's Castle Villas I Condominium Association, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members; and Board of Directors, Bluebeard's Castle Villas III Condominium Association, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members v. FAIRFIELD RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; Equivest Finance, Inc., a Connecticut corporation; Equivest St. Thomas, Inc., f/k/a Bluebeard's Castle, Inc., a Virgin Islands corporation; RCI Resort Management, Inc., an Indiana corporation; Equivest Capital Inc., f/k/a Resort Funding, Inc., a Delaware corporation; John S. Cavanaugh; William F. Reighley; and Bluebeard's Castle Pirates' Pension Condominium Association, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members as interested party only. Peter Hernandez, John Johnson and Scott Nassar, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 24 July 2009

52 V.I. 611

BOARD OF DIRECTORS, BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE HILLTOP VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members; Board of Directors, Bluebeard's Castle Villas I Condominium Association, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members; and Board of Directors, Bluebeard's Castle Villas III Condominium Association, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members
v.
FAIRFIELD RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; Equivest Finance, Inc., a Connecticut corporation; Equivest St. Thomas, Inc., f/k/a Bluebeard's Castle, Inc., a Virgin Islands corporation; RCI Resort Management, Inc., an Indiana corporation; Equivest Capital Inc., f/k/a Resort Funding, Inc., a Delaware corporation; John S. Cavanaugh; William F. Reighley; and Bluebeard's Castle Pirates' Pension Condominium Association, an unincorporated association, in its own behalf and on behalf of its members as interested party only.
Peter Hernandez, John Johnson and Scott Nassar, Appellants.

D.C. Civil App. No. 2005-180.

District Court of the Virgin Islands,
Division of St. Thomas and St. John,
Appellate Division.

July 24, 2009.

Joel H. Holt, Esq., St. Thomas, USVI, for the Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
GÓMEZ, Chief Judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands; FINCH, Judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands; and DONOHUE, Judge of the Superior Court, Division of St. Croix, sitting by designation.

Three members of a housing condominium's board of directors appeal an order, entered by the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands on June 6, 2005, prohibiting them from participating in litigation decisions in an action involving the housing condominium. For the reasons given below, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal arises out of an action (the “Underlying Action”) commenced in November, 2004, by three of four condominium associations (the “Plaintiffs”) that together comprise a development known as Bluebeard's Castle Resort on St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands.¹ The Defendants in the Underlying Action are several corporate entities and individuals involved in the development of the Plaintiffs' condominiums.

Before the Underlying Action was commenced, Peter Hernandez, John Johnson and Scott Nassar (the “Appellants”) were elected to the board of directors of one of the Plaintiff associations, the Bluebeard's Castle Villas III Condominium Association (“Villas III” or the “Appellee”). The Villas III board of directors had approved bringing the Underlying Action before the election of the Appellants.

Over the course of the Underlying Action, a dispute arose among the members of the Appellee's board of directors with respect to the selection of legal counsel. On April 5, 2005, the Superior Court held a hearing on the matter. On June 6, 2005, the Superior Court issued an order (the “Order”) preventing the Appellants from participating in litigation decisions in the Underlying Action. The Appellants now appeal the Order. The Underlying Action is proceeding in the Superior Court notwithstanding this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders in civil cases. See VI. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33 (1997). The requirement of finality, also known as the final judgment rule, means that “ ‘a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.’ ” Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424, 429-30, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1985) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981)). The Supreme Court has explained that “the final judgment rule serves several salutary purposes”:

It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of avoiding the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. The rule also serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration.

Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203-04, 119 S. Ct. 1915, 144 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1999) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374). Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has held that a decision is not final unless it “ ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521-22, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 100 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945)).

The Order in this matter does no more than prevent three individuals from participating in litigation decisions in the Underlying Action. As such, it is not a final order on the merits that would ordinarily allow for direct appeal in this...