Bear Mgc Cutlery Co. v. Estes Exp. Lines

• Citation: 132 F.Supp.2d 937
• Decision Date: 22 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. CV-00-PT-3591-E.,CV-00-PT-3591-E.
• Parties: BEAR MGC CUTLERY CO., INC., Plaintiff, v. ESTES EXPRESS LINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama

132 F.Supp.2d 937

BEAR MGC CUTLERY CO., INC., Plaintiff, v. ESTES EXPRESS LINES, INC., Defendant.

No. CV-00-PT-3591-E.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

February 22, 2001.

RM Woodrow, Doster & Woodrow, Anniston, AL, for Bear MGC Cutlery Co, Inc., plaintiff.

Lawrence J Roberts, Shawncoulson, LLP, Miami, FL, for Estes Express Lines, defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PROPST, Senior District Judge.

This cause comes to be heard upon plaintiff Bear MGC Cutlery Co.'s ("plaintiff") Motion to Remand, filed on December 27, 2000, and Defendant Estes Express Lines, Inc.'s ("defendant") Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 14, 2000.

HISTORY

The plaintiff is an Alabama corporation. The defendant is a Virginia corporation that does business in Alabama. On November 24, 2000, the plaintiff filed the complaint at issue in the Circuit Court for Calhoun County, Alabama. The complaint alleges, in essence, that the defendant, who had contracted with the plaintiff to deliver certain goods to it, had failed properly to deliver the goods. The complaint alleges that the defendant damaged the goods during delivery and that the defendant somehow "deceived" the plaintiff. The causes of action listed as counts in the complaint are all brought under Alabama law: breach of contract, negligence and wantonness, outrage, and breach of warranty. No federal cause of action is directly claimed. The amount in controversy is $40,000 plus interest and costs.

The defendant filed its Notice of Removal with this court on December 14, 2000. Its basis for removal is that this court has jurisdiction over the controversy because it is "an action to recover for alleged loss, damage, delay, or injury to cargo transported in interstate commerce by a motor carrier wherein damages claimed exceed $10,000." The defendant claims that because it is a motor carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board of the United States Department of Transportation, its liability is controlled exclusively by the provisions of the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, which governs a motor carrier's liability for loss or damage to goods shipped in interstate commerce. In its motion in opposition to the plaintiff's motion to remand, the defendant refers the court to its Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 14, 2000, in which the defendant cites a host of case law in which courts have held that the Carmack Amendment preempts state law liability for interstate motor carriers. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913) (View that state laws and regulations not superseded by Carmack Amendment "untenable"); Strickland Transp. Co. v. American Distributing Co., 198 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir.1952) (Texas damages law preempted by damages limitations in Carmack Amendment); Adelman v. Hub City Los Angeles Terminal, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 1544, 1551 (N.D.Ala.1994) (Carmack amendment provides exclusive remedy in suits over goods lost or damaged during interstate transportation); American Eye Way, Inc. v. Roadway Package System, Inc., 875 F.Supp. 820, 820-821 (S.D.Fla. 1995) (Carmack Amendment preempts suits for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation under state law).

In opposition, the plaintiff notes that other courts have held that the Carmack Amendment does not preempt state common law claims, see Counter v. United Van Lines, Inc., 935 F.Supp. 505 (D.Vt.1996), and that the state court should be allowed to determine whether the claims are preempted, see Romney v. Lin, 105 F.3d 806 (2d Cir.1997); Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. KLLM, Inc., 58 F.Supp.2d 315 (D.Vt. 1999). The plaintiff's reliance on these three cases is simplistic and a bit misleading. The court in Counter held that the Carmack Amendment did not preempt the plaintiff's specific claim because it had nothing to do with goods that had been lost or damaged after they had been shipped. 935 F.Supp. at 508. On the contrary, the goods in question in Counter had never been shipped. Id. The court found that the Carmack Amendment applied only to goods that actually had been transported and, therefore, did not preempt the plaintiff's claims. Id. With regard to Romney, an ERISA case, the Second Circuit concluded that the federal district court had every right to adjudicate the preemption issue. 105 F.3d at 813. That it stated that there are "some cases in which a state law cause of action is preempted, but only a state court has jurisdiction to so rule" does not translate into a blanket rule as the plaintiff implies. See Id. The plaintiff's use of Ben & Jerry's undermines, at least with respect to the District of Vermont, the plaintiff's argument that the Carmack Amendment does not preempt state law tort or contract claims. See 58 F.Supp.2d at 319 ("... [the Carmack Amendment] has preempted state law."). It does, however, hold that defendants cannot remove a case not brought under the Carmack Amendment solely on the basis of federal preemption. Id. at 317.

The plaintiff, citing no authority, argues that the fact that the defendant initiated an action against it in a Virginia state court suggests that the defendant has surrendered jurisdiction of the entire case to any and all state courts before which the plaintiff chooses to bring it. According to the plaintiff, the Virginia action amounts to a "waiver" of the right to remove this action. The defendant contends that the Virginia suit, which it initiated to recover unpaid freight charges from the plaintiff — an action that it claims is not covered by the Carmack Amendment — is irrelevant to the instant case.¹

DISCUSSION

The instant case falls into a narrow category of removal cases: those in which the removal is based entirely upon alleged federal preemption of the state causes of action. Diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case because the amount in controversy — $40,000 — does not meet the jurisdictional prerequisite. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal question jurisdiction, exercised over suits "arising under the Constitution laws, or treaties of the United States," ostensibly does not exist because the complaint does not purport to claim a federal cause of action. However, the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's state law claims can be removed to a federal court whose jurisdiction is based solely on federal preemption under the Carmack Amendment implicates the doctrine of "complete" or "super" preemption.

The doctrine of complete preemption is quite different from the concept of ordinary preemption. Ordinary preemption concerns itself with the issue of whether the plaintiff's state law claims may be dismissed because they are preempted by federal law. Blab T.V. v. Comcast Cable Comm., Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 854-855 (11th Cir.1999). The issue may be raised at both state and federal levels. Id. at 855. The doctrine of complete preemption focuses on whether the federal court, to which an action brought solely pursuant to state law claims has been removed, possesses federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Id.

Complete preemption operates as a corollary, or, more accurately, an exception, to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 854. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is "master" of his own complaint, and can effectively prevent removal to a federal forum by refraining from pleading federal claims. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). The defendant usually cannot remove a case brought solely pursuant to state law (assuming, of course, that diversity jurisdiction does not exist) simply by asserting a federal defense, even the defense of ordinary federal preemption. Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 854 (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425). In such a situation, the plaintiff's reliance on Romney, supra, would be well-placed — there are indeed instances in which state law claims are preempted, but in which the state court can make such a decision. These situations arise when a plaintiff brings an action in state court, totally grounded in state law, in which the state cause(s) of action are preempted by federal law, but in which neither diversity jurisdiction nor complete preemption exists. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has characterized a state law case that may be completely preempted as one in which the claims, regardless of the state labels that the plaintiff attaches to them, give a federal court subject matter jurisdiction. McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir.1998). The Supreme Court has described complete preemption as arising under "extraordinary" circumstances, specifically, when "the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425.

Complete Preemption and the Carmack Amendment

The Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of complete preemption in the context of the Carmack Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit also has not evaluated the issue. In fact, only two circuit courts have examined the issue of whether the Carmack Amendment preempts state law so completely that a state law suit alleging facts within its scope can serve as a basis for federal question removal jurisdiction. In Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 643-646, 652 (9th Cir.1984), the Ninth Circuit held that the Carmack Amendment does not provide the basis for federal question removal jurisdiction solely because it preempts state law. In a later, unpublished opinion, Bormaster v. Express Shipping Ctr., Inc., 185 F.3d 865, 1999 WL 391044, *2 (9th Cir.1999) (unpub.), a Ninth Circuit panel, describing the Carmack Amendment, stated that "The Carmack Amendment completely preempts state law...." In light of the court's earlier holding, however, it is likely that the court...