Bean v. UNITED WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC
| Decision Date | 09 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. CV94-PT-1033-M.,CV94-PT-1033-M. |
| Citation | 861 F. Supp. 1554 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
| Parties | Edwin BEAN, Danny L. Claborn, Ernest Bert Dodd, Arlon Turner, Morene Garner, Louise Jones, Jimmy Lindsey, Burlin McCreless, Thomas Moore, Richard O'Tinger, Leona Richardson, Arvie Lee Scruggs, Verlon White, Jerry A. Williams v. UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM AND PLASTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC, a national labor union; Reeves Rubber, Inc., a corporation; S & B Technical Productions, a corporation; Bobby Breedwell, individually and in his official capacity as President of Local 899 URCLPWA of Albertville, Alabama. |
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John T. Robertson, IV, Henslee Bradley & Robertson, Gadsden, AL, for plaintiffs.
John Lee Quinn, Longshore Nakamura & Quinn, Birmingham, AL, Charles R. Armstrong, Carolyn T. Wonders, URW Asst. Gen. Counsel, Akron, OH, William B. Hairston, Jr., Engel Hairston & Johanson, Birmingham, AL, Peter F. Munger, Paul T. Ryan, Clark Paul Hoover & Mallard, Atlanta, GA, and Edward Bograd and Terrie V. Hagler, Blair Conaway Bograd & Martin, Charlotte, NC, for defendants.
This cause comes to be heard on defendant S & B Technical Products' (hereinafter S & B) Motion to Dismiss. S & B originally filed this motion on June 20, 1994. Plaintiffs responded to the motion in brief submitted July 6, 1994. S & B replied to plaintiffs' response in brief submitted July 18, 1994. This court filed a Memorandum Opinion on August 1, 1994, explaining the court's tentative positions regarding the issues raised by the Motion, and affording plaintiffs an opportunity to respond to such positions. Both plaintiffs and defendant S & B have submitted supplemental briefs in response to the court's earlier Memorandum Opinion.
In considering this Motion to Dismiss, the court derives the facts from the allegations contained in plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint, as well as affidavits submitted by plaintiffs, and assumes all facts alleged therein to be true.
Plaintiffs were for many years employed by defendant Reeves Rubber, Inc. (Reeves), at its Albertville, Alabama plants. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2. Defendants United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastics Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Local 899, URCLPWA of Albertville, Alabama (collectively "the Union"), were plaintiffs' exclusive bargaining agents in negotiating and enforcing employment contracts with Reeves. Id. Pursuant to that authority, the Union and Reeves entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in July, 1992. That agreement was to be effective until June 10, 1995. Id.
On or about November 2, 1993, Reeves sold its facility at which some of the plaintiffs worked to defendant S & B. At that time, Reeves terminated the employment of those plaintiffs. On or about February 1, 1994, Reeves sold the facility at which the remaining plaintiffs worked to defendant S & B. Id. at 3. At that time, Reeves terminated those plaintiffs' employment. Id.
Sometime after these transactions occurred, S & B purchased substantially all the remaining assets of Reeves. Id. The court does not know why the remaining assets were purchased after the facilities were purchased.
Since these purchases, S & B has hired a majority of Reeves' former employees. Moreover, a majority of S & B's employees at these facilities were employees of Reeves when it owned the same facilities. Id. Plaintiffs applied for positions with S & B, but were not hired. Id. According to plaintiffs, S & B chose not to re-hire them because they were the more senior and pro-union workers at Reeves. Id. at 4. Thus, plaintiffs allege, S & B's hiring practices were grounded in anti-union animus.
S & B has continued to manufacture the same products at these facilities as Reeves manufactured. Id. at 3. No new products have been introduced. Id. Based on the similarities of employees, assets, and manufacturing activities, plaintiffs allege that there is substantial identity between Reeves and S & B. Moreover, given this substantial identity, plaintiffs contend that S & B is bound by the terms of the CBA entered into by the Union and Reeves.
Plaintiffs allege that through the sale of the business and the subsequent failure to hire former employees on the basis of Union loyalty, defendants S & B and Reeves conspired1 to "so act as to nullify and void the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and to rid themselves of its terms, conditions, obligations, and responsibilities." Id. at 4. Plaintiffs allege that, pursuant to this conspiracy, defendant S & B has committed unfair labor practices and has breached repeatedly the terms of the CBA. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that S & B's actions in failing to recognize and negotiate with the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for plaintiffs and others, in implementing changes in the terms of plaintiffs' employment without bargaining in good faith, in engaging in individual bargaining with its individual employees, and in refusing to hire plaintiffs, constitute both unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1), § 8(a)(3), and § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988), as well as breaches of the CBA, which are actionable under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendant Union was under, and still remains under, a duty to represent the interests of its members fairly. Plaintiffs contend that, pursuant to that duty, the Union was obligated to negotiate with S & B for plaintiffs' employment. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that the Union was and is obligated to pursue their unfair labor practices claims with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Plaintiffs allege that, in bad faith, the Union has refused to enforce the CBA, has refused to attempt to negotiate with S & B, and has refused to pursue plaintiffs' unfair labor practices claims with the NLRB. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs contend that because the Union's failure to take these actions was arbitrary, discriminatory, and in bad faith, such inaction constitutes a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation.
S & B ("defendant") has moved to dismiss the complaint against it on two grounds. First, defendant argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction as to claims brought against it under § 8 of the Act. Second, defendant contends that, as against S & B, the complaint alleging violations of § 301 of the LMRA fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For these reasons, defendant urges this court to dismiss the complaint against it under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), FED.R.CIV.P.
Defendant argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over claims brought against it under § 8 of the NLRA. Citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), defendant reasons that under § 10 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988), Congress has conferred on the NLRB primary and exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under § 8 of the Act. This jurisdiction "preempts the authority of federal courts with respect to claims falling solely within the ... prohibitions of Section 8 of the Act." S & B's Brief in Support at 3. For this reason, defendant urges this court to dismiss all claims brought against it under Section 8 of the Act.
Further, defendant contends that any claim brought against it under § 301 of the LMRA fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, defendant argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over any such claim. As to both of these grounds, defendant reasons that the jurisdictional grant conferred by § 301 extends only to "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization...." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Thus, in order to sue under § 301, defendant maintains, there must be a contract in existence between the employer and the labor organization. Defendant admits that a successor employer can be required to bargain and negotiate with a labor organization, if there is a "substantial continuity of identity" between the predecessor and successor employers. Plaintiffs' claim still fails under this standard, defendant asserts, because the duty to bargain has never been extended to a duty to abide by the terms of the preexisting CBA. There was no contract which had been entered into between the Union and S & B. Thus, defendant argues, no suit can be maintained against it under § 301, nor could this court exercise jurisdiction under that section.
In opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiffs' argument is two-fold. First, plaintiffs contend that the court has jurisdictional power to resolve unfair labor practice questions which arise as collateral issues to a suit for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. Second, plaintiffs assert that because defendant voluntarily hired a majority of Reeves' former employees, defendant placed itself under a duty to bargain with the Union, if not under a duty to abide by the CBA.
In response to defendant's § 8 jurisdictional argument, plaintiffs maintain that this court can exercise jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims, where those claims "emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies." Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 743, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 2647, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988). Citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), plaintiffs argue that one such independent federal remedy is a union's breach of fair representation. Thus, plaintiffs argue that the court can exercise jurisdiction over all § 8 claims which form the basis for the plaintiffs' breach of fair representation claims.
Answering defendant's contentions as to § 301, plaintiffs assert that defendant's actions in employing a majority of the...
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