Beasley v. Schuessler

• Decision Date: 09 December 1987
• Parties: Manuella BEASLEY v. John SCHUESSLER and Morgan Schuessler. Civ. 5892.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 551

519 So.2d 551

Manuella BEASLEY v. John SCHUESSLER and Morgan Schuessler.

Civ. 5892.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 9, 1987.

John A. Tinney, Roanoke, for appellant.

S. Sanford Holliday, Wedowee, for appellees.

L. CHARLES WRIGHT, Retired Appellate Judge.

In 1983, John Schuessler and Morgan Schuessler (the Schuesslers) filed a complaint alleging that certain individuals trespassed on their tract of land in Randolph County and cut trees and timber there in 1982. The Schuesslers demanded judgment against these individuals in the amount of $10,000. The second count of the complaint requested that the trial court award the statutory penalty pursuant to § 35-14-1, Code 1975.

In February 1984, the trial court issued a judgment which stated that the Schuesslers had reached an agreement with Pate Ross, the pulpwooder who actually cut the timber, and, therefore, the trial court awarded judgment against Pate Ross in the amount of $2,000. The trial court also stated that "the defendants Mauella [sic] Beasley and Texanna Stitt filed no response to the complaint" (emphasis added), and default judgment was entered against each of them. The trial court awarded judgment against "Mauella " Beasley and Texanna Stitt in the amount of $10,000.

The judgment against Texanna Stitt was settled, and a release of claims and satisfaction of judgment was entered. Manuella Beasley filed a motion to set aside the judgments. The motion was granted because service was never perfected on her in her proper name.

The Schuesslers filed a motion to add Manuella Beasley (Beasley) as party defendant. Beasley filed a response to this motion for the limited purpose of contesting jurisdiction. The motion was granted, and Beasley was served by certified mail. Beasley filed a motion to dismiss wherein she alleged that she was a resident and citizen of Chicago, Illinois, and had no connection whatsoever with Alabama which would allow Alabama courts jurisdiction of her. She also alleged that the satisfaction of judgment previously obtained was a release of joint tortfeasors and barred this action against her. The motion to dismiss was denied.

Beasley filed an answer alleging essentially the same matters raised in her motion to dismiss and further alleged that Pate Ross was an independent contractor and there existed no principal-agent relationship between them.

A hearing was held on the case. The trial court entered judgment against Beasley in the amount of $5,500. Beasley's post-trial motion was denied. Beasley appeals.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Beasley. Beasley contends that the Alabama court did not have personal jurisdiction over her because she is a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois and has no connection whatsoever with the State of Alabama.

Rule 4.2(a) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (A.R.Civ.P.) provides that, if a person has sufficient contacts with the state, there exists an appropriate basis for the Alabama courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over that individual. Rule 4.2(a)(2)(A)-(I), A.R.Civ.P., provides nine situations under which in individual would be considered to have sufficient contact with Alabama. Rule 4.2(a)(2) also provides that an individual has sufficient contacts under these nine circumstances when either "acting directly or by agent."

The Schuesslers maintain that the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Beasley pursuant to subsections (A), (C), (F), and (I) of Rule 4.2(a)(2), A.R.Civ.P. The Schuesslers contend that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that (1) Beasley was transacting business in Alabama because she sold timber in the state; (2) Pate Ross, who was hired to cut the timber, caused tortious injury or damage to the Schuessler property; (3) Beasley had an interest in real property in Alabama because she was being compensated for timber cut and removed from land in Randolph County; and (4) Beasley established minimal contact with Alabama when she accepted a check for the sale of timber in Alabama.

The Alabama Supreme Court has previously held that, for the Alabama courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual, he must have some minimum contact with the state which has resulted from some affirmative act on the part of that individual. Cagle v. Lawson, 445 So.2d 564 (Ala.1984). Further, it must be fair and reasonable to require such individual to come to Alabama to defend such an action. Cagle, 445 So.2d 564.

If a cause of action has arisen from the minimum contacts with the state by the nonresident, then the courts must determine whether the assumption of jurisdiction will offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Cagle, 445 So.2d at 565. See also, Brick Warehouse, Ltd. v. Sunshine Homes, Inc., 481 So.2d 860 (Ala.1985); Brooks v. Inlow, 453 So.2d 349 (Ala.1984). In determining such, the courts should consider the nature and quality of the individual's activity in the state, the foreseeability of a cause of action resulting from such activity, and how much inconvenience the individual would experience. Cagle, 445 So.2d 564.

In this case, Manuella Beasley and her husband, Leon Beasley, along with several other individuals, conveyed all of their interest in the property in Randolph County to Texanna Stitt in 1974. The Schuesslers contend that Beasley had an interest in real property in Alabama because she was being compensated for timber cut in Randolph County. Though the evidence indicates that Manuella...