Beach v. State, No. 56586

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; MORGAN, P.J., HENLEY and DONNELLY, JJ., and EDWARDS
• Citation: 488 S.W.2d 652
• Docket Number: No. 56586,No. 2
• Decision Date: 11 December 1972
• Parties: Sidney Theodore BEACH, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent

Page 652

488 S.W.2d 652 Sidney Theodore BEACH, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent. No. 56586. Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. Dec. 11, 1972.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied
Jan. 8, 1973.

Page 653

M. J. Croghan, Jr., St. Louis, for appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Hoyne, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying Sidney Theodore Beach's Criminal Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., motion to vacate concurrent 10-year sentences for second degree murder and assault with intent to kill with malice, entered upon pleas of guilty. We have jurisdiction, the notice of appeal having been filed before January 1, 1972. Art. V, §§ 3, 31, Constitution of Missouri, 1945, V.A.M.S.

Appellant's first point is that the court erred in denying his motion to vacate for the reason that the court's finding 'did not determine the period during which the attorney had authority to act for petitioner'; that the court should have found that the attorney had such authority for a period of approximately one month.

Shortly after the indictment was returned appellant's brother hired attorney Walter Brady to represent appellant. Walter Brady entered his appearance as attorney for appellant on April 1, 1968. Appellant testified that he discharged Walter Brady sometime in April, 1968. The record shows that on October 2, 1968 appellant, acting pro se, filed a motion for a hearing on violation of constitutional rights in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, claiming that he had been denied a speedy trial. On October 24, 1968 Walter Brady appeared in court and procured an order that October 2 motion be passed. As a result the motion was never called up for hearing prior to the time appellant pleaded guilty to the two charges (in May and June, 1969). Although not spelled out with clarity it seems to be appellant's position under his first point that the judgments and sentences should be vacated because of the failure of the court to find that attorney Walter Brady's authority to act as his counsel terminated in April, 1968 and that his subsequent action in making the unauthorized court appearance on October 24 constituted a derogation of his constitutional rights to petition and to a speedy trial.

There is no merit in this point. The delay did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction or invalidate the conviction and there is no showing that the alleged frustration of his right to petition and to a

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speedy trial affected the fairness of his trials in May and June, 1969. State v. Caffey, Mo.Sup., 438 S.W.2d 167. Furthermore, 'A plea of guilty voluntarily made with understanding of the nature of the charge is conclusivie as to guilt and waives all nonjurisdictional, procedural and constitutional infirmities, if any, in any prior stage of the proceeding. (Citing seven decisions.)' Geren v. State, Mo.Sup., 473 S.W.2d 704, 707. 'The entry of the plea of guilty ended all questions based upon either statutory or constitutional guaranties of a speedy trial. State v. Barrett, Mo.Sup., 406 S.W.2d 602, 604(3--5); Pate v. United States, 8th Cir., 297 F.2d 166, cert. den., 370 U.S. 928, 82 S.Ct. 1569, 8 L.Ed.2d 507.' Rew v. State, Mo.Sup., 472 S.W.2d 611, 613(3).

Appellant's second point is that he did not plead guilty voluntarily; that the sequence of events from the date of his arrest to the time he entered his pleas of guilty 'served to degrade petitioner's mental attitude to the extent that it was impossible for him to enter intelligent and fully voluntary pleas of guilty.' He points to the search of his room and effects and the seizure of his automobile at the time of his arrest; the disclosures of guilt to psychiatrists at the state hospital where he was taken for psychiatric examination, made without an attorney being present and at the importuning of the hospital employees; the continuance of his cases and the passing of his pro se motion without his knowledge, in violation of his rights; the appointment and withdrawal of a succession of lawyers; the representation of attorney Myron Gollub that he would receive probation, and the failure of the sentencing court to mention that by pleading guilty appellant would lose the constitutional right to confront his accusers and the privilege against self-incrimination.

Appellant had the benefit of the advice of...