Bearden v. State
Decision Date | 28 September 2001 |
Citation | 825 So.2d 868 |
Parties | Joshua Matthew BEARDEN v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Joshua Matthew Bearden, pro se.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Sandra J. Stewart, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Joshua Matthew Bearden appeals the circuit court's summary denial of his Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief, in which he attacked his 1998 convictions for rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree. Bearden was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for each conviction; the sentences were to run concurrently. He did not appeal. On July 18, 2000, Bearden filed the instant Rule 32 petition attacking his convictions. In his petition, Bearden alleged that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to impose the sentence, that his trial counsel was ineffective, and that his failure to appeal his convictions was through no fault of his own. After receiving a response from the State, the circuit court summarily denied Bearden's petition, finding that none of Bearden's claims were pleaded with enough specificity to warrant relief, and that all of Bearden's claims were barred by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), Ala.R.Crim.P., because they could have been, but were not, raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, and by Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Crim.P., because Bearden's petition was filed outside the two-year limitations period.
Initially, we note that the circuit court erred in finding that Bearden's petition was time-barred by Rule 32.2(c). Rule 32.2(c), provides, in pertinent part:
"Subject to the further provisions hereinafter set out in this section, the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed: (1) In the case of a conviction appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within two (2) years after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, Ala.R.App. P.; or (2) In the case of a conviction not appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within two (2) years after the time for filing an appeal lapses."
The record reflects that Bearden was convicted on April 8, 1998, and was sentenced on June 8, 1998. Bearden had 42 days from June 8, 1998—until July 20, 1998— see Rule 4(b)(1), Ala.R.App.P., to file a notice of appeal. On July 20, 1998, the two-year limitations period in Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Crim.P., began to run. Bearden's petition was filed on July 18, 2000, two days before the limitations period had expired. Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding that Bearden's petition was time-barred by Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Crim.P.
However, "`where the judgment of the circuit court denying a petition for postconviction relief is correct for any reason, it will be affirmed by this Court, even if the circuit court stated an incorrect reason for its denial.'" Long v. State, 675 So.2d 532, 533 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting Swicegood v. State, 646 So.2d 159, 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). For the reasons that follow, we find that the circuit court was correct in summarily denying all but one of Bearden's claims.
Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to impose the sentence. He makes two arguments in this regard.
First, Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because, he says, the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for his arrest was not properly verified. Although couched in jurisdictional terms, this claim does not present a jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., Sumlin v. State, 710 So.2d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) ( ). Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that this claim is procedurally barred by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), Ala.R.Crim.P., because it could have been, but was not, raised or addressed at trial or on appeal.
Second, Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because, he says, the indictments charging him with first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy were fatally defective. Specifically, he argues that the indictments failed to allege what he terms "an essential element" of both offenses—the victim's age. (Bearden's brief at p. 11.)
The indictment charging Bearden with rape in the first degree alleged, in pertinent part, that Bearden "did engage in sexual intercourse with [the victim], a female, by forcible compulsion, in violation of Section 13A-6-61 of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama." (C. 49.) The indictment charging Bearden with sodomy in the first degree alleged, in pertinent part, that Bearden "did engage in deviate sexual intercourse with [the victim] by forcible compulsion, in violation of Section 13A-6-63 of the Alabama Criminal Code, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama." (C. 50.)
Section 13A-6-61, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
Section 13A-6-63, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
Contrary to Bearden's contention, his indictments were not fatally defective for not charging the victim's age. Subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of §§ 13A-6-61 and 13A-6-63 are alternative methods of proving the crimes of first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy; all three methods do not have to be charged in the indictment and all three methods do not have to be proven by the State. Bearden was charged with first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion under § 13A-6-61(a)(1) and § 13A-6-63(a)(1); he was not charged with first-degree rape pursuant to § 13A-6-61(a)(3) or first-degree sodomy pursuant to § 13A-6-63(a)(3). The victim's age was not an element of the crimes for which Bearden was charged and of which he was convicted and, therefore, did not have to be charged in the indictment. Consequently, Bearden's claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to impose the sentence because the indictments were defective is meritless. The circuit court properly denied his Rule 32 petition as to this claim.
Bearden also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. In this regard, Bearden claims that his counsel was ineffective for allegedly:
None of Bearden's claims were pleaded with the required specificity; they are merely bare allegations unsupported by any facts....
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