Beasley v. Poole
| Decision Date | 11 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:11-cv-63,1:11-cv-63 |
| Parties | ANTONIO J. BEASLEY, SR, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER D. POOLE; ASHLEY OWNBY; MICHAEL J. STENGEL; ADELA T. COOPER; JUDGE R. ALLAN EDGAR, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
The Court is in receipt of a pro se civil rights complaint filed by Antonio J. Beasley, Sr., ("Plaintiff") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Court File No. 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that various federal officials violated his constitutional rights through their misconduct in connection with his federal criminal proceedings, specifically, in connection with his plea agreement. Plaintiff alleges "Federal Personal [sic] violated the real mean [sic] of the plea Agreement and they were acting under 'color or Federal Law.'" (Court File No. 1). Plaintiff also claims his defense counsel and appellate counsel violated his constitutional rights during those proceedings.
Because some of the named defendants are federal employees and none of them are state employees, the complaint has been construed as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971) ().
For the following reasons, no service shall issue, and Plaintiff's complaint will be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (Court File No. 1). Thus, the prematurely filed motion to dismiss is MOOT (Court File No. 4).
It appears from the application to proceed in forma pauperis submitted by Plaintiff, that he lacks sufficient financial resources at the present time to pay the required filing fee of $350.00. Thus, his motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (Court File No. 8). Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED to the extent he does not have to initially pay the full $350.00 filing fee and DENIED to the extent that he is not relieved of the ultimate responsibility of paying the full $350.00 filing fee, but instead, will pay the full fee as assessed. Since Plaintiff is a prisoner in custody at the United States Prison Hazelton in Bruceton Mills, West Virginia, he will be ASSESSED the full civil filing fee of $350.00 under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff's preceding monthlyincome (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full filing fee of $350.00 as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk of Court will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this memorandum and judgment to the Warden and Custodian of Records at USP Hazelton in Bruceton Mills, West Virginia, and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Prisons to ensure the custodian of Plaintiff's inmate trust account complies with the portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of the filing fee.
The agency having custody of the plaintiff shall collect the filing fee as funds become available. This order shall become a part of Plaintiff's file and follow him if he is transferred to another institution. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall continue to collect monthly payments from Plaintiff's prisoner account until the entire filing fee of $350.00 is paid.
Plaintiff will also be ORDERED to provide the prison officials at any new institution with a copy of this order. Failure of Plaintiff to notify the new prison officials of this order and outstanding debt will result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions against him without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides: "The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity."
In McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 205 (2007), the Sixth Circuit explains that when screeninga prisoner complaint, district courts must examine the complaint brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the prisoner has paid the full filing fee or is a pauper, and is acting pro se or is represented by counsel. The District Court first examines the financial status of a plaintiff prisoner and makes an assessment of fees, and then it reviews the merits of the complaint. The District Court may conduct the fee assessment and the screening process in the same opinion or order. Id. at 608.
A complaint filed by an inmate challenging the conduct of an "officer or employee of a governmental entity" may be dismissed under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if the complaint is "frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief my be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Therefore, guided by the analogous cases dismissing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must determine whether the complaint should be dismissed because, even if everything alleged in the compliant is assumed to be true and accurate, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. Cf. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987).
The law is well established that this Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007);Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). In addition, when evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are presumed to be true. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997). The mandated liberalconstruction requires a court to permit a complaint to proceed if it can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail; thus, a Court must allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982).
Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not translate to ignoring a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Department of Social Services for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Thus, the liberal construction is not boundless as pro se plaintiffs are required to comply with substantive law and the minimum requirements for pleading a civil complaint under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). In other words, the Court is not required to conjure up factual allegations and claims on Plaintiff's behalf which he failed to plead in his complaint. Id. at 714. Therefore, the relaxed pro se pleading requirement does not automatically entitle pro se plaintiffs to take every case to trial. Id.; Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and accepts all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint as being true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). When a factual allegation is capable of more than one reasonable inference, it must be construed in Plaintiff's favor. Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court may not dismiss a complaint merely because the Court does not believe the allegations of fact set forth in the complaint. In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court is not required to accept as true mere legal conclusions and unwarranted inferences of fact. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the complaint must do more than recite bare assertions of legal conclusions without supportingallegations of material facts. Evans v. Pearson Enterprises Inc., 434 F.3d 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2006). Conclusory allegations or bare legal conclusions will not suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 Fed. Appx. 501 (6th Cir. March 18, 2009), available in 2009 WL 723132, *4; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ().
To place Plaintiff's civil complaint into context, it is necessary to summarize his underlying criminal case. The facts and procedural history of his criminal case are discussed in some detail because Plaintiff's civil complaint brought under Bivens is based upon his federal criminal case. In fact, his complaint is a...
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