Beasley v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 23 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 11-cv-459-JPG |
| Parties | QUINTON BEASLEY, #B-69081, Plaintiff, v. GLADYSE TAYLOR, LEE RYKER, LIEUTENANT STAFFORD, SHERRY BENTON, PAMELA MORAN, BILL RISSE, and MS. HOSKINSON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Quinton Beasley, who at the time he filed this action was incarcerated in Lawrence Correctional Center ("Lawrence"), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since the case was filed, Plaintiff has been released on parole. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint and supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are subject to summary dismissal.
Prior to filing the instant action, Plaintiff brought another civil rights case in this Court, Beasley v. Stephens, et. al, No. 10-cv-895-GPM (S.D. Ill., filed Nov. 9, 2010). In that case, hesued Lawrence Warden Lee Ryker, Randy Stephens, the Prisoner Review Board, Administrative Review Board, and the Illinois Department of Corrections, claiming that he was improperly charged with a parole violation, and as a result was put into a higher risk security level during his incarceration at Lawrence. That case was dismissed on July 7, 2011, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that various actions were taken against him by the named Defendants, all in retaliation for his filing of the prior lawsuit described above, and for pursuing other grievances over prison conditions.
In his complaint, Plaintiff references several instances that are described with particularity only in his attached grievances and other documents. On January 10, 2011, he was placed in segregation on investigative status (he does not explain why) (Doc. 1-1, pp. 4-5; 17). He claims that during the initial 30 days of his segregation, in violation of the Illinois Administrative Code, he was never interviewed by the reviewing officer, nor was any investigation conducted regarding the reasons for his placement in that status. Defendant Warden Ryker and Defendant Stafford then extended Plaintiff's stay in segregation for a total of 90 days (Doc. 1-1, pp. 5, 18; Doc. 1, p. 8). The response to Plaintiff's grievance of April 10, 2011, states that after his initial placement on investigative status, Plaintiff's status was changed to administrative detention as of February 10, 2011. Plaintiff apparently remained in administrative detention for the final 60 days of his confinement in segregation (Doc. 1-1, p. 17).
Plaintiff further complains that Defendant Moran (the grievance officer) failed to investigate or address Plaintiff's claims of staff misconduct after he filed a grievance over his placement in investigative segregation (Doc. 1., p. 8; Doc. 1-1, pp. 13-24). Defendants Benton and Risse allegedly failed to address his grievances or improperly reviewed them (Doc. 1, p. 8).He claims Defendant Risse informed him that superiors had instructed him not to do anything about Plaintiff's grievances (Doc. 1, p. 8: Doc. 1-1, p. 8).
Plaintiff also alleges that the conditions of his segregation cell were inhumane. He was allowed to shower only once a week, he was denied any yard recreation time, he developed excruciating back pains due to the lack of activity, the water in his cell had a bad taste and turned his clothing brown, and his phone calls to his public defender were restricted (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8; Doc. 1-1, pp. 18-19). In addition, his outgoing mail to the Administrative Review Board was destroyed by Defendant Hoskinson and his incoming mail was delayed. He claims his continued confinement under these conditions was in retaliation for complaints and grievances he had filed.
Finally, he was transferred to another prison, still under administrative detention status.
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into five (5) counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
It is well settled that prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, bringing lawsuits, or otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, "[a]ll that need be specified is the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file an answer." Higgs v. Carver, 286F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). Naming the suit or protected activity and the act of retaliation is all that is necessary to state a claim of improper retaliation. Id. A complaint that provides a short, clear statement of the relevant facts complies with the federal rules of civil procedure, and thus cannot be dismissed because it does not allege all facts necessary to clearly establish a valid claim. Id.
At issue here is whether Plaintiff experienced an adverse action that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and if the First Amendment activity was "at least a motivating factor" in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009). With these criteria in mind, the Court will consider Plaintiff's specific claims.
Illinois statutes and correctional regulations do not place limitations on the discretion of prison officials to place inmates in administrative segregation, including investigative or temporary lockdown or confinement and involuntary protective custody. Accordingly, there is no liberty interest implicated by an inmate's placement in these forms of segregation. Williams v. Ramos, 71 F3d 1246, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1995); Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1281-1284 (7th Cir. 1991); Kellas v. Lane, 923 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1991); see generally Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). Moreover, continued confinement in administrative detention, such as Plaintiff experienced for the final 60 days of his segregation, does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1995). Although Plaintiff was subjected to more burdensome conditions, those conditions are "within the normal limits or range of custody which theconviction has authorized the [government] to impose." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (); see Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477. Administrative detention does not "constitute a 'grievous loss' of liberty, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoners generally in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, nor a dramatic departure from the basic conditions or duration of the prisoner's sentence." Crowder, 74 F.3d at 815 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-85).
It appears that the restriction on telephone calls to Plaintiff's public defender was one of the standard conditions imposed on prisoners in segregation. If Plaintiff is alleging that he was unconstitutionally deprived of access to the courts, he has failed to state such a claim. He does not describe any meritorious court action that was adversely affected by the telephone restriction. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Nor does he assert that he was unable to communicate with the attorney in writing.
For these reasons, Plaintiff cannot maintain a substantive claim for a...
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