Bearshield v. City of Gregory, 12426

• Citation: 278 N.W.2d 164
• Decision Date: 19 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12426,12426
• Parties: Velda BEARSHIELD, Special Administratrix of the Estate of William Bearshield, Deceased, Claimant and Respondent, v. CITY OF GREGORY, Employer and Appellant, and St. Paul Insurance Companies, Insurer and Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 164

278 N.W.2d 164

Velda BEARSHIELD, Special Administratrix of the Estate of William Bearshield, Deceased, Claimant and Respondent, v. CITY OF GREGORY, Employer and Appellant, and St. Paul Insurance Companies, Insurer and Appellant.

No. 12426.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued Jan. 23, 1979.

Decided April 19, 1979.

J. M. Grossenburg of Day & Grossenburg, Winner, for claimant and respondent.

Gary E. Davis of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for employer and appellant, and insurer and appellant.

MORGAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit reversing the decision of the Director of the Department of Labor determining that respondent's claim was barred by the statute of limitations contained in SDCL 62-7-35. ¹ We affirm the judgment of the circuit court and remand the matter to the Department of Labor for further proceedings.

In the early morning hours of December 13, 1972, a brick was hurled through a window of the police station in Gregory, South Dakota. As a result of the incident, Officer William Bearshield, respondent, who was on duty at the time, received some glass splinters in his left eye. Later that day, a local doctor removed the glass and washed the eye. Throughout the next few months, respondent continued to visit the doctor because the eye continued to be irritated and red. The injury was reported to and these medical expenses were paid by the city's worker's compensation insurer. Respondent also noticed occasional blurred vision.

In July of 1973, respondent began suffering from frequent headaches and blurred vision. This condition continued through the fall of 1974, when, on November 20, respondent entered the Veterans Administration Hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota for treatment of his headaches. During the examination, respondent was informed that his left eye was damaged and blindness in that eye caused his headaches. In the following months, respondent visited eye specialists in Yankton and Mitchell, both of whom also told him the eye was blind. This development was reported to the worker's compensation carrier through its agent. The carrier, in turn, on December 1, 1975, wrote respondent acknowledging that they had been notified but advised respondent that further benefits would not be forthcoming due to the running of the statute of limitations. Subsequently, on May 10, 1976, respondent filed a petition for hearing on his claim for worker's compensation disability benefits. Following the hearing, the hearing examiner for the Department of Labor (Department) ruled that the two-year statute of limitations on worker's compensation claims had run and that respondent's claim was barred. Respondent appealed the Department's decision to circuit court, which reversed the decision and remanded it to the Department for further proceedings. It is the circuit court's reversal of the Department's decision that the City of Gregory and its insurance carrier, appellants, contest before this Court.

Appellants first urge that the circuit court erred in modifying and reversing the Department's decision because it was supported by substantial evidence. The scope of review is defined in SDCL 1-26-31 which states that the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. The statute specifies that the court may reverse or modify the decision only if substantial rights of the appellant (respondent herein) have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions, are, among other things, unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

It is appellants' contention that it was error for the circuit court to reverse the Department's ruling that the respondent "knew or should have known" of the injury in July of 1973, since that ruling is supported by substantial evidence and therefore cannot be overturned. Appellants' contention is based, however, on the premise that the Department's ruling is a finding of fact, which it is not. The facts found by the Department were that in July of 1973, respondent experienced blurred vision and headaches. The Department's determination that, at that time, respondent knew or should have known he was blind was a conclusion of law. The determination of what is or is not "knowledge" sufficient to initiate the running of the statute of limitations is a legal determination, not a factual one.

In actuality, the facts were undisputed. The issue over when the statute of limitations starts to run depends upon the determination when respondent had sufficient knowledge that he had a work-related compensable injury. This is primarily a question of law. The Department correctly ascertained the law with respect to "knowledge", but, in the opinion of the circuit court, it erred in its application of the law to the facts of this case. We hold that the circuit court was correct in determining the scope of its review of the Department's decision.

We then turn to appellants' second contention, that the circuit court erred in determining that the statute of limitations commenced to run on December 2, 1974.

The statute of limitation for worker's compensation claims is "two years after an...