Beasley v. State
| Decision Date | 13 February 1913 |
| Citation | 61 So. 259,181 Ala. 28 |
| Parties | BEASLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; Armstead Brown, Judge.
Yank Beasley was indicted for the murder of Ephriam White convicted, and sentenced to be hanged, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
The following charges were refused to defendant:
(1) "The court charges the jury that if they are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that there was a present, impending danger, real or apparent, to the life or limb, or grievous bodily harm, from which there was no probable means of escape, and that the deceased was the aggressor, they cannot convict the defendant."
(2) "The court charges the jury that if the defendant shot under a bona fide belief that his life was in danger, and had under all circumstances a reasonable cause to believe that he was in imminent danger at the moment the shot was fired, then the defendant cannot be convicted."
The evidence tended to show that Ephriam White came to his death about January 2, 1912, from the effects of a bullet wound fired by Yank Beasley. It appears that defendant and deceased, with several others, were in a wagon going home and that they talked about 35 or 40 minutes before the shooting; that at the time of the shooting Ephriam White was sitting on the dash-board of the wagon, leaning forward, with a rifle across his lap; and that Yank was sitting on the spring seat about the middle of the wagon. The defendant attempted to bring out by the second witness introduced for the state the fact that White had tried to kill Beasley; but on objection by the solicitor, the evidence was excluded. When Beasley took the stand to testify in his own behalf, he stated that after the others had gotten out of the wagon, and he was preparing to leave, White got up and clicked his gun twice, and that as he got about three-quarters up he turned his rifle towards defendant. After this testimony defendant was asked if he had had any previous difficulty with White, which was, on motion of the solicitor, excluded. Also: "Did Ephriam White shoot at you within two weeks prior to this killing?" Objection to which was also sustained. Also: "State whether or not, within the two weeks prior to the killing, White shot at you twice, one time shooting through your hat, and at another time shooting buckshot into you." Also: "Did Hannah White tell you on the day of the killing that Ephriam White was looking for you to kill you?" Also similar questions as to Tom Carrison; also as to Hannah Harris. Later the defendant put up these various witnesses to show a communication to him of the threats sought to be brought out by the question above referred to, but, on objection by the state, was not permitted to do so.
Weil, Stakely & Vardaman, of Montgomery, for appellant.
R.C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The rule is well settled that, when there is a conflict in the evidence, in homicide cases, as to who was the aggressor, the accused may strengthen his defense by showing ill will threats by the deceased, or a previous difficulty. It is also a well-established doctrine that when the deceased has made threats against the defendant, and which have been communicated to him, he is not thereby authorized to commence an attack or to act upon said communicated threats until the deceased has committed some overt act or made some hostile demonstration; but in such case the law allows the threatened party to act with greater dispatch and upon a perhaps slighter overt act than is required on the part of a defendant who was not threatened by the deceased, or between whom and the accused there was no bad blood or ill will. The mere fear of an attack will not justify action on the part of the defendant; and he cannot avail himself of communicated threats until he first shows some overt act or hostile demonstration on the part of the deceased which would be calculated to reasonably impress upon him the bona fide belief that he was in imminent peril. This does not mean that the supposed facts generating the belief must be real; for they may be appearances only, and yet justify as prompt action as if they were real. Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471; ...
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McGuff v. State
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