Bd. of Educ. of Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 186 v. Attorney Gen. of Ill.

• Decision Date: 15 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 4–14–0941.,4–14–0941.
• Citation: 44 N.E.3d 1245
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 186, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. The ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellant, and Molly Beck, Defendant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

44 N.E.3d 1245

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 186, Plaintiff–Appellee

v. The ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Defendant–AppellantandMolly Beck, Defendant.

No. 4–14–0941.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Dec. 15, 2015.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.

Lorilea Buerkett (argued), of Brown, Hay & Stephens, LLP, Springfield, for appellee.

Roger Huebner, of Illinois Municipal League, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

James A. Petrungaro, of Scariano, Himes & Petrarca, Chtrd., Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois Association of School Boards et al.

OPINION

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 During a March 2013 public meeting, plaintiff, the Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 (Board), voted to terminate the employment of its superintendant, Dr. Walter Milton, Jr. In May 2013 and April 2014, defendant, the Attorney General of Illinois (AG)—acting on allegations raised by defendant, Molly Beck—issued two binding opinions in which the AG ultimately concluded that the Board failed to comply with the Open Meetings Act (Act) (5 ILCS 120/1 to 7.5 (West 2012)) when it terminated Milton's employment.

¶ 2 In June 2013, the Board sought administrative review of the AG's conclusions that the Board (1) terminated Milton's employment by impermissibly taking final action during a closed Board session and (2) failed to adequately inform the public of Milton's proposed termination prior to a subsequent public meeting. In November 2013 and September 2014, respectively, the trial court reversed both of the AG's conclusions, finding that the Board's termination action complied with the Act.

¶ 3 The AG appeals, arguing that she properly concluded that the Board failed to comply with the Act. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In November 2012, Milton sent a letter to the Board inquiring about terminating his employment contract. Thereafter, the Board and Milton reached an agreement on the terms of his contractual release. On January 31, 2013, Milton signed and dated a 19–page “Separation Agreement and Release” (Agreement). The Agreement set forth, among other matters, compensation, health-care coverage, and the parties' respective obligations with regard to Milton's scheduled March 31, 2013, resignation.

¶ 6 During a portion of the February 4, 2013, meeting that was not open to the public, six of the Board's seven members signed the Agreement but did not date their signatures. On March 1, 2013, the Board published an agenda and the entire Agreement on the “Springfield Public Schools Electronic School Board” website. This posting was four days prior to the scheduled March 5, 2013, public meeting. See Springfield Public Schools, Agenda Public (Mar. 5, 2013), http://esbpublic.springfield.k12.il.us/ (posting the agenda and the entire Agreement—which included the aforementioned signatures—on the Board's website calendar).

¶ 7 The agenda for the March 5, 2013, public meeting listed numerous items that the Board was scheduled to consider. The first item under the heading, “Roll Call Action Items,” was item 9.1, entitled, “Approval of a Resolution regarding the * * * Agreement * * * Between Superintendant * * * Milton * * * and the Board.” At the March 2013 public meeting, the Board's president introduced that agenda item, as follows:

“I have item 9.1, approval of a resolution regarding the * * * Agreement. The Board president recommends that the Board * * * vote to approve the * * * Agreement between * * * Milton * * * and the Board.”

Thereafter, the Board (1) approved the Agreement by a six-to-one vote and (2) added the date March 5, 2013, to the signatures of the six approving board members.

¶ 8 In June 2013, Beck, acting on behalf of the local newspaper, the State Journal Register, sent an e-mail message to the AG's public access counselor (PAC), alleging that the Board violated the Act. Specifically, Beck asserted, as follows:

“On [January] 31, 2013, members of the * * * Board * * * signed a separation agreement * * * with the district's superintendant, * * * Milton. The Board signed this agreement, which includes terms of compensation, without taking a public vote beforehand. * * * [A] signed agreement is an approved agreement, and signing the agreement before voting publically violates the * * * Act, prompting this request for review.”

(Contrary to Beck's assertion and as previously noted, Milton signed the Agreement on January 31, 2013, and six of seven board members signed the Agreement on February 4, 2013, which the Board later postdated March 5, 2013.)

¶ 9 Following an investigation, the AG issued a binding opinion in May 2013, concluding, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(8) * * * The signing of the * * * Agreement by six of the Board's seven members during the February 4, 2013, closed session * * * did constitute the taking of a final action in violation of section 2(e) of [the Act (5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2012)) ].

(9) Assuming arguendo, that the Board could have effectively ratified its improper final action by voting on the separation agreement at a properly noticed open meeting, the Board would nonetheless have violated section 2(e) of [the Act] by voting to approve the * * * Agreement at its March 5, 2013, meeting because it failed to adequately inform the public of the nature of the matter under consideration or the business being conducted.”

¶ 10 In June 2013, the Board filed a complaint for administrative review under section 7.5 of the Act (5 ILCS 120/7.5 (West 2012) ), challenging the AG's aforementioned conclusions. Following a hearing on the Board's complaint, the circuit court entered an order in November 2013, finding that the AG erred by concluding that the Board took “final action” when six board members signed the Agreement during a February 4, 2013, closed session. The court determined, instead, that the Board's final action occurred on March 5, 2013, when the board members voted to approve the Agreement during the public meeting. The court declined to reach the merits of the AG's conclusion regarding the inadequacy of the Board's efforts to inform the public of the Agreement prior to that public meeting, opting, instead, to remand the matter so that the Board could respond to that claim.

¶ 11 In April 2014—after the parties complied with the circuit court's order—the AG issued a second binding opinion, concluding, in pertinent part, as follows:

“The [AG] finds that the Board violated section 2(e) of [the Act] by voting to approve the * * * Agreement during its March 5, 2013, meeting without adequately informing the public of the business being conducted. The [AG] concludes that the Board's posting of the * * * Agreement on its website did not constitute a public recital during an open meeting within the scope of section 2(e) of [the Act]. Further, the few comments made during the discussion leading to the vote were insufficient to provide the public with information from which it might comprehend the purpose and effect of the Board's action.”

¶ 12 After the AG issued its second binding opinion, the matter returned to the circuit court. In September 2014, the court entered an order reversing the AG's second binding opinion, reasoning, in part, as follows:

“The [AG's] opinion significantly expands the requirements of the * * * Act, changing the requirement of public notice from advising of the nature of the final action to be taken to a requirement that the public body explain the significance of the final action to be taken. There is no authority which would support such an expansion of the requirements of section 2(e) of the * * * Act.”

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 A. The Applicable Portions of the Statute at Issue

¶ 16 Section 1 of the Act provides, as follows:

“Policy. It is the public policy of this State that public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business and that the people have a right to be informed as to the conduct of their business. In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and declares that it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.

The General Assembly further declares it to be the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.” 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2012).

¶ 17 Section 2(c) of the Act delineates numerous exceptions that permit closed sessions under narrowly construed circumstances. See 5 ILCS 120/2(c) (West 2012). Specifically, section 2(c)(1) of the Act provides the following exception:

“(c) Exceptions. A public body may hold closed meetings to consider the following subjects:

(1) The appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, or dismissal of specific employees of the public body * * *.” 5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1) (West 2012).

¶ 18 Section 2(e) of the Act provides, as follows:

“Final Action. No final action may be taken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.” 5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2012).

¶ 19 B. The Appropriate Standard of Review

¶ 20 Judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 to 3–113 (West 2012)) “requires this court to review all questions of law and fact presented by the record in relation to the administrative agency's decision and not the decision of the * * * circuit court.” Senno v. Department of Healthcare & Family Services, 2015 IL App (1st) 132837, ¶ 33, 398 Ill.Dec. 711, 44 N.E.3d 1123. The applicable standard of review depends on whether the...