Beals v. See

• Decision Date: 16 February 1848
• Citation: 10 Pa. 56
• Parties: BEALS <I>v.</I> SEE.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

10 Pa. 56

BEALS v. SEE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 5, 1848.

February 16, 1848.

Feb. 5.

CERTIFICATE from the Nisi Prius.

Waln, for plaintiff in error.—There is no power to compel a party to submit his books for inspection, but under the act of 1798 or by a bill of discovery. Under the act it only extends to a production at the trial, not to a permission to make a general examination of all his transactions in the absence of the other party. Such a course would be ruinous in mercantile affairs. The evidence was not admissible under the plea of payment, without notice of special matter: 5 Barr, 54; 1 Raw. 309; 13 S. & R. 453; 5 W. & S. 103; 3 Ib. 361; 4 Ib. 571.

The sale by Dorr to defendants, after the time that elapsed, was sufficient to authorize the jury to presume that the goods had been converted into cash, when money had and received would lie: 9 S. & R. 11; 7 Cow. 662; 1 Dall. 222; 9 Pick. 96; Doug. 137; 4 Bing. 178. In that case, it is said, if a thing be received as money, then it may be sued for as such. Here the goods were received in satisfaction of an alleged debt: 13 East. 20; 4 T. R. 687. It was said to be a case of exchange. But, if Dorr was insane then, there could be no bargain on his part. If the jury thought, as they might well do, that the insanity preceded the day fixed by the inquest, clearly the bargain was void. It lies on defendants to show sanity after this finding: 4 Cow. 207; 1 Penna. 32. Actual fraud is not necessary, though we considered we had shown sufficient for the jury on that point; mere weakness of mind is some evidence of that: 4 Cow. 207. But, if the party be insane, the bargain was absolutely void: 15 John. 513; 16 Mass. 348; 5 Whart. 379.

Ch. Gibbons, contrà.—The order under the act is in lieu of a bill of discovery; and the only effect of the order for inspection was, to save time. As to the want of notice of special matter, none is required under the plea of non assumpsit. The only evidence of the terms of sale was, that payment should be made in goods: if that were so, the action was misconceived: 1 Ch. Pl. 385; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 118; 7 S. & R. 246; 14 Ib. 179. It was for the plaintiff to show general insanity prior to the day fixed by the jury, nor have the committee any authority to interfere with a contract executed before the commission issued and not overreached by the inquest: 1 Ch. Ca. 112; Shelf on Idiots, 418. He is a mere bailiff, Ib. 180; and, if the time be not carried back far enough, the inquest will be quashed: Ib. 97. It is for the court to interfere, and they will not where the contract was fair: Ib. 428, 412-19; 9 Ves. 478.

Feb. 16. GIBSON, C. J.

Books produced at a trial in obedience to an order of the court, are in its custody; and it may allow such access to them, or make such other disposition of them as, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it may deem necessary to fairness and justice. Its orders in respect to them are, consequently, not subject to a writ of error. How could the errors assigned in this part of the case be corrected by it? The mischief being done, would be irreparable. The information supposed to be improper, has been gained; the accounts of the intestate, in regard to other transactions, have been exposed; and what has been done could not be undone by sending the cause to another jury. We are required to reverse the judgment, in order not to correct an incorrigible error, but to inflict a penalty on the gratification of an impertinent curiosity. That is not a legitimate motive for the interference of a court of error. But there was no room even for the infliction of a penalty. If the inspection went no further than the accounts pertinent to the cause, there was no harm done. Even if it went beyond them, there still was no harm done; for the intestate's business was ended by his death, and all his transactions must necessarily be revealed in the settlement of his estate. The defendants, therefore, could gain no advantage, as dealers in the trade, from a knowledge of the intestate's former transactions in it; and, even if an injury should have been done by it to his estate, it would be in a matter collateral to the action, and therefore not corrigible by any proceeding in it.

Nor was there error in permitting the books to go to the jury, without notice having been given of the parts intended to be used. They would have been competent on non assumpserunt without the plea of payment, which was entirely unnecessary. The accounts went to show, that the transaction was not a sale of goods, and therefore to subvert the cause of action; but, at all events, they went to show that the contract had been mutually executed, and they were consequently evidence of direct payment or satisfaction in goods, which needs no notice of special matter. As to the admission of a particular item to prove a partnership between the plaintiff and his brother, it is sufficient to say, the exception is not founded in fact.

The fourth and fifth assignments of error, are unfounded both in law and in fact. The judge did not charge, that the transaction was an exchange of goods. He left the evidence of the fact to the jury, with instruction that if the ribbons were to be paid for in goods, the value of the goods could not be recovered back as money had and received, and the principle is indisputable. The case which comes nearest to the present, is Curcier v. Pennock, 14 S. & R. 51, in which the defendant gave the plaintiff a parcel of foreign and uncurrent coin for merchandise, who, discovering it to be spurious,...