Beanland v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.

• Citation: 345 F. Supp. 220
• Decision Date: 20 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 18808-1.,18808-1.
• Parties: Henry L. BEANLAND, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Western District of Missouri

345 F. Supp. 220

Henry L. BEANLAND, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. 18808-1.

United States District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

June 20, 1972.

Jo B. Gardner, Monett, Mo., for plaintiff.

Neal E. Millert, David R. Odegard, James & McCanse, Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

JOHN W. OLIVER, District Judge.

I.

This case pends on defendants' motion for new trial and its alternative motion for remittitur of the $275,000 verdict rendered by the jury in this FELA case. Final ruling of those motions was necessarily delayed because of the necessity for directing further proceedings in connection with ground 17 of defendants' motion for new trial. It was there alleged that defendants had been deprived of a fair trial by the alleged misconduct of two members of the jury. We filed a memorandum opinion in connection with that question on February 23, 1972, and incorporate what was there said as a part of this memorandum opinion by this reference. That memorandum opinion is published immediately following this opinion. We shall discuss and rule the additional questions presented in regard to ground 17 in Part V of this opinion.

II.

Defendants' motion for new trial alleges sixteen other separate grounds of alleged error. Its alternative motion for remittitur is based on five separate grounds. Many of the grounds alleged in both motions are stated in stereo-typed form, e. g., "the verdict is contrary to the evidence elicited at the trial;" "the verdict of the jury herein is excessive." Numerous questions are raised in regard to instructions given and refused. Some of the grounds relate to questions of rulings on the admissibility of evidence. We have carefully reviewed our notes made during trial and are confident that the rationale of our rulings is clearly apparent of record and that additional discussion of those rulings, with two exceptions, would not be of benefit to the Court of Appeals. We state, however, that we have carefully considered each of the alleged grounds separately in light of the voluminous briefs filed by the respective parties and have concluded that defendants' motion for new trial and its alternative motion for remittitur should be denied.

III.

In addition to supplementing our discussion of ground 17 of defendants' motion for new trial (which relates to the alleged misconduct of two members of the jury), we believe it is appropriate to discuss ground 5 of defendants' motion for new trial which alleges that "the Court improperly refused defendants' motion for a continuance."

The files and records of this Court show that by operation of this Court's local rules this case was initially assigned to Division 2, presided over by the Honorable William R. Collinson. It was then processed for trial in the same manner as every other case which reaches this Court's accelerated docket. The procedures under which it was processed were designed to avoid the delays and needless loss of judicial time and juror expense occasioned by practices which would otherwise exist if counsel, rather than the Court, were permitted to control the docket of this Court by seeking and easily obtaining continuances of cases set for trial.

Counsel were advised by a notice mailed July 26, 1971 by the Clerk's office that during the period between October 26, 1971 and about November 12, 1971, all four divisions of this Court would be in continuous session for purposes of trying the civil jury cases listed, which, of course, included this case. Counsel were requested in July to arrange their schedule so that no request for postponement would be made the following October. That notice expressly emphasized that "none of the cases set for trial during this period will be continued because of conflicting engagements." A form was enclosed with the July notice which requested that lead trial counsel be listed so that the trial docket could be arranged with the least possible conflict.

Judge Collinson, on October 7, 1971, approved Amended Standard Pretrial Order No. 2, which had been filed in accordance with Local Rule 20. That order, of course, was also approved by counsel for both parties. Judge Collinson set the case for final pretrial conference for October 19, 1971.

The regular accelerated docket of this Court, which had been issued October 6, 1971, carried a setting of November 1, 1971 for the trial of this case. Defendants' motion for continuance shows that Judge Duncan reset the case which pended in the St. Joseph Division, which counsel claimed as a conflicting setting, from October 26, 1971 (the first week of the accelerated docket) to November 1, and still later to November 8, 1971. The files and records show that the original November 1, 1971 setting for this case was moved to November 8, 1971. We do not know the precise circumstances under which the shifts were made in the two Rock Island cases which pended in the St. Joseph Division and in the Western Division of this Court.

Judge Collinson, in a pretrial order dictated to reflect the proceedings of the final pretrial conference, stated that the final pretrial conference had been held as scheduled and that, after a lengthy discussion of conflicting dates of trials, the Court had ordered that the case remain on the docket for trial on November 8, 1971. Judge Collinson's order reflects that the "defendants announced that they would file a motion for continuance because of these conflicts and because of lack of discovery of additional injuries now listed by the plaintiff." October 20, 1971, the day after the final pretrial conference, defense counsel filed such a motion asking the Court to remove the case from its November 8, 1971 trial setting "for the reason that trial counsel is unable to adequately prepare this cause for trial on that date because of a conflicting trial setting in this District, together with the other circumstances set forth in the Suggestions submitted herewith."

Judge Collinson's order denying that motion stated:

Defendants have filed herein a motion for continuance to continue the trial setting on November 8, 1971. After an examination of this motion, a discussion with Judge Richard Duncan and a discussion with Chief Judge Becker of this Court, and being fully familiar with all the matters pertaining to this because of a pretrial conference which was held this week, the Court could find no merit in the request for continuance. It is therefore

ORDERED that the defendants' motion for continuance be, and it is hereby, denied.

By usual operation of the standard accelerated docket procedures of this Court, the case was assigned for trial to Division I. Defendants' motion for a continuance was orally renewed after that assignment on the same grounds already considered and ruled by Judge Collinson. At the request of counsel we discussed Judge Collinson's ruling with him and were satisfied that no exceptional circumstances were presented which required this Court to take any different view of the matter than that taken by Judge Collinson on October 22, 1971 after he had discussed the matter with both Judge Duncan and Chief Judge Becker.

We were satisfied that the granting of any continuance under the circumstances would have established a precedent which, if followed in other cases, would disrupt the orderly processing of the heavy docket of this Court. The defendant was entitled to have its motion for continuance ruled in accordance with law. We were and are satisfied that defendant was accorded that right. Defendant was not entitled to more.

The transcript of the proceedings in this case reflects that defendants' professed fear of being unable to prepare for trial was totally unfounded. Both Mr. Millert and Mr. Odegard tried this case in a highly competent manner which would have been impossible had they been unprepared. Neither ever complained about being surprised by anything that occurred during the trial. We find and conclude that the case was tried well on both sides; that there was a minimum of objections; and that we are satisfied that the denial of any continuance in this case did not prejudice the defendants in any manner. We are confident that substantially the same result would have been reached had the case been defended by any other two of the partners in the law firm retained by the defendants.

IV.

Separate consideration must be given defendants' alternative motion for remittitur. Although defendants concede that "there was some expert opinion that plaintiff's earning capacity may be permanently impaired," it nevertheless seeks to have this Court reduce the amount of the verdict returned by the jury.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit most recently collected the applicable cases in Scoville v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, (8th Cir., 1972) 458 F.2d 639. In Scoville, the railroad complained that a $73,575 verdict for one group of plaintiffs and a $65,952 verdict for another group of plaintiffs in a railroad crossing case was plainly excessive as a matter of law because a $35,000 verdict was the highest ever sustained by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in a wrongful death action for the death of a child. The Missouri Pacific unsuccessfully suggested that the Court of Appeals recognize that juries are "sometimes prone to return verdicts against railroads despite the law or the facts."

The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that the jury verdicts in that case were either "monstrous" or "plainly unjust" within the meaning of the rule of decision established in the numerous Eighth Circuit cases which it cited in footnote 20. That case also emphasized the responsibility of the trial judge to make a fair and objective finding of the atmosphere of the trial in evaluating whether the jury had been improperly induced to act out of passion or prejudice in arriving at the verdict. Judge Johnsen, when Chief...