Beasley v. Beasley
| Decision Date | 21 November 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 31094.,31094. |
| Citation | 404 Ill. 225,88 N.E.2d 435 |
| Parties | BEASLEY et al. v. BEASLEY et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Arthur Beasley and others sued Raymond Beasley and others in partition to determine title to land involving construction of a deed.
The Circuit Court, Gallatin County, Caswell J. Crebs, J., entered a decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court, Simpson, J., affirmed, construed the deed as creating a fee tail estate under the common law, and held that the remaindermen therein were not barred by laches or adverse possession from asserting their rights to the realty on death of the life tenant.Kern & Pearce, of Carmi, Joseph L. Bartley, of Shawneetown, and Charles L. Rice, of Cairo, for appellants.
Craig & Craig, of Mt. Vernon, for appellees.
A freehold being involved, this appeal comes directly here, seeking to reverse a decree of the circuit court of Gallatin County. January 19, 1881, the deed in question was executed and delivered, and on July 7, 1881, recorded in Gallatin County. It was in printed form, the blanks filled in by handwriting, and reads as follows:
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¦‘The Grantors_____Charles Cook and Nancy J. Cook ¦
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¦His wife_______________________________________ ¦
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¦of the______First Part____________in the County of ¦
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¦____Gallatin______and State of________Illinois___ ¦
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¦for and in consideration of______One Hundred________ ¦
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¦Dollars, in hand paid, CONVEY and WARRANT to ¦
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¦_______Lettie A. Beasley and her Bodley Heirs_______ ¦
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¦of the_____Second Part_____________________County of ¦
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¦________Gallatin______and State of____Illinois___ ¦
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¦the following described real estate, to-wit: ¦
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¦______The North East Quarter of the North West______ ¦
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¦_____Quarter of Section No Twenty Eight (28) in_____ ¦
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¦______Township No, Seven (7) South of Range No______ ¦
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¦_____Eight (8) East Containing Forty acres More_____ ¦
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¦_____or less________________________________________ ¦
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¦Situated in the County of Gallatin in the State of Illinois, ¦
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¦hereby releasing and waiving all rights under and by virtue ¦
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¦of the Homestead Exemption Laws of this State.‘ ¦
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The main question for decision is what interest was conveyed by this deed, and to whom. On its date Lettie A. Beasley had two living children, and two more were born to her thereafter. Her husband died in 1884 but she continued to occupy the premises until the fall of 1885. August 14, 1882, the premises were sold for taxes for the year 1881, to John D. Richeson, who procured a tax deed therefor and recorded it in Gallatin County, August 18, 1884. The validity of this tax deed was challenged at the trial and it was then offered for the purpose of showing color of title only.
Lettie A. Beasley and her husband, William Beasley, on July 9, 1881, mortgaged the premises to Helen M. Loveland, who later foreclosed the mortgage and procured a master's deed to the premises August 11, 1885, which was recorded in Gallatin County on the 29th of the same month. August 18, 1884, the tax purchaser gave a quitclaim deed to the premises to Silas Cook and on August 12, 1887, the latter was given a quitclaim deed to the same premises by the executor of the will of Helen M. Loveland, so that he then became the holder of the two chains of title to the premises, one through the tax deed and the other through the master's deed, the former being recorded in Gallatin County on August 18, 1884, and the latter being recorded in said county September 5, 1887.
It is contended by those holding title through mesne conveyances from Silas Cook that through the deed to Lettie A. Beasley and her bodily heirs she individually took fee-simple title in the premises, or that she and her two living children took title in fee simple thereto. It is claimed, on the other hand, by the bodily heirs of Lettie A. Beasley, that the said deed created what would have been a fee tail estate at common law, and that by virtueof section 6 of the Conveyance Act, then and still in force, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1874, chap. 30, par. 6, and Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, chap. 30, par. 5), Lettie A. Beasley took a life interest in the premises with remainder to the living heirs of her body subject to being opened up to let in afterborn children.
If the deed of January 19, 1881, conveyed a fee-simple title to either Lettie A. Beasley or to her and her two children living at that time, it would seem from the record that they had lost their rights to assert title by reason of the statutes of limitations, as the evidence showed twenty years' adverse possession and also more than seven years' possession under color of title with payment of taxes. If, on the other hand, that deed created remainders in the bodily heirs of Lettie A. Beasley, a serious question arises as to whether or not their interest has been lost by reason of said statutes. We shall pass upon that point later in this opinion.
This suit for partition was filed February 28, 1940, by three of the bodily heirs of Lettie A. Beasley against her fourth bodily heir and all others claiming an interest in the real estate. The bodily heirs had given an oil-and-gas lease on the premises, and those claiming title adversely to them had given an oil-and-gas lease thereon to other persons. Some of the original parties died while this suit was pending, but, through proper amendments, all persons interested were made parties and the court was asked to determine in whom the title was vested. Claim was made that if the bodily heirs of Lettie A. Beasley took a vested remainder in the premises through the deed in question, their rights and interests were barred by the twenty-year Statute of Limitations, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, chap. 83, par. 1), and also by the statute concerning color of title and seven years' continuous possession with payment of taxes. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, chap. 83, par. 6.
The circuit court found that the deed of January 19, 1881, would convey an estate tail under the common law and therefore section 6 of the Conveyances Act applied vesting a life estate in Lettie A. Beasley with remainder in the heirs of her body subject to being diminished in quantity and opened up to let in afterborn children. It further found that the statutes of limitations did not operate to run against the bodily heirs of Lettie A. Beasley during her lifetime.
All parties agree that a conveyance to one and the heirs of his body (or his bodily heirs) would be a fee-tail conveyance at common law and that the statute would apply. Appellants say, however, that the words ‘of the second part’ following the words ‘to Lettie A. Beasley and her bodley heirs' change the effect of the deed in question so that it would not convey a fee-tail estate at common law. The deed contained no descriptive part and no habendum clause or other explanatory words. The words ‘and her bodley heirs' were in the granting clause. Generally, where words of this nature appear in the granting clause rather than in the descriptive or other part of the deed and there is nothing in the context to indicate a contrary intention, we have held that by their use the parties intended them to be words of limitation rather than words of purchase. Sauls v. Cox, 394 Ill. 81, 67 N.E.2d 187; Jones v. Makemson, 293 Ill. 534, 127 N.E. 730;Coogan v. Jones, 278 Ill. 279, 115 N.E. 877;Dick v. Ricker, 222 Ill. 413, 78 N.E. 823,113 Am.St.Rep. 426.
There is nothing in the context of the deed before us to indicate that the words ‘bodley heirs' should be given a meaning different from what they are generally understood to mean in the law of real property. Where a grantor employs words which have a definite legal significance in the law of real property, it is presumed he intended that such technical words should be given their special significance unless it appears from the context that he intended they should be given a different meaning. Bibo v. Bibo, 397 Ill. 505, 74 N.E.2d 808;Gridley v. Gridley, 399 Ill. 215, 77 N.E.2d 146. The license permitted in the construction of wills is not allowed in construing a deed. Failure to observe this distinction leads to confusion. Sauls v. Cox, 394 Ill. 81, 67 N.E.2d 187.
To hold that the deed in question did not create an estate tail at common law would require us to construe it as passing a present fee-simple estate either to Lettie A. Beasley, individually, or to her and her two children living at the date of the deed. In the former case, we would be required to hold the words ‘and her bodley heirs' meaningless, or, in the latter case, to hold that there were several grantees in the deed,...
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