Bd. of REGISTRATION IN Med. v. DOE

Decision Date03 September 2010
Docket NumberNo. SJC-10556.,SJC-10556.
Citation933 N.E.2d 67,457 Mass. 738
PartiesBOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE v. John DOE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Paul Cirel (Ingrid Martin with him), Boston, for the defendant.

Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiff.

Timothy C. Miller, for Federation of State Medical Boards of the U.S., Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

COWIN, J.

This case arises out of an investigation by the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) into the treatment practices of John Doe, a board-certified psychiatrist who specializes in pain management. As part of its investigation, the board subpoenaed the treatment records of twenty-four of Doe's patients.

Doe refused to comply with the subpoena, and pursuant to G.L. c. 233, § 10, 2 the board commenced an action to enforce it. A judge in the Superior Court ruled that the records were not protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see G.L. c. 233, § 20B 3 (the statute), and ordered Doe to produce them. Doe appealed and we transferred the case on our own motion.

Doe contends that the subpoenaed records are protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege set out in G.L. c. 233, § 20B. The board argues that the privilege does not apply because Doe does not meet the qualifications of a “psychotherapist” as defined by the statute. The board maintains that Doe devotes most of his time to pain management. Because pain management is not the practice of psychiatry, the argument goes, Doe does not devote a substantial amount of time to the practice of psychiatry as required by the statute. In the alternative, the board contends that, even if Doe is a psychotherapist as defined by the statute, the records must be produced in this case because the board's compelling need to examine the records in furtherance of its mission to protect the public safety outweighs the confidentiality interests protected by the privilege. The record establishes that pain management is a subspecialty of psychiatry; consequently, Doe devotes a substantial amount of time to the practice of psychiatry. Thus, we conclude that Doe is a psychotherapist within the meaning of the statute. In addition, we conclude that thepsychotherapist-patient privilege statute does not permit a weighing of the public interest against the interestsprotected by the privilege. We therefore vacate the judgment stating that Doe is not a psychotherapist and ordering him to produce the records, and remand to the Superior Court for entry of an order quashing the subpoena.

1. Facts and procedural history. We summarize the uncontested facts in the record. Doe is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the Commonwealth. He is board certified in psychiatry by the American Board of Medical Specialities 4 and lists both psychiatry and pain management as his specialty areas of practice. In his 2004 registration renewal application submitted to the board, Doe stated that he practices pain management eleven hours per week and psychiatry nine hours per week. In his 2006 registration renewal application, 5 Doe indicated that he has decreased the number of hours per week that he practices, but he did not indicate any change in the apportionment of his practice between pain management and psychiatry.

The allegations against Doe and the details of the board's subsequent investigation are summarized in an affidavit of an investigator employed by the board. In 2007, the board received a report from a physician who had been approached by one of Doe's patients (patient A) about obtaining narcotics detoxification treatment. According to the report, the physician contacted Doe to confirm the medications Doe prescribed for patient A, as well as the bases for Doe's diagnosis of the patient's condition. It appeared to the physician that Doe himself was impaired: he could not verify the diagnosis of his patient, explain the medications he had prescribed, or comprehend the physician's questions. The physician notified the board of his concern regarding Doe.

In response, the board's investigator reviewed pharmacy records of medications prescribed by Doe. Her examination of the prescription records of 205 of Doe's patients revealed that eighty-one per cent of the patients had been prescribed oxycodone,741 seventy-eight per cent had been prescribed diazepam (marketed under the brand name Valium), and seventy-seven per cent had been prescribed both oxycodone and diazepam. The records showed also that Doe may have issued prescriptions of Schedule II substances for two persons who may have been members of his household. 6

In 2008, the investigator wrote to Doe requesting an interview and seeking the medical records of patient A and twenty-three other patients. Doe appeared for the interview and produced the records of patient A only. Doe stated that he believed that he could disclose patient A's records because patient A had violated apain management agreement with Doe. 7 Doe asserted that patient confidentiality prohibited him from disclosing the remaining records.

In her affidavit submitted to the Superior Court in connection with the board's motion to enforce the subpoena, the investigator stated that Doe described his practice as focusing primarily on pain management and that he practices psychotherapy fewer than five hours per week. In addition, Doe discussed some of the details of his practice. The investigator's affidavit stated that Doe asserted that he accepts payment in cash only, does not receive insurance payments, accepts only patients referred by other patients, and holds open office hours rather than scheduling appointments. Additionally, Doe asks patients to draw pictures and questions them regarding their favorite films and colors and uses the answers in assessing their medical conditions. Doe maintains that he treats patients in accordance with the standard practices of modern psychiatry by utilizing talk therapy, medications, and instruction on relaxation techniques.

After Doe's interview with the investigator, the board served Doe with a subpoena duces tecum demanding the production of the records of the twenty-four patients. 8 As stated, when Doerefused to comply, the board filed an action in the Superior Court to enforce the subpoena. See G.L. c. 233, § 10. In response, Doe argued, inter alia, that the records are protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see G.L. c. 233, § 20B, and the Massachusetts common law of privacy, see Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 67-68, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985). In addition, Doe sought an evidentiary hearing to challenge the assertions in the investigator's affidavit and to “learn the purpose of her investigation.” Doe subpoenaed the investigator and all records relating to the board's investigation of Doe.

After a nonevidentiary hearing, a judge in the Superior Court concluded that Doe was not a “psychotherapist” within the meaning of G.L. c. 233, § 20B, held that the privilege did not apply in this case, and ordered Doe to produce the subpoenaed records. In addition, the judge allowed the board's motion to quash the subpoenas issued by Doe. Doe's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. 9 Doe appealed, and the judge stayed execution of the judgment pending appeal. 102. Standard of review. Interpretation of a privilege statute constitutes a question of law. See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 90, 849 N.E.2d 797 (2006). We review these questions de novo. See Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 302, 901 N.E.2d 1185 (2009). Generally, we review factual findings for clear error. Id. However, where factual findings are based solely on documentary evidence, they receive no special deference. See id. 3. Discussion. a. The psychotherapist-patient privilege. As stated, the Legislature has enacted a statutory privilege protecting certain communications between psychotherapists and their patients. 11 General Laws c. 233, § 20B, provides that the privilege applies “in any court proceeding and in any proceeding preliminary thereto and in legislative and administrative proceedings.” Because the statute by its terms applies to “administrative proceedings,” the privilege applies to the board's investigation of Doe. 12 We limit our consideration to the situation in this case (an administrative investigation preliminary to the possible filing of a statement of allegations), and do not inquire into the reach of the privilege statute, or the six exceptions set forth therein, in subsequent proceedings such as those that attach in the event that a license revocation case is actually commenced.

b. Statutory definition of “psychotherapist.” General Laws c. 233, § 20B, sets forth two requirements that a physician must meet in order to qualify as a psychotherapist within the meaning of the statute. First, a physician must be “licensed to practice medicine.” Id. Second, a physician must also “devote [ ] a substantial portion of his time to the practice of psychiatry.” Id. See note 3, supra. The first requirement is not at issue in this case because it is undisputed that Doe is licensed by the board to practice medicine in the Commonwealth. Thus, the only question is whether Doe meets the second requirement by devoting a substantial portion of his time to the practice of psychiatry.

Before the Superior Court, the board argued that the practiceof pain management does not constitute the practice of psychiatry. In a memorandum of decision and order, the judge concluded that, because Doe “does not satisfy the ‘substantial portion’ requirement of G.L. c. 233, § 20B,” he does not qualify as a psychotherapist. Whether pain management is a subspecialty of psychiatry is a question of fact. While the judge did not make explicit findings on the question, his determination that Doe does...

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