Beach v. University of Utah

• Citation: 62 A.L.R.4th 67,726 P.2d 413
• Decision Date: 26 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 19389,19389
• Parties: , 35 Ed. Law Rep. 545 Danna K. BEACH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, David P. Gardner, individually and in his official capacity as President of the University of Utah, Dr. Rick Davern, individually and in his official capacity as Vice President, Academic Affairs, University of Utah, the Institutional Council of the University of Utah, individually and through its members, Joseph Bernolfo, M.L. Brian, Reed W. Binton, Edward W. Clyde, Richard Giauque, Mrs. James H. Gillespi, Mrs. Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Paige Paulsen, D. Brent Scott, and Fullmer H. Latter, individually and in their official capacities, David M. Grant, individually and in his official capacity as Dean of the College of Sciences, University of Utah, Bill Baker, individually and in his official capacity as Chairman, Biology Department, University of Utah, Ed Ridges, individually and in his official capacity as Business Manager, Biology Department, University of Utah, Orlando Cuellar, individually and in his capacity as a biology professor, University of Utah, and Ron Stewart, individually and in his official capacity as teacher's assistant, University of Utah, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

Page 413

726 P.2d 413

62 A.L.R.4th 67, 35 Ed. Law Rep. 545

Danna K. BEACH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, David P. Gardner, individually and

in his official capacity as President of the University of

Utah, Dr. Rick Davern, individually and in his official

capacity as Vice President, Academic Affairs, University of

Utah, the Institutional Council of the University of Utah,

individually and through its members, Joseph Bernolfo, M.L.

Brian, Reed W. Binton, Edward W. Clyde, Richard Giauque,

Mrs. James H. Gillespi, Mrs. Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Paige

Paulsen, D. Brent Scott, and Fullmer H. Latter, individually

and in their official capacities, David M. Grant,

individually and in his official capacity as Dean of the

College of Sciences, University of Utah, Bill Baker,

individually and in his official capacity as Chairman,

Biology Department, University of Utah, Ed Ridges,

individually and in his official capacity as Business

Manager, Biology Department, University of Utah, Orlando

Cuellar, individually and in his capacity as a biology

professor, University of Utah, and Ron Stewart, individually

and in his official capacity as teacher's assistant,

University of Utah, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 19389.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 26, 1986.

Kathryn P. Collard, Salt Lake City, Robert P. Schuster, Gary L. Shockey, Bradley L. Booke, Jackson, Wyo., for plaintiff and appellant.

Allan L. Larson, Bruce H. Hensen, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

Plaintiff Danna Beach appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her claim against the University of Utah, the President of the University, the University Institutional Council, various officials of the College of Science, and a biology professor (collectively referred to as "the University") seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when she fell from a cliff at night during a field trip sponsored by the University. For the purposes of its decision only, the trial court assumed that defendants owed a special duty of care to Beach but concluded that there was no breach of that duty. We affirm on the ground that no special relationship existed between the parties requiring the University to protect Beach from the consequences of her voluntary intoxication.

When a case has been dismissed upon a motion for summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was rendered. See, e.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). The recitation of the facts in this case reflects that principle. Beach, a twenty-year-old student at the University of Utah, enrolled in a freshman-level field biology class during the spring quarter of 1979. The class, taught by a tenured professor, Orlando Cuellar, required students to attend three one-day field trips and three weekend field trips.

Before the first trip, Cuellar instructed his students that they must follow his directions during class time, but were free to pursue personal interests when the day's work was completed. Students were urged to drop the class if the field trips posed any physical or other problems for them. Beach had lived away from home for three years, and although she lacked camping experience, she enjoyed athletics and had no trouble keeping up with the physical demands of the trips.

Prior to the final outing, Beach had attended all of the field trips and experienced only one minor problem. On a field trip to Lake Powell, she fell asleep in the bushes near the camp after drinking some wine. Cuellar and several students later found her and returned her to the camp. Beach informed Cuellar that the incident was unusual.

The final trip of the quarter took place over the Memorial Day weekend in the Deep Creek mountains of Utah. Beach arrived at the campsite late Friday afternoon with Cuellar's teaching assistant. Before dinner, Cuellar took all of the students on a hike to orient them to their surroundings. The hike included the area in which Beach's fall later occurred, an area of high rocks off which Beach and several other students rappelled on Saturday.

On Sunday, the students attended a lamb roast given by a local rancher after completing their field work. Beach stated that she had one mixed drink and three or four glasses of home-brewed beer while at the lamb roast. Cuellar testified that he assumed most people at the lamb roast were drinking alcohol and that he had several beers. After the lamb roast, Beach returned to camp in a university van driven by Cuellar. While in the back of the van, Beach drank some whiskey.

Beach testified that when the van reached the campsite, she did not act inebriated or in any way impaired, but appeared to be well-oriented and alert. She had no trouble getting out of the van and headed for her tent, just across the stream from the van and one hundred twenty-five feet from the center of the camp. On the way, however, she became disoriented. When no one responded to her call for assistance, she decided to retrace her route. Beach had no memory of anything else that happened that night.

Beach's tentmate noticed her absence at six o'clock the next morning. Because Beach was usually one of the last to turn in at night, she had not been missed the previous evening. A search began, and about six hours later, she was found unconscious in a crevice near the rocky area where she had rappelled the previous day. As a result of injuries sustained in her fall, Beach is a quadriplegic with some limited use of her arms.

Beach filed a suit seeking damages from Cuellar, the University, and numerous University officials. The University moved for summary judgment alleging that it owed Beach no special duty of care. For purposes of the summary judgment, the court assumed arguendo that the University had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect and supervise Beach, but concluded that there was no breach of that duty. The trial court therefore granted the University's motion and dismissed Beach's action.

On appeal, Beach asserts that a special relationship existed between the parties which gave rise to an affirmative duty on Cuellar's part to supervise and protect her. She claims that summary judgment was inappropriate because the facts were in dispute concerning whether that duty had been breached. ¹

One essential element of a negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by defendant. Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1979); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). Absent a showing of a duty, Beach cannot recover.

Here, Beach contends that Cuellar and the University breached their affirmative duty to supervise and protect her. Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another. Absent unusual circumstances which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility, "one has no duty to look after the safety of another who has become voluntarily intoxicated and thus limited his ability to protect himself." Benally v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 9, 376 P.2d 388, 390 (1962). The law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between the parties. These relationships generally arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1964). ² The essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party upon the other or mutual dependence between the parties. Id. at comment (b).

To avoid summary judgment, Beach was obligated to prove that she had a special relationship with the University which obligated the University to supervise and protect her and that the duty was breached, causing her injuries. The question, then, is whether the facts in the record establish some basis for imposing an affirmative duty upon the University to protect Beach from her own intoxication and disorientation on the night in question.

At oral argument, counsel for Beach conceded that the mere relationship of student to teacher was not enough to give rise to such a duty. In fact, Beach's counsel conceded that Cuellar had no duty to walk each student to his or her tent or sleeping bag on the night of the accident, a measure that presumably would have prevented the accident. Therefore, to prevail on the special duty issue, Beach must distinguish her circumstances from those of the other students on the field trip.

The primary thrust of Beach's claim before this Court, as demonstrated by her counsel's concessions at oral argument, is that based upon the incident during the earlier field trip to Lake Powell, Cuellar knew or should have known of her propensity to become disoriented after drinking. Because of this knowledge, Beach maintains that the University had a special duty to supervise her on the evening in question. We do not agree that any special duty arose by reason of Cuellar's knowledge.

The Lake Powell incident, which Beach relies upon heavily, is not determinative of whether a special relationship arose. Beach testified that at Lake Powell, she became dizzy when she reached the bushes after leaving the rest of the company. Therefore, there was nothing about her demeanor during the time she was within Cuellar's sight that would have alerted Cuellar or other participants in the field trip to the fact that she had a tendency to become dizzy or disoriented when she consumed alcohol. Equally important, Beach told Cuellar after that incident that what had occurred was not normal behavior for her.

At the time of the final field trip, Beach had attended other field trips and had had no further incidents. She evidenced the judgment and skills of any normal twenty-year-old college student. There was nothing to suggest that she was not in good physical condition; in fact, on the final trip she joined several other students in rappelling from rocks located just...