Beals v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 20 June 1889
• Citation: 149 Mass. 405,21 N.E. 959
• Parties: BEALS v. THOMPSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

149 Mass. 405

21 N.E. 959

BEALS v. THOMPSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 20, 1889

COUNSEL

Robert M. Morse, Jr., and Frank A. Dearborn, for plaintiff.

J.L Hunt, for defendant.

OPINION

FIELD J.

This is an action of tort, in which the defendant is charged with writing and sending to the husband of the plaintiff a letter containing a false and malicious libel concerning the plaintiff. The defendant, in his answer, admits that he wrote and sent the letter, and he says that the contents of it were true, and that it was written and sent without malice. He also says that it was a privileged communication. Letters of the defendant to the plaintiff were put in evidence, against the objection of the defendant, "some of which were received by her previous to her alleged separation from her husband, some before her husband received from defendant the letter mentioned in plaintiff's declaration, while others were received by her after her divorce from her husband." The letters which are the Exhibits B to L were sent to the plaintiff after her marriage, and were admitted by the court for the purpose of showing malice on the part of the defendant. The letter which is Exhibit A was sent to the plaintiff before her marriage, and was admitted during the cross-examination of the defendant and after he had testified to certain things in regard to which this letter tended to contradict him. This letter contained evidence of malice. With a single exception the dates of the letters do not appear, but they all plainly relate to the same subject, and to many of the same circumstances, and they must have been written with the same general purpose. As the defendant set up the truth of the matter contained in the letter sent to the plaintiff's husband, evidence of actual malice was competent. Pub.St. c. 167, § 80; Perry v. Porter, 124 Mass. 338; Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 471; Com. v. Damon, 136 Mass. 441. We think that all the letters sent to the plaintiff contain abundant evidence of malice on the part of the defendant, and that they are all so connected with the publication declared on as to be relevant upon the issue of malice. Some of them, including letter A tended also to contradict the testimony of the defendant. They were all properly admitted in evidence.

The exceptions also state that "the court refused to instruct the jury that the letter mentioned in plaintiff's declaration was a privileged communication and that this action could not be maintained," and "instructed the jury that no privilege was shown." There are no facts recited in the exceptions which tend...