Beam v. Seaboard System R.R., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1988
• Parties: Richard Talmadge BEAM v. SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC. Richard Talmadge BEAM v. Sammy E. CHESTNUT. 87-580, 87-833.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 927

536 So.2d 927

Richard Talmadge BEAM v. SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC.

Richard Talmadge BEAM v. Sammy E. CHESTNUT.

87-580, 87-833.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 28, 1988.

Rehearing Denied in 87-580, Dec. 30, 1988.

R. Bradford Wash of Emond & Vines, Birmingham, for appellant.

Henry E. Simpson and Morris Wade Richardson of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellees.

BEATTY, Justice.

These consolidated appeals concern an action for damages based on injuries suffered by the plaintiff, Richard Talmadge Beam, when he was run over by a train. Beam appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Seaboard System Railroad, Inc. ("Seaboard System"), and its engineer, Sammy Chestnut. We reverse.

Shortly after one o'clock on the morning of July 29, 1983, Beam was struck by a Seaboard System train traveling from the Gadsden storage yard to the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Plant in Gadsden. He suffered injuries including disfigurement, paralysis, and quadriplegia as a result of the accident. At the time Beam was hit, he was a trespasser on the Seaboard System track. It is undisputed that when he was run over, Beam was lying unconscious between the rails of the track, intoxicated from consuming beer and using marijuana throughout the previous afternoon and evening.

A railroad owes no duty to prevent injury to an undiscovered trespasser on its track. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. French, 261 Ala. 306, 310, 74 So.2d 266, 269 (1954); Kendrick v. Birmingham Southern R.R., 254 Ala. 313, 320, 48 So.2d 320, 326 (1950). But when the railroad discovers the trespasser, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring him or her. French and Kendrick, supra. In Kendrick this Court held that the law permits recovery "for a negligent failure to use preventative means to avert injury after a discovery of peril, and after a knowledge that the trespasser cannot extricate himself in time to avoid being injured." 254 Ala. 313, 320, 48 So.2d 320, 326. The duty of reasonable care arises, however, only upon discovery of the trespasser. In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. French, 261 Ala. 306, 310, 74 So.2d 266, 269 (1954), we stated the rule of liability as follows:

" 'It is well established in this jurisdiction that in order to predicate liability for subsequent negligence, the defendant must be shown to have had actual knowledge of the plaintiff in a perilous position, and thereafter negligently [failed] to use all the means at his command and known to skillful engineers, so circumstanced, to avert damage to the plaintiff, when to have promptly and duly used such means could have averted the accident.' " (Quoting Louisville & N.R.R. v. Griffin, 240 Ala. 213, 216, 198 So. 345, 347 (1940).)

The complaint in this case alleges that after Chestnut discovered Beam on the track, Seaboard System and its engineer were guilty of wanton and/or negligent conduct in operating the train. Beam contends that Chestnut became aware that Beam was on the track earlier than he says he did, and that after becoming aware that he was on the track Chestnut failed to take prompt action to stop the train. According to Beam's complaint, this allegedly wanton and/or negligent conduct caused his injuries.

The defendants answer that Chestnut did not identify Beam as a person on the tracks until he was within 150 feet of him, and that he tried every reasonable way to stop the train before it ran over the plaintiff. Chestnut testified in his deposition that he sighted an object on the track when he was about 200 feet ahead of it and then applied the emergency brakes. Only when he was around 150 feet from the object, he says, was he able to identify the object as a human being. Chestnut and Seaboard System contend that, as a matter of law, there was nothing negligent or wanton about the manner in which Chestnut stopped the train, and that they therefore were entitled to summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P.; Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). In Mann v. City of Tallassee, 510 So.2d 222, 225 (Ala.1987), we observed that "summary judgment should be granted only when, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, it appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the non-moving party cannot prevail as a matter of law." (Quoting Hale v. City of Tuscaloosa, 449 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Ala.1984).) This Court has held that, "if there is a scintilla of evidence which supports the position of the non-moving party, summary judgment should not be granted." Cole v. First National Bank of Tuskaloosa, 485 So.2d 717, 719 (Ala.1986).

Beam contends that there was a genuine issue of fact in this case regarding the point along the track at which the engineer became aware that he was on the track. In support, he offers five pieces of evidence: a federal regulation governing the arrangement of train headlights, the opinion of an expert witness, a Seaboard System storage yard rule, an excerpt from Chestnut's deposition, and a subsequently made measurement that allegedly casts doubt upon Chestnut's deposition testimony. We hold that the last two items present a scintilla of evidence creating of a genuine issue of material fact, which precludes summary judgment for the defendants.

Among Beam's evidence are a federal regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 229, 125(b), and the affidavit of an expert witness. The regulation requires that headlights be arranged so as to illuminate a person who is at least 300 feet in front of the train. The plaintiff's expert testified that if the headlights complied with this regulation, Chestnut's testimony regarding his distance from Beam when he saw him is grossly inaccurate. This evidence tends to prove only that Chestnut was capable of seeing Beam earlier than he says he did, not that he actually saw Beam any earlier. For this reason, the regulation and the affidavit of the expert witness do not present a scintilla of evidence putting in issue the location of the engineer when he discovered Beam. That Chestnut's headlights illuminated the track 300 feet ahead, and that he could or might have seen Beam earlier if he had been keeping a careful lookout are immaterial. Beam was a trespasser, and Chestnut did not owe him the duty to discover him lying on the track...