Beach v. Parmeter

• Decision Date: 01 May 1854
• Parties: Beach versus Parmeter.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

23 Pa. 196

Beach versus Parmeter.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Tioga county.

Cone, for plaintiff in error.—The direction was calculated to mislead the jury by referring to the case of a road wagon with a heavy load, whereas the vehicle in question was a small wagon. The defendants were guilty of carelessness in running against the plaintiff's horse whilst the rider was endeavoring to get out of the road. The defendants might have stopped or turned out: 4 Dana 497, Payne v. Smith.

In the part of the charge last referred to, the Court assumed that the collision was not caused by the defendants. In the case of Payne v. Smith the collision was accidental, though resulting from the defendants' carelessness. Though a person is not liable criminally for an injury caused by accident, unless at the time he was acting unlawfully, yet he may be liable in a civil action.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by WOODWARD, J.

It is not denied that the Court stated the law of the road correctly in regard to a teamster with a heavy draught; but as the defendants were driving a buggy, it is supposed this allusion to a teamster was calculated to mislead the jury. We think not. The illustration was fairly put, and it was not inapplicable to a buggy laden with three men and drawn by a single horse. In regard to such a buggy, no less than in reference to a teamster with heavy draught, the law unquestionably is that a footman or a horseman has no right to force it out of the beaten track of the road if there be sufficient room to pass on either side. And where a road is narrow, and there is difficulty in passing, if the horseman can turn out without danger to himself or beast, and the buggy cannot be turned out without incurring danger, it is the duty of the former to give way. This was the doctrine which the jury must have deduced from the charge, and in this there was no misleading.

When the Court said that if the injury complained of resulted from accident no blame could attach to the defendants, they must be understood to have meant inevitable accident — such as no human foresight could avert, or an accident occasioned by the concurring negligence of both parties. The whole tenor of the charge conveys this idea, and in such teaching there was no error. For inevitable accidents and for such as result from mutual negligence of parties, the law gives no redress, but when the injury comes from the exclusive negligence of one party, ...