Beadle v. Steele

• Citation: 5 So. 169,86 Ala. 413
• Parties: BEADLE ET AL. v. STEELE ET AL.
• Decision Date: 14 December 1888
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

5 So. 169

86 Ala. 413

BEADLE ET AL. v. STEELE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 14, 1888

Appeal from chancery court, Madison county; S. K. MCSPADDEN Chancellor.

This bill was filed by the appellants, Joshua H. Beadle and William H. Echols, as administrator of William Echols deceased, against the appellees, Joseph C. Steele, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Adam Hall, deceased, and Patrick H. Moore, and seeks to subject certain landed assets in the hands of the defendant Moore to payment of their claim against the estate of Adam Hall deceased. The complainant Beadle, and W. H. Echols' intestate, William Echols, were executors of the will of said Adam Hall; and, upon a final settlement of the administration of said executors, it was found and decreed that the said estate of said Adam Hall was indebted to the said executors in the amount stipulated in the bill; and the present bill is filed for the purpose of fastening that indebtedness against the said estate upon certain described assets in the hands of the defendant Moore.

Humes & Sheffey and Cabiness & Ward, for appellants.

R. W. Walker, for appellee.

CLOPTON J.

The claim of appellants originated as follows: Joshua H. Beadle and William Echols, as executors of the will of Adam Hall which was admitted to probate in June, 1858, filed a bill in the chancery court to obtain a construction of the will, and the directions of the court in the administration of the estate. William Echols having died during the pendency of the suit, it was continued in the name of Beadle, the surviving executor, who resigned his executorship in May, 1867, under an agreement which will be hereinafter noticed, and the appellee Joseph Steele was appointed administrator de bonis non with the will annexed. On a supplemental bill filed by Steele, a final settlement of the administration of the executors was made, and a decree rendered in January, 1881, in favor of Beadle and William H. Echols, as administrators of William Echols, against Steele, as administrator de bonis non, for the sum of $3,956, and also for the sum of $500 as compensation to their solicitors, with interest on each from July 1, 1879. The present bill is filed by them to condemn the land therein mentioned to the payment of this decree. The bill avers a deficiency of personal property, its waste by the administrator de bonis non, the issue of execution on the decree, the return of "no property," and the insolvency of Steele and his sureties. Complainants' title to relief is rested on the doctrine that a court of equity will give aid to a creditor of the estate of a deceased person, and enforce payment of his debt out of lands descended or devised in the hands of the heir or devisee, when it appears that the personal estate was originally insufficient, or had been wasted by the personal representative, and that all legal remedies against him and his sureties had been exhausted, or that such remedies would be unavailing in consequence of their insolvency. The land sought to be subjected constituted a part of a larger tract of land, which was sold by the testator in his life-time, and which Steele, as administrator, took and received from the vendee in compromise and settlement of the unpaid purchase money. The compromise was reported to and confirmed by the chancery court. Having been acquired by the personal representative in payment of a debt due the testator, the land became assets of his estate, and subject to sale for distribution, or for the payment of debts, in the same manner as if it had descended or been devised. Cruikshank v. Luttrell, 67 Ala. 318. On the annual settlement made by the executors in the probate court, in August 1861, an allowance of $2,500 for special services was made to the executors. This allowance was brought forward as a credit on the final settlement in the chancery court. But for this credit, and the commmissions allowed on the final settlement, there would have been no balance due the executors. It is therefore manifest that the balance for which the decree was rendered in their favor consists of the usual commissions and the allowance for special services. By statute, all the property of a decedent, except such as is declared exempt, is charged with the payment of his debts, and may be sold for the payment of the same. This charge the personal representative cannot defeat by a distribution of the lands among the heirs or devisees before the debts are paid. The statute, however, has been construed as charging the lands with debts owing by the decedent at the time of his death, and it has been held that they cannot be sold to pay the costs and expenses of administration, when no debts of the decedent are shown for the payment of which the lands are liable under the statute. Garrett v. Garrett, 64 Ala. 263; Sermon v. Black, 79 Ala. 507. It follows that complainants are not entitled to subject the lands to the payment of the decree, as descended or devised. But, as we are not prepared to hold that a personal representative, by converting personal assets into real estate, can thereby deprive a creditor of the right to subject such real estate to his debt, the same as he would have had to subject the personal estate so converted, (which question we do not decide), we shall consider the equity of complainant on the theory that the purpose of the bill...