Beasley v. Bozeman

• Decision Date: 10 July 1975
• Citation: 294 Ala. 288,315 So.2d 570
• Parties: John K. BEASLEY and Jerry K. Beasley, a minor who sues by and through his father and next friend, John K. Beasley v. Gregory BOZEMAN, a minor, and Lynn Bozeman. SC 1134.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 570

315 So.2d 570

294 Ala. 288

John K. BEASLEY and Jerry K. Beasley, a minor who sues by and through his father and next friend, John K. Beasley v. Gregory BOZEMAN, a minor, and Lynn Bozeman.

SC 1134.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 10, 1975.

Jordan, Heard & Fuller, Montgomery, for appellants.

Thomas H. Keene, Montgomery, for appellees.

MADDOX, Justice.

The sole question for decision is the constitutionality of Alabama's 'Guest Statute,' Title 36, § 95, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp. 1958), which reads as follows:

'Liable only for willful or wanton misconduct.--The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.'

Appellant argues that our guest statute violates Sections 1, 6, 13 and 22 of the State Constitution and Amendment 14 of the Federal Constitution. These identical claims were made when the constitutionality of Alabama's guest statute was upheld in this Court's case of Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939).

We are aware that some courts have held their guest statutes to be unconstitutional. Cf. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974). The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the right of a state to pass a guest law. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929).

Several other states besides Alabama have recently upheld their individual guest statutes. See Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Civ.App.1973); Richardson v. Hansen, 527 P.2d 536 (Colo.1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del.Supr.1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, 525 P.2d 99 (Or.1974); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah, 1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86 (S.D.1975).

We are of the opinion, that under the distribution of powers section of our State Constitution, it is within the province of the Legislature to ascertain and determine when the welfare of the people might require that the guest statute should be repealed. The Legislature's power should not be interfered with unless it is exercised in a manner which plainly conflicts with some higher law. Pickett v. Matthews, supra.

The judgment of the circuit court is due to be affirmed.

Since we affirm the case, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the point raised by the appellee that the constitutional question was not adequately raised in the trial court.

Affirmed.

MERRILL, BLOODWORTH, ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur.

HEFLIN, C.J., concurs in the result.

JONES, J., concurs specially, with which FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., concur.

JONES, Justice (concurring specially).

Because my concurrence with this opinion represents a change of mind, I am constrained to comment on the reasoning process which led to this reversal in my thinking. It is the discipline of this office, and fortunately so, that initial impulses do not always prevail against thorough research and more deliberate consideration. Especially do we find this to be true when we commit to writing the rationale for our conclusions, which is frequently practiced in difficult cases although another of the Justices has been assigned to prepare the opinion. It is not too uncommon to find that what will 'think out' will not 'write down'; thus the expression in judicial circles, 'It just won't Write that way.'

My initial compulsion was to strike down the guest statute as bad law. While I have not changed my mind about the quality of the Act, I have concluded there is no legal basis on which this Court could hold the statute invalid. To disagree with the public policy expressed by the legislature in the guest statute is easy. Indeed, I have always believed that the 'hitch-hiker' theory, which was allegedly the basis of the public policy expressed therein, was but a guise and a ruse for the real reason for its passage--the protection of corporate insurors and other vested interests. Had I been a member of the legislature then, I would have voted against its passage--or now, I would vote for its repeal. The case law development, particularly those decisions which seek to define the status of guests versus other passengers, of itself shows the folly and lack of wisdom of such a law.

On the other hand, I believe strongly in the wisdom of the separation of powers doctrine which is the foundation of our system of government, and the Court is powerless to strike down as invalid a legislative act unless such act is constitutionally prohibited or otherwise violative of constitutional proscriptions. The legislative process, through elective representatives, with all of its faults, and its tendency to be unduly influenced by pressure groups, is the best method yet derived by man for the enactment of laws expressive of the public policy of its people. (I would add parenthetically: My faith in this process further leads me to believe that a legislature sensitive to the will of the people it represents will now exercise its prerogative to repeal this inherently bad law.)

Having said this, however, I would hasten to add that this does not mean that this Court is not a lawmaking tribunal. The common law is still very much alive in this state; and I believe it is the proper function of this Court, in the context of litigated issues, to formulate and announce through written opinions rules of law in areas which fall outside legislative prerogatories or in areas where those prerogatories have not been legislatively exercised. This includes, in my opinion, reexamination of existing case law; and, with due regard to the principle of stare decisis, to overrule prior decisions when we are convinced beyond peradventure of doubt that such decisions were wrong when decided or that time has affected such change as to require a change in the law.

Stare decisis is a noble principle, but it is not case-hardened res adjudicata. Unlike the Killy-loo bird, who insists on flying backward, the law must be interested in where it is going as well as where it has been. This judicial reexamination of case law likewise should include statutory interpretation so as to insure...