Bd. of Educ. of Plainfield v. Local R1-126

Decision Date27 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 28804.,28804.
Citation108 Conn.App. 35,947 A.2d 371
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesBOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF PLAINFIELD v. LOCAL R1-126, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.

BEACH, J.

The plaintiff, the board of education of the town of Plainfield (board), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendant, Local R1-126, National Association of Government Employees (union). The board claims that the court improperly denied its application to vacate the arbitration award because the arbitrators had exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that (1) a mutual, definite and final award on the subject matter was not made and (2) an award was issued that modified the provisions of the agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.1

The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our discussion. The union is the exclusive bargaining representative of the custodial and maintenance employees of the board. The board and the union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the period from July 1, 2005, to June 30, 2008. Article XXI, paragraphs five and six, of that agreement provide: "Absences of up to four (4) weeks, to the extent the Board elects to fill in for the absent employee, will be offered to full time bargaining unit members on an overtime basis. If, after four (4) weeks, the employer decides to hire a new bargaining unit employee, once the individual on the extended absence returns to work, the individual hired as a fill-in will be the junior employee for purposes of promotion or layoff. Nothing herein shall prevent the Board from assigning a part time employee to do work at a location that has an absent full time employee."

In August, 2004, the board's director of buildings and grounds issued a directive to lead custodians to use part-time employees to cover the shifts of absent full-time employees. Following the directive, open shifts of absent full-time employees Following the directive, open shifts of absent full-time employees were assigned to part-time employees on a straight time basis. The union filed a grievance on October 13, 2004, alleging a violation of article XXI of the collective bargaining agreement. After initial steps in the grievance procedure provided for in the agreement were unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, the union requested arbitration. The arbitrators framed the following issue for arbitration: "Did [the board] violate [a]rticle XXI of the collective bargaining agreement when it assigned part-time employees to perform work at schools which would have been performed by absent full-time employees without first offering that work on an overtime basis to full-time employees? If so, what shall the remedy be?"

A hearing was held on August 31, 2006. On December 28, 2006, the arbitrators issued an award finding that the board had violated article XXI. As a remedy, the award provided that "[t]he [b]oard ... shall apply the language of [a]rticle XXI pertinent to filling positions on an overtime basis to determine the [moneys] to be given bargaining unit members who were wrongfully denied the right to fill the absences of full-time employees up to a term of four (4) weeks. The period of time for the purpose of damages shall be from the filing of the grievance until a successor contract to the July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2005 contract was signed by the parties. The [moneys] shall be paid by the [b]oard in each instance of wrongful absentee coverage by part-time employees for four (4) hours at the applicable rates ... as the part-time employees only filled in for four (4) hours for the absent full-time employees."

The board filed in Superior Court an application to vacate the award dated January 26, 2007, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418.2 The board alleged that the award both impermissibly modified the agreement and was executed imperfectly such that it was not mutual, final and definite. The court held a hearing on March 26, 2007, at which the board called Mary Conway, superintendent of the Plainfield school district, as a witness. On April 25, 2007, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the board's application. The court stated that the board has claimed that it does "not have the information necessary to implement the award.... If this information is indeed unavailable, and the superintendent so testified at the hearing, then there may be future disputes about the payments due. This is a far different matter from an arbitration which orders future negotiation. This arbitration award is final." (Citation omitted.) This appeal followed.

Before reaching the claims on appeal, we acknowledge that "the policy behind arbitration compels a deferential standard of review of arbitration awards. [T]he law in this state takes a strongly affirmative view of consensual arbitration.... Arbitration is a favored method to prevent litigation, promote tranquility and expedite the equitable settlement of disputes.... As a consequence of our approval of arbitral proceedings, our courts generally have deferred to the award that the arbitrator found to be appropriate.... The scope of review for arbitration awards is exceedingly narrow.... Additionally, every reasonable inference is to be made in favor of the arbitral award and of the arbitrator's decisions. ....

"Despite the wide berth given to arbitrators and their powers of dispute resolution, courts recognize three grounds for vacating arbitration awards.... As a routine matter, courts review de novo the question of whether any of those exceptions apply to a given award.... The first ground for vacating an award is when the arbitrator has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute.... The second acknowledged ground is when the award violates clear public policy.... Those grounds for vacatur are denominated as common-law grounds and are deemed to be independent sources of the power of judicial review.... The third recognized ground for vacating an arbitration award is that the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of ... § 52-418." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 361 v. New Milford, 81 Conn.App. 726, 729-30, 841 A.2d 706 (2004).

In this case, the board applied to vacate the award pursuant to § 52-418(a), which provides in relevant part that "[u]pon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court ... shall make an order vacating the award ... (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made." General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4).

"Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that ... the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted,3 will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved.... In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact.... Furthermore, in applying this general rule of deference to an arbitrator's award, [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the [arbitral] award and of the arbitrators' acts and proceedings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brantley v. New Haven, 100 Conn.App. 853, 864-65, 920 A.2d 331 (2007); see Rocky Hill Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Education, 72 Conn. App. 274, 278, 804 A.2d 999, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 272 (2002).

I

The board first claims that the court improperly denied its application to vacate the award because the award was not final and definite. Specifically, the board contends that the award is indefinite because the board does not have the information and records necessary to implement it, thereby rendering "the calculation of the award open to negotiation" and, further, that the time period for the purposes of damages stated in the award cannot be ascertained.4 We disagree.

"In assessing whether an arbitrator has exceeded his or her powers the basic test has become the comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the award conforms to the submission... . Conformity with § 52-418 also requires that the award meet the minimum requirements of being mutual, final and definite. [A]n award must be final as to the matters submitted so that the rights and obligations of the parties may be definitely fixed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocky Hill Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Education, supra, 72 Conn.App. at 280, 804 A.2d 999.

In support of its claim that the award is indefinite, the board cites State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565, 49 Conn. App. 33, 713 A.2d 869 (1998), aff'd, 249 Conn. 474, 732 A.2d 762 (1999), and Rocky Hill Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Education, supra, 72 Conn.App. at 274, 804 A.2d 999, which hold that when future negotiations are required by an arbitration award, that award is indefinite and fails to conform to the requirements of § 52-418. In AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565, the aggrieved party was a correction officer who wrongly had been dismissed from her job. The arbitration award ordered the grievant to be reinstated at either the Niantic correctional facility or at an alternate...

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