Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's County v. Marks–sloan

• Decision Date: 28 October 2011
• Docket Number: 2010.,Sept. Term,No. 1447,1447
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTYv.Stephanie Lynn MARKS–SLOAN.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

202 Md.App. 59

30 A.3d 1026

273 Ed. Law Rep. 867

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY

v.Stephanie Lynn MARKS–SLOAN.

No. 1447

Sept. Term

2010.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 28, 2011.

Abbey G. Hairston & Sarah M. Burton (Thatcher Law Firm, LLC, on the brief), Greenbelt, MD, for Appellant.Michael J. Winkelman (McCarthy, Winkelman & Morrow, LLP, on the brief), Bowie, MD, for Appellee.Panel: JAMES R. EYLER, GRAEFF and LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.EYLER, JAMES R., J.

The question before us is one of statutory interpretation. We must determine the nature and extent of the protection from tort liability enjoyed by employees of County Boards of Education, pursuant to Maryland Code (2006 Repl. Vol.) § 5–518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). We conclude that the statute does not provide employees with immunity from suit but rather provides that county boards must protect an employee from execution on a judgment against the employee. We shall affirm the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 26, 2007, appellant Norman Iglehart, an employee of appellant Board of Education of Prince George's County (the “Board”), was driving a school bus owned by the Board, near a parking lot for school buses located at the intersection of Cherry Lane and Belle Ami Drive in Prince George's County. Mr. Iglehart's bus forced a motorcycle driven by appellee Stephanie Lynn Marks–Sloan (“Marks–Sloan”), a fellow Board employee, off the road. Ms. Marks–Sloan sustained injuries as a result of the accident.

After the accident, Ms. Marks–Sloan sought compensation from the Maryland Worker's Compensation Commission (the “Commission”). On February 25, 2008, the Commission found that Ms. Marks–Sloan sustained an accidental injury arising out of and during the course of her employment by the Board. The Commission awarded her medical expenses, temporary total disability, and attorneys' fees.

On October 31, 2008, Ms. Marks–Sloan filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Mr. Iglehart, the Board and Prince George's County (the “County”), alleging that she was injured as a result of Mr. Iglehart's negligent driving and that the Board and the County were vicariously liable for Mr. Iglehart's alleged negligence. Subsequently, Ms. Marks–Sloan and the County filed a stipulation, dismissing with prejudice Ms. Marks–Sloan's claim against the County, leaving Mr. Iglehart and the Board as the remaining defendants.

On April 3, 2009, Mr. Iglehart and the Board filed a “Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Grant Summary Judgment.” In support of their motion, appellants argued that the worker's compensation award was Ms. Marks–Sloan's sole remedy against the Board and that Mr. Iglehart, as a Board employee, possessed statutory immunity from a suit based on simple negligence arising during the scope of his employment. On April 27, 2009, the circuit court denied the motion as to Mr. Iglehart and granted the motion as to the Board. Nevertheless, the court required the Board to remain a party to the litigation for the “purposes of any potential indemnification.”

After discovery and a series of motions and other pleadings relating to whether appellees's suit against the Board was barred by the workers' compensation act and whether Mr. Iglehart was immune from suit, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement. The parties agreed that Mr. Iglehart negligently caused the motor vehicle accident, and that a verdict would exceed $100,000. They also agreed that the court could enter judgment, without prejudice to appellants' right to appeal and raise the legal issues asserted in prior motions.

The circuit court entered its final order on June 17, 2010, which provided in pertinent part that it be:

ORDERED, that Judgment be entered on behalf of the Plaintiff Stephanie [Marks–]Sloan in the amount of $100,000, against the Board of Education for Prince George's County and Norman Iglehart pursuant to the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5–518 (2010);

AGREED between the parties that the employee, Norman Iglehart, is dismissed from this action.

* * *

AGREED between the parties that [appellants] have not waived their rights to pursue any post judgment Motions permitted by the Rules and have not further waived their rights to file a timely appeal on the legal merits of [appellee's] Complaint in this matter.

Appellants then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, on the basis that judgment was entered improperly against Mr. Iglehart, which the court denied. ¹

On appeal, appellants contend that the circuit court erred in not granting summary judgment in their favor because Mr. Iglehart enjoys statutory immunity from suit and the Board is not liable because workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy.

Standard of Review

“Where an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, [we] must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md.App. 65, 85, 988 A.2d 1 (2010). Here, our analysis hinges on the circuit court's interpretation and application of CJ § 5–518, and we review the decision below de novo.

Discussion

The parties agree that (1) if the Board is liable, as a self insurer, it may raise the defense of sovereign immunity to any amount claimed above $100,000. CJ § 5–518(b) and (c); (2) generally, tort suits against employers for compensable accidental injuries sustained during and in the course of employment are barred, see Maryland Code (2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9–509(a) of the Labor and Employment Article (workers' compensation act) (LE); (3) generally, an employee with a compensable workers' compensation claim can bring a tort action against a non-supervisory co-employee, see Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983); and (4) Maryland law permits an employer liable for workers' compensation benefits to contractually indemnify its employee for tort damages rendered against the employee. See Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'g Co., 230 Md. 584, 590, 187 A.2d 864 (1963) (“Since 1948, ... employers in Maryland have been entitled to rely on the assumption that they would not be liable for or on account of an injury to an employee, beyond payment of compensation, unless they expressly waived immunity by agreeing to assume an obligation for contribution or indemnity.”).

The issues on this appeal turn on the interpretation of the relevant sections of CJ § 5–518.² CJ § 5–518(d) provides, in pertinent part:

(d) Parties in tort claims; separate litigation of issues.

(1) The county board shall be joined as a party to an action against a county board employee, ... that alleges damages resulting from a tortious act or omission committed by the employee in the scope of employment....

(2) The issue of whether the county board employee acted within the scope of employment may be litigated separately.

* * *

CJ § 518(e) provides:

A county board employee acting within the scope of employment, without malice and gross negligence, is not personally liable for damages resulting from a tortious act or omission for which a limitation of liability is provided for the county board under subsection (b) of this section, including damages that exceed the limitation on the county board's liability.

CJ § 5–518(h) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (e), ... of this section, a judgment in tort for damages against a county board employee acting within the scope of employment, ... shall be levied against the county board only and may not be executed against the county board employee....

Here it is undisputed that Mr. Iglehart was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and it is not alleged that his action rose to the level of malice or gross negligence. As a result, it is undisputed that Mr. Iglehart is “not personally liable for damages,” as provided by CJ § 5–518(e). The parties disagree as to the nature of this protection from liability.

Appellants read CJ § 5–518(e) expansively to provide complete immunity from suit and judgment in tort to employees like Mr. Iglehart, and accordingly, they maintain that the tort action against him should have been dismissed with prejudice. The Board asserts that, because Mr. Iglehart was immune from suit and judgment, there is no co-employee liability for it to satisfy, and workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy. Appellee reads CJ § 5–518(e), together with other language in the statute, as providing that employees of county boards of education are immune only from the ultimate financial consequences of their torts and, accordingly, are to be indemnified by their employers for tort damages. We agree with appellee's interpretation of the statute.

There is no Maryland appellate court decision interpreting this aspect of the statute in question. In determining whether there are other statutes governing liability and immunity that may be relevant, we have found only the Local Government Tort Claims Act, CJ § 5–301, et seq. and the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code (2009 Repl. Vol.), § 12–101, et seq. of the State Government Article (SG), and related provisions, CJ § 5–522(b).

Under the Local Government Claims Act, CJ § 5–303(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

[A] local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with the local government.

CJ § 5–302(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

[A] person may not execute against an employee [of a local government] on a judgment rendered for tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with a local government.

Together, these provisions make clear that in a tort action against a local government employee, a plaintiff may bring...