Beal v. Rubbermaid Commercial Products Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 August 1997
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4-96-CV-90310.
• Parties: Roy Eugene BEAL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RUBBERMAID COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

972 F.Supp. 1216

Roy Eugene BEAL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RUBBERMAID COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS INC., Defendant.

Civ. No. 4-96-CV-90310.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

August 14, 1997.

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I. John Rossi, Des Moines, IA, Craig Rogers, Waukee, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Gayla R. Harrison, Johnson, Hester & Walter, Ottumwa, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

PRATT, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in this court on April 30, 1997. Plaintiffs filed their Resistance to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 16, 1997. Defendant filed its Reply on June 24, 1997. A hearing was held on July 31, 1997 and Plaintiffs filed a Supplement to Oral Argument on August 6, 1997. This motion is now fully submitted.

Having reviewed the motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are either undisputed or viewed in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See United States v. City of Columbia, 914 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1990); Woodsmith Publ'g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990). On April 15, 1996, the four named Plaintiffs, Roy Beal, Ruth Stewart, Karen Hughes, and Julie McKay,¹ jointly filed an action in this court, under the Family and Medical Leave Act [FMLA]. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1993). They claim that their employer, Rubbermaid, violated the FMLA, among other things, by terminating or constructively terminating their employment due to absences which should have been exempted pursuant to provisions of the FMLA. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant violated the following regulations which were promulgated pursuant to the provisions of the FMLA: 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b) (failing to post notice of relevant provisions of the FMLA); 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (failing to give notice to the employees of designation of leave as FMLA or non-FMLA leave within two days); 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a)(2), (b) (requiring Plaintiffs to obtain certification from company physician); 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (requiring a 30-day notice for all "non-emergency" situations) (emphasis added); and 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (considering absences of seven days or less not eligible for the FMLA). In Plaintiffs' Complaint, there are additional claims: breach of contract, violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Statutes, and retaliatory discharge.

Defendant's employee handbook includes a provision on employee attendance and specifically delineates a progressive disciplinary point system which ultimately results in termination for accumulation of seven points. The handbook also includes personal and family leave provisions which essentially track the FMLA regulation language regarding "serious health conditions." Additionally, it contains a funeral leave provision allowing for three paid days following the death of a family member, with the possibility of additional time upon request of the employee.²

For convenience and clarity, the court will lay out the facts as to each Plaintiff separately.

Plaintiff Beal:

Plaintiff Beal began working for Rubbermaid in 1986. He was discharged on May 22, 1995. On March 31, 1995, Beal was placed on a performance plan addressing eight areas needing improvement including, among other things, attendance and improper filling out of time cards. This plan required Beal to submit progress reports every two weeks and specifically stated that "[i]f this plan yields only short term results, you will be subject to disciplinary action and possibly termination."

Beal injured his back on or about April 12, 1995. As a result, he missed work April 12 and 13, 1995. He went to his personal doctor, Dr. Cassady, on April 13 and had his back "manipulated." He does not recall if he received a prescription at this time or not. Dr. Cassady gave Beal a work release note recommending that he not work until April 18, 1995. Defendant originally assessed one point for this absence but later waived it.

Beal returned to work on April 21, 1995. He worked on April 22, and one hour on April 23. Beal worked these days even though his second work release note released him from work until April 27, 1995. He worked again on May 8, 1995.

At his supervisor's request, Beal saw the company physician on May 11, 1995 "when [his] back went out again" and was told he could return to work with some restrictions.³ Beal saw the company physician again on May 17, 1995, at which time he was given a return to work notice as of that date.⁴ He did not work May 15, 16, 20, 21, and 22, 1995.

Defendant terminated Beal's employment on May 22, 1995. His termination notice states he was discharged for poor performance.⁵

Plaintiff Stewart

Plaintiff Ruth Stewart began working for Rubbermaid in 1989. She was discharged on or about March 25, 1995, after accumulating seven points under the progressive-discipline attendance policy.

Stewart has a skin condition diagnosed as eczema, which she maintains periodically results in swelling and skin lesions. The discomfort from the condition typically lasts less than twenty-four hours.⁶ Medical Records reveal that Stewart only saw her physician regarding this condition two or three times between July 1990 and March 1995. According to her own recollection, Stewart called her physician, Dr. Cassady, approximately three times from January to March of 1995. She took over-the-counter medications, rather than prescriptions, to relieve her discomfort and would often "go home and soak" in Aveeno or some similar soothing bath.⁷ Additionally, she sometimes would put on some medicine that Dr. Cassady had given her.

The only doctor's notes that Stewart possesses which refer directly to a skin condition were issued from Dr. Cassady on March 6 and March 30, 1995, respectively. The note drafted on March 6, 1995 exempted her from work until March 10, 1995. Stewart had the originals of these notes in her possession at the time of her deposition. The twenty-one medical excuse forms in her file made no reference to a skin condition.⁸

Plaintiff Hughes

Plaintiff Karen Hughes began working for Rubbermaid in 1993. She voluntarily terminated her position with Rubbermaid on March 5, 1995, after being called back from a voluntary four month layoff.

In the spring of 1995, Hughes was absent from work when her husband, who was also employed by Rubbermaid, had surgery related to diabetes. Defendant originally assessed her a point for this absence, but the point was later waived. Hughes did not receive a disciplinary warning related to this point.

In August of 1995, Hughes' husband was again hospitalized as a result of diabetic complications. Hughes requested time off to care for her husband during his surgery and recuperation period. She was assessed a point under the company's absenteeism policy for taking this time off. As a result, Hughes was disciplined at the Attendance Policy Step II level. This point, however, was also waived at a later date.

Hughes accumulated two more half-points in September of 1995, one when her husband left work sick and she drove him home and one when her son was taken to the emergency room for problems associated with asthma.

On October 12, 1995, Hughes was assessed another half-point when she left work early to go to the emergency room. She was treated for bronchitis and released. She got a prescription for an antibiotic which she filled, but she did not have any followup appointments related to the bronchitis. Hughes was able to perform her normal family-related activities after her emergency room visit.⁹

In November of 1994, Hughes took a voluntary layoff from the company. In February, 1995, she was called back to work. She took some vacation days and then voluntarily quit her position. She claims she quit because she had previously been told that if she received one more point she would be fired.

Plaintiff McKay

Plaintiff Julie McKay began working for Rubbermaid in 1992. She was discharged on July 13, 1995. On April 12, 1995, McKay injured her back while working at Rubbermaid. She was sent to the company doctor and returned to work immediately thereafter without missing any work time. She was able to perform all of her normal job functions. After this injury, McKay also saw her personal physician one time. He readjusted her back and gave her a prescription for a muscle relaxant. He did not give her any work restrictions or limitations.

On May 13, 1995, McKay's son was killed in a car accident. She took three days of paid leave in accordance with the funeral leave provision in the employee handbook. At her request, she was given an additional thirty days of unpaid leave to deal with her loss. Subsequently, she returned to work.

On the evening of July 10 or 11, 1995, McKay again injured her back. She contends that she informed the supervisor at the time of the injury. McKay finished working that shift, but was absent from work on her next scheduled shift, July 13, 1995. She called to inform the company of her absence. That same day David Laurson signed McKay's termination notice. McKay went to her own doctor, Dr. Cassady, either on July 13 or 14 to have her back readjusted. Between July 13, 1995 and the time of the deposition, she saw her doctor three or four times to have her back readjusted and to refill the prescription for muscle relaxants.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir.1994); City of Columbia, 914 F.2d at 153; Woodsmith Publ'g, 904 F.2d at...