Bealefield v. Lumpkin

• Decision Date: 30 September 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:21-cv-01630
• Parties: EDWARD BEALEFIELD, (TDCJ-CID #2022207) Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

EDWARD BEALEFIELD, (TDCJ-CID #2022207) Petitioner,
v.
BOBBY LUMPKIN, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-01630

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

September 30, 2022

CHARLES ESKRIDGE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM ON DISMISSAL

Hon. Charles Eskridge United States District Judge

The motion for summary judgment by Respondent Bobby Lumpkin is GRANTED. Dkt 9.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by Edward Bealefield is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Dkt 1.

His motion for evidentiary hearing is DENIED. Dkt 19.

1. Background

The indictment charged Bealefield as follows:

IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: The duly organized Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas, presents in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County, Texas, Edward Bealefield, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about October 12, 2011, through November 17, 2011, did then and there unlawfully, during a period of time of thirty or more days in duration, commit at least two acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than fourteen years of age, including an act constituting the offense of

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aggravated sexual assault of a child, committed against [A.R.] on or about October 12, 2011, and an act constituting the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child committed against [A.R.] on or about November 17, 2011, and the Defendant was at least seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of each of those acts. Against the peace and dignity of the State. [Signed by the foreman of the Grand Jury.]

Dkt 12-30 at 201.

A jury found Bealefield guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child in August 2015 in Cause Number 1464575, before the 176th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. Dkt 12-40 at 211-12. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarized the pertinent factual background as follows:

When they first met, appellant was forty-six years old and the complainant was thirteen. They were both neighbors, and their families bonded over a summer trip to the beach

Nothing inappropriate happened during the trip, but once they returned home, a romantic relationship started to form Appellant and the complainant began having frequent conversations in private. They kissed for the first time about a month after the trip. A few months later, their relationship became sexual, and for the next few years, they would meet regularly to have sexual intercourse, as frequently as three or four times each week.

The complainant claimed that she was in love with appellant, but her feelings gradually waned as she entered high

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school. At age fifteen, she told a relative about the relationship. The relative notified police, who then arrested appellant.

Bealefield v State, 2018 WL 3734102, at *6 (Tex App Houston [14th Dist] Aug 7, 2018, no pet) (unpublished).

Upon conviction by the jury, Bealefield elected to have the trial court assess punishment. Dkt 12-40 at 211. The trial court sentenced him to forty years in prison. Ibid. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in August 2018. Bealefield v State, 14-15-00805-CR, 2018 WL 3734102, at *6 (Tex App Houston [14th Dist.] Aug 7, 2018, no pet). Bealefield didn't file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Bealefield then filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus on June 26, 2019. Dkt 12-40 at 37. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied it without written order on the findings of the trial court without a hearing and on the court's own independent review of the record on April 14, 2021. Dkt 9-1 at 1.

Bealefield filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in May 2021. Dkt 1. He contends that his conviction is void for several reasons as summarized here and specified further below:

o He was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel:

• Failed to investigate the timeline of events;

• Failed to interview potential witnesses, namely his family members, A.R.'s mother, and a witness who was in the courtroom, Lygia Armstrong;

• Advised him not to testify;

• Failed to object to the prosecutor's closing statement, the jury charge, and the lack of notice regarding extraneous offenses;

• Failed to investigate his medical condition;

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• Failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure;

o The evidence is insufficient to support his conviction;

o The prosecution erred during closing argument by stating opinions instead of facts; and o His due process rights were violated during his state habeas proceeding.

Dkt 1 at 6-8.

2. Legal standard

Respondent moves for summary judgment, arguing that claim two is procedurally barred and that the remaining claims by Bealefield lack merit and must be dismissed. Dkt 9 at 7-10. Also submitted were the trial transcript and other state-court records. Dkts 11 & 12.

a. AEDPA

Bealefield proceeds here pro se. A pro se petition is construed liberally and isn't held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings filed by lawyers. See Martin v Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 n 4 (5th Cir 1996); Bledsue v Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir 1999).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 USC § 2241 et seq, governs this federal petition for habeas corpus. See Woodford v Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 20508 (2003); Lindh v Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997). This has consequences for the standard of review as to disputed questions of both law and fact.

As to disputed questions of law, AEDPA bars federal habeas corpus relief based upon claims that were adjudicated on the merits by state courts unless the decision of the state court “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d); see also Early v Packer,

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537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002); Cobb v Thaler, 682 F.3d 364, 372-73 (5th Cir 2012). The Fifth Circuit holds that a state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law “if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts.” Gray v Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir 2010), citing Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2002). And the Fifth Circuit holds that an unreasonable application of federal law means that the decision is “unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Escamilla v Stephens, 602 Fed.Appx. 939, 941 (5th Cir 2015, per curiam), quoting White v Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). This is a high bar. To satisfy it, a petitioner must “show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Woods v Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015), quoting Harrington v Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

As to disputed questions of fact, AEDPA precludes federal relief unless the adjudication by the state court of the merits was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d)(2); see also Martinez v Caldwell, 644 F.3d 238, 241-42 (5th Cir 2011). A state court's factual determinations are “presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 USC § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness extends not only to express factual findings, but also to implicit or “unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusion of mixed law and fact.” Murphy v Davis, 901 F.3d 578, 597 (5th Cir 2018), quoting Valdez v Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n 11 (5th Cir 2001).

A federal court reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus may only consider the factual record that was before

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the state court when determining the reasonableness of that court's findings and conclusions. Cullen v Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). And the Supreme Court instructs that it “may not characterize these state-court factual determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because [it] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'” Brumfield v Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313-14 (2015), quoting Wood v Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). To the contrary, § 2254(d)(2) requires the federal court to “accord the state trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield, 576 U.S. at 314.

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must also demonstrate injury of a certain character. To warrant relief based on state-court error, a petitioner must show the alleged error had “substantial and injurious effect.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); for example, see Hughes v Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 345 (5th Cir 2008). This high bar isn't met where evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Burgess v Dretke, 350 F.3d 461, 472 (5th Cir 2003). There must be more than a mere reasonable possibility that it contributed to the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. But where a court is confident the error caused grave harm-or even if the record is evenly balanced in this regard-the petitioner is entitled to relief. See Fry v Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 n 3 (2007), citing O'Neal v McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995); see also Robertson v Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 305 (5th Cir 2003).

Finally, several other technical or procedural limitations can foreclose federal habeas corpus relief. For instance, a federal claim is foreclosed if it is barred because of a failure to comply with state procedural rules. See...