Beardsley v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 10 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–3609.,13–3609.
• Parties: Cheryl BEARDSLEY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

758 F.3d 834

Cheryl BEARDSLEY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13–3609.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 28, 2014.

Decided July 10, 2014.

Joseph S. Sellers, Spector & Lenz, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Andrew Neltner, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before RIPPLE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal from the denial of Social Security disability benefits is unusual because the administrative law judge discounted the opinion of the agency's own examining physician to conclude that the claimant before him was not disabled. Claimant Cheryl Beardsley argues that the ALJ erred by giving too little weight to the opinion of the examining doctor and too much weight to an erroneous view of her daily activities, particularly the care she provided for her elderly mother. Ms. Beardsley also argues that the ALJ improperly held against her the decision not to seek surgery without trying to ascertain the reasons for her reluctance. We agree. These errors undermined the “logical bridge” between evidence and conclusion that is needed to affirm a denial of disability benefits. See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir.2000). The judgment of the district court affirming the denial of benefits is reversed and Ms. Beardsley's case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ms. Beardsley was 49 years old when she fell and injured her knee. At that time, she had a history of working as a machine operator, assembler, inspector, and cashier. After the injury, Ms. Beardsley applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Her doctors determined that she had meniscal tears and a ruptured ligament. The effects of these injuries were compounded by her obesity and her worsening osteoarthritis in that same knee. Ms. Beardsley declined to have surgery for the ligament damage but received a series of injections for the arthritis.

After Ms. Beardsley applied for disability benefits, Dr. Larry Banyash examined her on behalf of the Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519, 416.919 (establishing such consultative examinations for applicants seeking, respectively, disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income). His opinion was that the pain and weakness in her knee restricted her ability to walk, stand, climb stairs, crouch, and kneel. He believed she was capable of sedentary work. Given Ms. Beardsley's age and skills, though, a finding that she was capable of only sedentary work would have qualified her as disabled at the time of the ALJ's decision under the “grid” the agency uses for making that determination. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.12.

Ms. Beardsley's paper record then went for review by another agency physician, Dr. M. Brill. This doctor was more sanguine about Ms. Beardsley's capabilities. He judged her able to stand or walk for about six hours of an eight-hour workday, and he thought she could occasionally climb stairs, crouch, kneel, or bend down. He also thought she was not at all limited in her ability to “Push and/or pull (including operation of hand and/or foot controls).”

After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ denied Ms. Beardsley's application for benefits. Applying the familiar five-step sequential inquiry for assessing disability, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a), the ALJ determined at step one that Ms. Beardsley had not engaged in substantial gainful activity and at step two that she had a number of severe impairments: chronic knee pain, depression, personality disorder, anxiety, and obesity. These did not, however, automatically qualify her as disabled at step three under the “Listings” in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ concluded at step four that these impairments prevented Ms. Beardsley from performing her past work as a cashier or on factory assembly lines, so her claim was decided at step five, where the issue was whether she retained the ability to do other jobs available in the national economy. The ALJ found that she did, concluding that Ms. Beardsley could still perform a range of light work so long as she did not have to stand or walk for more than 30 minutes at a time or for more than six hours total in a workday. The ALJ therefore denied Ms. Beardsley's application for benefits. The district court affirmed, and this appeal followed.

If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court on judicial review must uphold that decision even if the court might have decided the case differently in the first instance. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734–35 (7th Cir.2006). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court reviews the record as a whole but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's by reweighing the evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses. Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir.2000). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits,” the court must defer to the Commissioner's resolution of that conflict. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997).

A reversal and remand may be required, however, if the ALJ committed an error of law, Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir.2009); Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir.1997), or if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual mistakes or omissions, Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 309 (7th Cir.1996). The ALJ also has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record, Nelson, 131 F.3d at 1235, and must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the administrative findings, Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.2003); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir.2001). If the evidence does not support the conclusion, we cannot uphold the decision. Blakes, 331 F.3d at 569.

The logical bridge was not sound here. The ALJ relied on three principal grounds to find that Ms. Beardsley could do light work: (1) her description of her own capabilities and daily activities, (2) the opinion of Dr. Brill, and (3) Ms. Beardsley's conservative course of treatment, including her decision not to seek surgery. As we explain below, none of these factors, considered individually or collectively, provides adequate support for the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Beardsley could perform work more demanding than sedentary work.

I. Ms. Beardsley's Self–Reported Capabilities

Ms. Beardsley testified at her hearing that she experienced moderate to extreme pain throughout her leg and into her back. She had difficulty walking or standing for more than about ten minutes at a time, and although she could drive without using her injured left knee, she had trouble getting in and out of the car and did not like going out. She estimated that she shopped for necessities about once a week, leaning on the grocery cart for support, and that her pain would usually be worse the next day. Much of Ms. Beardsley's weekdays were spent keeping her mother company, which involved watching television, playing cards, doing light housework, preparing simple meals, and helping her mother into bed in the evening.

The ALJ acknowledged that these daily activities were “fairly limited,” but he was not persuaded that they weighed in favor of a disability finding because “allegedly limited daily activities cannot be objectively verified with any reasonable degree of certainty.” Whatever uncertainty may exist around such self-reports is not by itself reason to discount them—otherwise, why ask in the first place?—and the relevant regulations specifically allow ALJs to consider claimants' “daily activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). By the ALJ's reasoning, the agency could ignore applicants' claims of severe pain simply because such subjective states are impossible to verify with complete certainty, yet the law is to the contrary. See Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir.2004) (reversing and remanding where ALJ improperly discounted applicant's claims of severe pain); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 (regulations governing evaluation of symptoms, including complaints of pain). Nor was the record lacking in evidence to corroborate Ms. Beardsley's reported activities.Her mother gave a similar account of her daughter's daily routine and limitations, and both of their descriptions were consistent with the medical evidence of a severe knee injury.

The ALJ also highlighted what he saw as inconsistencies in Ms. Beardsley's self-reports. To the extent we see any inconsistencies here, they do not rise above trivial matters that the ALJ did not inquire into during Ms. Beardsley's hearing. Ms. Beardsley wrote in her application for benefits that she went to her mother's every weekday, but also said in the same document that she “went outside” about three times a week. She acknowledged paying her own bills but also said she had difficulty handling money because of her depression and other mental difficulties. Sometimes when she went out, she needed someone to accompany her, but sometimes not. “An ALJ's credibility assessment will stand as long as there is some support in the record,” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir.2008) (internal formatting omitted), but without some attempt by the ALJ to explore the supposed contradictions here, they do not provide a sound basis for concluding that Ms....