Bean v. Bean

• Citation: 108 N.W. 369,144 Mich. 599
• Parties: BEAN v. BEAN et al.
• Decision Date: 03 July 1906
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

144 Mich. 599
108 N.W. 369

BEAN
v.
BEAN et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 3, 1906.

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; Erastus Peck, Judge.

Judicial proceedings for the probate of the will of John H. Bean, deceased; Sinkler C. Bean and others contestants. A judgment of the circuit court reversed a judgment of the probate court, allowing the will to probate, and proponent Elmore Bean brings error. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Argued before McALVAY, GRANT, MONTGOMERY, OSTRANDER, HOOKER, and MOORE, JJ.

Moore, J., dissenting.

[108 N.W. 370]

Charles A. Blair and Charles E. Townsend, for appellant.

Richard Price and John W. Miner, for appellees.

MOORE, J.

John H. Bean was born February 13, 1820. He was the father of the parties to this litigation. His wife died in 1891. After that his son Elmore lived with him until the time of his death, which occurred prior to June 29, 1901. As early as 1897 he made deeds of his real estate to his various children and left them with a lawyer to be delivered after his death. On the 20th of December, 1898, he took up these deeds and executed a will consisting of nine pages, in which he disposed of upwards of 500 acres of land; some village and city real estate and a quantity of personal property. In this will he remembered each of his children in a substantial way, but giving to his son Elmore more than to any of the others, stating in the will: ‘I desire it understood that I have given this liberally to my said son Elmore for the reason that he has lived with me for a number of years and is now living with and caring for me and has done much for me, for which he had received no compensation.’ July 28, 1900, he made a new will revoking the former one, and, after making a small bequest to his son John C. Bean, he gave all the rest of his property to his son Elmore. The value of the estate is estimated to be from $20,000 to $25,000. After his death the following agreement was drawn: ‘Whereas, in his lifetime, John H. Bean made two wills, both of which are in existence, disposing of all his earthly effects; and whereas, the last of said wills gave everything of which he died seised to Elmore J. Bean and John C. Bean; and whereas, there is dissatisfaction among the other heirs of said John H. Bean over the terms of said last will and testament; and whereas, some of the heirs of John H. Bean claim that the first of said wills in point of date should be declared the last will and testament of John H. Bean: Now, therefore, it is hereby mutually agreed by and between Celina S. Culver, John C. Bean, Sinkler C. Bean, Elmore J. Bean, Nolan S. Bean, all the heirs of said John H. Bean, deceased, that both of said wills shall be filed in the office of the judge of probate for Jackson county, and that the later of said wills shall be probated, but that all of the property of said John H. Bean shall be finally distributed according to the provisions of said First will and testament, except, * * * and within ten days after the admission of probate of said later will Elmore J. Bean and John C. Bean shall make any and all conveyances necessary to carry out the provision of this agreement. It is further agreed that the property which eventually, under this agreement, is to go to the respective heirs shall and may be taken and occupied from this date, the same as though this agreement was now completed, and in case, for any reason, this agreement is not completed, then such occupation and possession shall in no manner confer any additional right upon such occupant. Witness our hands and seals this 29th day of June, A. D. 1901. Celinda S. Culver. John C. Bean. Sinkler C. Bean. Elmore J. Bean. Nolan S. Bean.’ This agreement was duly witnessed and acknowledged. The will was offered for probate in the probate court. Its allowance was contested, but was allowed by the judge of probate. An appeal was taken to the circuit court, a trial was had before a jury which disallowed the will. The case is brought here by writ of error.

The circuit judge before whom the case was tried was the late Erastus Peck. There were a great many witnesses sworn. The record contains nearly 400 printed pages, with 39 assignments of error. So many of the assignments of error relate to the charge of the judge, or his failure to charge, that we deem it advisable to quote here very liberally from his charge, as follows:

‘Two general questions are presented to the jury for consideration in determining the controversy now before you: First, whether the testator, John H. Bean, was of sound mind at the time the will in question was executed; and, second, whether the will was procured by undue influence. Upon the first of these propositions the proponent, Elmore Bean, has the burden of proof, and the question for your decision accurately stated is this: Has the proponent proven upon this trial by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the proposed will was executed, July 28, 1900, the testator, John H. Bean, was of sound mind, as that term is used in the statute of this state relating to wills. Now this inquiry relates to the precise time when the will was executed, July 28, 1900. It is immaterial what may have been the condition of his mind at any other time before or afterward. The question here for your determination is whether at the very time the will was executed the testator was of sound mind. Nor does the question relate to wills generally. It only applies to this particular will. The inquiry is, Was Mr. Bean mentally competent to make the will in controversy? The law of this state provides that every person of full age and sound mind may make a will. Mr. Bean was of full age. Was he also of sound mind? That is, did he have sufficient mental capacity to make this will? Now, if Mr. Bean did have sufficient mental capacity to make the proposed will, if his mind was sound when the will was made, he had a legal right to dispose of

[108 N.W. 371]

his property as he saw fit. The law does not require property to be disposed of equally among those who would be heirs in case of a man's death, but leaves every man who is of a sound mind to dispose of his property as he chooses. The fact that he prefers one to another can have no bearing upon the validity of his voluntary and intelligent action. It concerns no one what his reasons may be for doing what he has a right to do. The court and jury have no right to substitute their judgment for Mr. Bean's in this case, or to pass upon the wisdom or justice of his reasons, whether they are wise or unwise, just or unjust. They are for him, and no one else, to determine, provided that when he executed this will he was of sound mind and mentally competent to make it. On the other hand, if Mr. Bean did not have sufficient mental capacity to make this will, if his mind was not ‘sound,’ within the meaning of the statute, when the will was made, then the will is invalid and cannot stand, whatever may be its provisions. It is therefore very important that you should clearly understand what is meant by the term ‘sound mind’ as found in the statute of this state relating to wills. And, upon that subject, I now instruct you that if at the time he executed this will Mr. Bean had sufficient mental capacity to understand the business in which he was engaged, to know and understand the extent and value of his property, and how he wanted to dispose of it, to know the number of his children and who they were, to keep these facts in his mind long enough to dictate his will without prompting from others, he had sufficient capacity to make the will. Mr. Bean had sufficient capacity to make the will, if when it was made he understood the business in which he was engaged, and the extent and value of his property, and knew who were his children who would be heirs at law if he made no will. Soundness of mind implies such a mental condition as enables the testator to understand and comprehend his act and all the conditions which would enter into its rational performance. It is not enough that he understands some of them, or a part of them, or that he could form some rational idea upon some branch of the subject, but he must have mind enough to comprehend and understand the scheme, the general plan of the entire transaction. He need not be able at the moment to carry in his mind the details of his estate, but he must have a general comprehension of it, and of what he is doing, and the effect of the will he is making, and must at the same time be able to understand who his relatives are, and who are the natural objects of his bounty. He must be conscious also of the fact, in such a case as this, that he is making an unequal distribution of his estate among his children-is entirely disinheriting three of them.

‘Average mental capacity at the time of the execution of the will is not necessary to its validity. A less degree of mind or capacity is requisite to execute a will than to make a contract covering the same subject matter. Though the testator must understand substantially the extent of his property, his relations to others who may be, or naturally would be, the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will, and must have sufficient activity of memory to collect in his mind without prompting the elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive as well their obvious relations to each other, and be able to form some rational judgment in regard to them, yet he need not have the same perfect and complete understanding and appreciation of any of these matters in all their bearings as a person in sound and vigorous health of body and mind would have. Nor is it required that he know the precise legal effect of every provision contained in his will. The will in question is not valid unless Mr. Bean not only intended of his own free will to make such a disposition of his property as the law contemplates, but was capable...