Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Flemington v. State Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1911
• Citation: 81 N.J.L. 211,81 A. 163
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BOROUGH OF FLEMINGTON v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

81 A. 163

81 N.J.L. 211

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BOROUGH OF FLEMINGTON

v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 6, 1911.

Certiorari, on the application of the Board of Education of the Borough of Flemington, to the State Board of Education and others.Judgment of the State Board of Education set aside.

Argued February term, 1911, before SWAYZE, BERGEN, and MINTURN, JJ.

George H. Large, for prosecutor.Dungan & Reger, for Board of Education of Raritan Tp.William C. Gebhardt, for Glazer.

SWAYZE, J.On April 7, 1910, the board of education of the township of Raritan and Marcus L. Glazer entered into a written contract, by which the board employed Glazer "to teach in the Flemington public school No. 1, under the control of said board of Education, for the term of one year from July 1, 1910," and Glazer accepted the employment, and undertook to faithfully perform his duty thereunder, and to observe and enforce the rules prescribed for the government of the school by the board of education.The contract was made in pursuance of a resolution of the board of education adopted on April 4th.At that time a bill was pending in the Legislature and about to pass, which became a law April 7th, by which a portion of the township of Raritan was incorporated as the borough of Flemington, subject to the acceptance of the act by a vote of a majority of the legal voters of the territory to be included within the borough.The act was accepted at a special election on April 26th, and the certificate of the result of the election filed according to law on May 2d.By this action the borough of Flemington became a separate school district, under section 32 of the school law.Immediately thereafter, on May 5th, the board of education of Flemington submitted to the state superintendent of public instruction the question of its liability under the contract made with Glazer by Raritan.The state superintendent held that the contract was not binding upon Flemington.His decision was reversed by the state board of education.This action is now before us for review.

We entertain no doubt of our power to review the action of the state board.What was said by the court in Draper v. Commissioners of Public Instruction, 66 N. J. Law, 54, 48 Atl. 556, was based upon the fact that the plaintiff in that case had accepted an appointment as a teacher under the school law, and was bound by all of its provisions, and had therefore barred himself from having the propriety of his dismissal by the local school board reviewed in any tribunal except those specially created by the Legislature for the purpose.That this case did not decide that the Supreme Court was deprived of its constitutional function to review the action of inferior tribunals by certiorari is sufficiently indicated by what was subsequently said in Stockton v. Board of Education of Burlington, 72 N. J. Law, 80, 59 Atl. 1061.The only effect of the decision in the Draper Case was to hold that the court would not review the action of the local board of education until redress had first been sought in the special tribunals provided by the school law.

It is important in considering the merits of the case to observe the exact language of the contract, and to interpret it in view of the situation that existed when it was made.At that time the board of education of Raritan must have known that the creation of the new borough and the consequent severance of the school district under its charge was probable, if not imminent.Unless we are to attribute to them an intent to impose an onerous obligation upon the school district of Flemington by hasty action in anticipation of the change, we must assume that they intended to safeguard the rights of the new school district by the terms of the contract.This they have done.The contract is not a general contract by which Glazer is employed to teach in the Flemington public school No. 1.It is expressly limited by the addition of the words, "under the control of said board of education."Glazer on his part did not undertake generally to perform his duty as a teacher in Flemington public school No. 1, but undertook to perform his duty under rules prescribed by the board of education, which must have meant the Raritan board of education, since the Flemington board of education was not then in existence.The contract was, as it ought to have been, a contract where the personal element was considered, and Glazer could not be held under such a contract to obey the orders of another corporation.The words "under the* control of said board of education" may have either one of two meanings attributed to them.They may mean, as seems more natural, that Glazer was to be under the control of the said board of education—that is, the Raritan board—and this would harmonize the contract of the board for the personal services of Glazer with Glazer's contract to obey its orders.It may, however, be that the words, "under the control of said board of education," should be construed as descriptive of the school, and in that view the contract would be one to teach in the Flemington public school while it answered that description.Whichever view is taken, the result is that Glazer's contract ended when the condition upon which it depended ceased.In view of the fact that at the time this contract was made Glazer came within the description of persons protected by the so-called tenure of office act (P. L.1909, p. 398), and became entitled under the provision of the pension act of 1907(P. L. 1907, p: 286) to apply for a pension after a few years further service, it was a wise precaution on the part of the board of education of Raritan to limit his contract, especially in view of the obligation it imposed upon the Raritan board on the eve of the dismemberment of that school district.

This consideration is in our judgment enough to dispose of the case.Counsel have, however, argued the matter upon broader grounds, and the case is of sufficient public importance to justify an expression of opinion in the...