Beacon Hills Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Palmer Properties, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1995 |
| Citation | 911 S.W.2d 736 |
| Parties | BEACON HILLS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. PALMER PROPERTIES, INC., Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Richard C. Jessee, Morristown, for Appellant.
C. Dwaine Evans, Morristown, for Appellees.
This action was instituted in the Chancery Court for Hamblen County for the purpose of enforcing restrictive covenants applying to Beacon Hills Subdivision. The appellees alleged that the appellant was attempting to place a structure on a lot which did not conform to the requirements of the restrictive covenants. The trial court found the appellant to be in violation of the covenants and permanently enjoined the appellant from erecting the structure as proposed. This appeal resulted.
The appellant presents the following issue for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in holding that the defendant's [appellant's] manufactured home was a "trailer" within the meaning of the Plaintiffs' [appellees'] restrictive covenants.
We undertake our review of this case pursuant to the dictates of Rule 13(d), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, i.e., this Court reviews the trial court record (de novo ) with the presumption that the trial court's findings of fact are correct, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Absent an error of law affecting the result, or unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court's factual determinations, we will affirm the trial court's decision. Campanali v. Campanali, 695 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn.App.1985).
The restrictive covenant on the Beacon Hills Subdivision which is pertinent to this case provides as follows:
9. TEMPORARY STRUCTURES: No structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding shall be used on any lot at any time as a residence either temporarily or permanently.
It was stipulated by the parties in the trial court that the structure in question was a "manufactured home." A manufactured home has been statutorily defined. " 'Manufactured home' means a structure, transportable in one (1) or more sections which, in the traveling mode is eight (8) body feet or more in width, or forty (40) body feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty (320) or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein; except that 'manufactured home' includes any structure which meets the requirements of this subdivision except the size requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certificate required by the secretary and complies with standards established under this title." T.C.A. § 68-126-202(4).
A "mobile home or house trailer" is defined in T.C.A. § 55-1-105 as follows:
(a) "Mobile home or house trailer" means any vehicle or conveyance, not self-propelled, designed for travel upon the public highways, and designed for use as a residence, office, apartment, storehouse, warehouse, or any other similar purpose.
The restrictive covenants that apply to Beacon Hills Subdivision were recorded in the Office of the Register for Hamblen County on October 21, 1977. At that time T.C.A. § 68-126-202(4) had not been enacted. T.C.A. § 55-1-105, however, predates the recordation of the restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the structure proposed to be erected by the defendant falls within either definition. As the chancellor noted in his excellent memorandum opinion, "[a] great deal of difficulty in this case and others like it is that manufacturing methods and terminology have changed over the past twenty years, calling into question the applicability of restrictive covenants which prohibit 'trailers' or 'mobile homes' that were written before that time." The trial court found the structure to be a trailer as that term is used in the restrictive covenants. In so doing he relied upon Albert v. Orwige, 731 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn.App.1987).
In Albert, by stipulation of the parties, it was agreed that plaintiffs and defendants owned property in a subdivision called "Riverview Subdivision" and that the subdivision was subject to restrictive covenants prohibiting the use of trailers or mobile homes on the premises. Defendants purchased a 1985 model Spring Hill "structure" from Don Bryant Mobile Homes. The structure was built by Fleetwood Enterprises. At the time of the purchase defendants were aware that the property was restricted insofar as mobile homes were concerned. They discussed these restrictions with the owner of the sales lot, who advised them that the structure was not a mobile home, but rather was a manufactured or factory-built home.
The Albert court made the following observations:
The structure consisted of two units, each fifty-two feet long and approximately thirteen feet wide. Each unit was pulled by a tractor-truck over the public highways to defendants' lot in Riverview Subdivision. Concrete footers were poured at the site for the foundation. Anchors were imbedded in the footers on which were built pillars of concrete blocks. The two units were bolted together and secured to the anchors by means of metal straps. The assembled structure was constructed on four I-beams running the length of the units. The space between the foundation or footing and the structure was subsequently enclosed on three sides by an additional concrete block foundation.
Following installation, the wheels, axles and tongues were removed from each of the units and returned to the manufacturer. These could be reattached to the units, which could then be separated and towed away from defendants' lot by a shortbed tractor-truck in the same manner in which they had been brought to defendants' property. A certificate of title had been issued for the structure and each unit of the structure had been given a vehicle identification number.
In this case, we are unable to distinguish the description of the structure in Albert from the structure in this case. The structure here consisted of two units. Each unit was pulled by a tractor-truck over the public highways to defendants' lot in Beacon Hills Subdivision. Concrete footers were poured or proposed to be poured at the site for the foundation. The two units were to be attached together and secured to the foundation. The assembled structure was...
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