Beach v. Bradstreet

• Decision Date: 09 April 1912
• Citation: 82 A. 1030,85 Conn. 344
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BEACH v. BRADSTREET, Comptroller.

82 A. 1030

85 Conn. 344

BEACH v. BRADSTREET, Comptroller.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 9, 1912

Case reserved from City Court of Hartford; Herbert S. Bullard Judge.

Action by Harry L. Beach against Thomas D. Bradstreet, Comptroller. Question reserved for the Supreme Court of Errors on a demurrer to the complaint. Demurrer sustained.

A tax is for a " public purpose," within the Constitution, where for any of the recognized objects of government, or the welfare of the community in equal measure.

Action for an injunction restraining the Comptroller from continuing to refuse and neglect to make the regulations required of him under P. A. 1911, c. 187, and requiring him to make such regulations, brought to the city court of the city of Hartford and reserved by Bullard, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint, for the advice of this court.

The complaint sets up these facts: The General Assembly in P. A 1911, c. 187, enacted: " Every person resident in this state who has served in the army, navy, marine corps, or revenue marine service of the United States during the Civil War, and received an honorable discharge therefrom, the widow resident in this state, or if there be no such widow, the widowed mother resident in this state, of every person who has so served and has died either during his term of service, or after receiving honorable discharge from said service, and the pensioned widows, fathers and mothers resident in this state, of soldiers, sailors and marines who served in the army, navy or marine corps or revenue marine service of the United States during the Civil War, shall be paid by the state, as state aid, the sum of $30 each, annually, subject to such regulations as to proof of qualifications to receive the same, and as to the time and manner of payment thereof and receipt therefor as the comptroller shall prescribe. The exemption from taxation provided by Section 2315 of the General Statutes and amendments thereof, of the property of pensioned soldiers, sailors or marines of the United States and of persons resident in this state, who have served in the army, navy, marine corps or revenue marine service of the United States, or the widow, or the widowed mother or pensioned widow, father, or mother of any such person shall not apply to the property of any person entitled to state aid under the provision of this act." The plaintiff is a resident of this state, and served in the army of the United States during the Civil War, and received an honorable discharge therefrom. The defendant Comptroller refuses to make regulations for payment under this act on the ground that he is advised by the Attorney General that the said act is unconstitutional and void. The defendant demurs upon the ground that said act is contrary to fundamental principles of natural justice and in conflict with section 1 of article 1 and article 24 of amendments to the Constitution of Connecticut and with section 1 of article 14 of amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

William F. Henney and Alfred B. Beers, for plaintiff.

John H. Light, Arty. Gen., for defendant.

WHEELER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The range of powers granted by our Constitution to each department of government is limited by the Constitution of the United States and by that of our state (McGovern v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 545, 63 A. 433), and whether, as has been so often declared in judicial decision, it is limited by and to be exercised within those fundamental principles of natural Justice which are held to be the ligament of the social compact upon which all constitutional government rests, we need not now consider.

The delegation of legislative power to our General Assembly covers the whole field of legitimate legislation. Hence its power is limited by those " essential principles of liberty and free government" contained in our Bill of Rights (article 1, Const. of Conn.). State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 27, 46 A. 409, 49 L.R.A. 542, 84 Am.St.Rep. 124; State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 484, 33 A. 519, 31 L.R.A. 55, 48 Am.St.Rep. 227.

In this deposit of legitimate power is the great power of taxation, conferred not in express terms, but in necessary implication, arising from the existence in it of the legislative power. Bush v. Board of Supervisors, 159 N.Y. 216, 53 N.E. 1121, 45 L.R.A. 556, 70 Am.St.Rep. 538. For in all constitutional government the power of taxation is a natural and necessary incident of the legislative power, since there can be no lawful taxation without the consent of the people as represented in the Legislature. The exercise of this sovereign power is not unlimited; it is controlled by and subordinate to the same " essential principles of liberty and free government" which constitute the condition under which the executive, judicial, and legislative departments of our government can be exercised.

" There is no such thing in the theory of our government, state and national, as unlimited power in any of their branches." Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L.Ed. 455; State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 73 Conn. 255, 265, 47 A. 299, 57 L.R.A. 481.

Every definition of " taxation" expressly or impliedly asserts that it is to be imposed only for public purposes. This is a foundation principle of all constitutional government. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, supra; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 1 Sup.Ct. 442, 27 L.Ed. 238; State, Wagner et al., v. Collector of Delaware, 31 N.J. Law, 195; Opinion of the Judges, 190 Mass. 611, 77 N.E. 820; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 598; Miller on Const. p. 242; Desty on Taxation (1884 Ed.) p. 14, § 8; Judson on Taxation (1903 Ed.) § 346. State taxes in Connecticut are public burdens imposed by the General Assembly upon persons or property to raise money for a public governmental use or purpose. A republican form of government forbids the raising of taxes for any but public purposes, and under article 4, § 4, of the Constitution of the United States, Connecticut is forever bound to maintain such form of government and cannot exercise legislative power inconsistent with it. Allyn's Appeal, 81 Conn. 534, 537, 71 A. 794, 23 L.R.A. (N. S.) 630, 129 Am.St.Rep. 225. Moreover, fundamental rights existing under and protected by our Constitution are further protected by the fourteenth amendment, which voids any act of state legislation in denial of the fundamental law of its land. State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 73 Conn. 255, 269, 270, 47 A. 299, 57 L.R.A. 481. The unconstitutionality of this act is rested upon the single specific ground that it devotes public funds to private ends.

Our treatment of a question such as this, involving the act of a co-ordinate department of government, should not be circumscribed by the limitations of ordinary actions between individuals. We should not be unmindful of Marshall's admonition, " It is a Constitution we are expounding." It is our duty to approach the question with great caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presumption and intendment in its favor, and sustain the act, unless its invalidity is, in our judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. McGovern v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 545, 63 A. 433; Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 441, 65 A. 436, 600, 20 L.R.A. (N. S.) 160, 129 Am.St.Rep. 193, 8 Ann. Cas. 452; State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, 289; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210, 227; Town of Wilton v. Weston, 48 Conn. 325; Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 87, 95,26 Am.Dec. 631; A. T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 19 Sup.Ct. 609, 43 L.Ed. 909.

We cannot impute to the legislative department the disregard of a fundamental principle of civil liberty and free government except in clearest case. Allyn's Appeal, 81 Conn. 534, 536, 71 A. 794, 23 L.R.A. (N. S.) 630, 129 Am.St.Rep. 225. Nor must we be unmindful that within reasonable limits the legislative department is the judge of what will constitute a public use, and that the wisdom of its act is not our concern. Considerations of public polity which might, and perhaps ought to, make their appeal to the practical judgment of the legislative body, are not relevant to our determination and must not be permitted to influence our decision. In re Powers, 25 Vt. 265. Acting within these principles of constitutional construction, the judiciary must decide, in cases properly arising, whether the legislative department has exceeded its constitutional power. It in its sphere represents the people as much as does the legislative department, and it can serve the community in no higher or truer way than in doing its constitutional duty.

Some years ago a writer in the Harvard Law Review (volume 12, p. 316) presented the results of his examination of the legislation of Massachusetts for the preceding 25 years and made it plain that there had been in that period hundreds of instances involving hundreds of thousands of dollars of the public funds voted in gratuities clearly contrary to the Constitution, although few instances had been tested in the courts. In the instances where the vote of gratuities had been before her courts they had sturdily upheld the Constitution. Massachusetts' experience does not stand alone among the states. We are to decide whether the expenditure of public funds to be raised by taxation, as called for by this act, is for a public purpose or not.

If the use of the proceeds of the tax be for the support of government or for any of the recognized objects of government, the tax is considered to be for a public purpose. Gray, Limitations of the Taxing Power (Ed. 1906) § 169. If the proceeds of the tax will directly promote the welfare of the community in equal measure, the tax is for a public purpose. Opinion of Tapley, J., 58 Me. 617.

The...