Beasley v. Washington

Citation169 Mich.App. 650,427 N.W.2d 177
Decision Date11 August 1988
Docket NumberNo. 95493,95493
PartiesWillie BEASLEY and Lois Beasley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Denise M. WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellee. 169 Mich.App. 650, 427 N.W.2d 177
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan (US)

[169 MICHAPP 652] Bockoff & Zamler, P.C. by Anne K. Flaherty, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Lewis, White & Clay by Eric L. Clay and Camille L. Stearns, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and GRIBBS and GILLESPIE, * JJ.

CYNAR, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs, Willie and Lois Beasley, appeal as of right from a September 5, 1986, order denying their motion for a new trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Mr. Beasley (plaintiff) testified that, on September 8, 1981, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., he was driving his 1965 Chevrolet van west on Six Mile Road. At the intersection of Six Mile and Wildemere, in the City of Detroit, his vehicle collided with the 1979 Eldorado driven by defendant. Defendant left the scene of the accident to take her five-year-old son to the hospital.

Plaintiff remained on the scene and told the police officers about the accident. After the accident,[169 MICHAPP 653] plaintiff refused medical treatment. Plaintiff stated that, although his head hurt and was throbbing and he had a bump on his head, he refused to see a doctor despite being urged by his family to do so. In fact, plaintiff went to work the following day, working the afternoon shift from 3:30 to 11:30 p.m. When he got off work, he tried to catch a bus home. Plaintiff waited thirty to forty-five minutes for a bus. No bus came. Subsequently, he walked home from the bus stop.

Two days after this accident, on September 10, 1981, plaintiff rode his daughter's bicycle to work, a distance of over ten miles. Plaintiff worked the afternoon shift and rode the bicycle back home. During the return trip, plaintiff had a second accident at the intersection of Greenfield and Glendale Roads. He stated that he rode the bicycle to the top of the hill near the intersection and apparently blacked out. He did not remember anything about the second accident. He just recalled waking up at the hospital.

The driver of the vehicle involved in the second accident, Thomas Ledbetter, testified as to how this particular accident took place. Ledbetter stated that, while he was stopped at the "Stop" sign at the intersection of Greenfield and Glendale, plaintiff's bicycle ran into his vehicle. Plaintiff was flung across the front hood of the truck, landing on the road. Ledbetter did not see plaintiff until the impact.

After the second accident, plaintiff was taken to Mount Carmel Mercy Hospital. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Blaise U. Audet. X-rays were taken and they revealed that plaintiff had suffered multiple linear skull factures. Plaintiff was admitted into the hospital.

While in the hospital, plaintiff complained of nausea, vomiting and headaches. A CAT scan was [169 MICHAPP 654] ordered. The CAT scan results showed that plaintiff had an epidural hematoma (blood clot) between the skull and the surface of the brain. In order to alleviate this condition, plaintiff underwent a right frontal craniotomy, surgery to evacuate the hematoma to relieve pressure to the brain. The surgery left plaintiff with a scar on his right front scalp area. For nearly one year, plaintiff showed an abnormal EEG (electroencephalogram) indicating "brain suffering."

Following the presentation of plaintiffs' proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict. Defendant alleged that the plaintiffs had not met their burden by establishing the threshold for recovery under the no-fault act, M.C.L. Sec. 500.3135; M.S.A. Sec. 24.13135, which requires plaintiffs to show a serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement. The trial court took defendant's motion under advisement and told defense counsel to proceed with defendant's case.

In closing argument, plaintiffs maintained that defendant was negligent and that this negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that, even if the second accident contributed to plaintiff's injuries, the injuries were "individable" so that the jury was duty bound to find the first accident to be the cause of all of the injuries. Plaintiffs sought damages totalling $204,000.

Defendant argued that she was not negligent. Further, defendant alleged that, even if she had been negligent, plaintiff's injuries were caused solely from the second accident. Additionally, defendant asserted that plaintiffs had failed to establish the threshold requirement for recovery under the no-fault act.

The jury reached its verdict on a special verdict form. The jury found that plaintiff had not suffered[169 MICHAPP 655] a serious impairment of body function or permanent disfigurement. Nevertheless, the jury proceeded to award plaintiffs $40,000 in damages. The trial court accepted the verdict, interpreting it as a determination of no cause of action. Subsequently, on January 31, 1986, the trial court reconvened to rule on defendant's directed verdict motion. After hearing argument, the court granted the motion.

Plaintiffs moved for a new trial. The trial court denied their motion on September 5, 1986. The instant appeal followed.

First, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a new trial on the basis that the trial court clearly recognized that the jury had reached an inconsistent verdict and yet did not resubmit the case to the jury with further instructions. We agree.

It is within a trial court's sound discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial. Murphy v. Muskegon County, 162 Mich.App. 609, 616, 413 N.W.2d 73 (1987). Absent an abuse of such discretion, the trial court's decision cannot be interfered with on appeal. Kailimai v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 398 Mich. 230, 247 N.W.2d 295 (1976).

After the jury finished with their deliberations, they returned the following verdict on the prepared special verdict form:

"FORM OF VERDICT

"We, the jury, make the following answers to the question submitted by the Court.

"1. Was the Defendant negligent? Yes X No

"2. Was the Defendant's negligence a proximate cause of an injury to the plaintiff? Yes X No

[169 MICHAPP 656] "If you answer 'No,' do not answer any further questions.

"3. Did the injury which Plaintiff suffered result in permanent serious disfigurement or serious impairment of body function? Yes ____ No X

"If your answer is 'No,' do not answer any further questions.

"4. What is the total amount of Plaintiff's damages? $40,000

"5. Was the Plaintiff negligence [sic]? Yes X No

"If your answer is 'No,' do not answer any further questions.

"6. Was the Plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of injury to the Plaintiff? Yes X No

"If your answer is 'No,' do not answer any further questions.

"7. Using 100% as the total combined negligence which approximately [sic] caused the injury to the Plaintiff, what percentage of such negligence is attributable to the Plaintiff? 49%

"Please note that the Court will reduce the total amount of Plaintiff's damages entered in question number 4 by the percentage of negligence attributable to Plaintiff, if any, entered in question number 7. The remainder will be the amount which Plaintiff is entitled to recover.

[169 MICHAPP 657] "8. What is the total amount of Mrs. Beasley's damages? -0"

The no-fault act requires a plaintiff to establish a threshold of death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement before recovery is permitted, M.C.L. Sec. 500.3135; M.S.A. Sec. 24.13135. As the verdict form indicates, the jury found that plaintiffs had not established the threshold for recovery. Yet, despite the fact that the jury found no serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement, the jury proceeded to award damages.

The trial judge recognized the inconsistent nature of the verdict but he did not resubmit the case to the jury with further instructions. Instead, he accepted the verdict and interpreted it as a determination by the jury that plaintiffs had no cause of action.

Initially, we must determine whether the jury verdict was inconsistent. "[I]t is fundamental that every attempt must be made to harmonize a jury's verdicts. Only where verdicts are so logically and legally inconsistent that they cannot be reconciled will they be set aside." Granger v. Fruehauf Corp, 429 Mich. 1, 9, 412 N.W.2d 199 (1987).

In Harrington v. Velat, 395 Mich. 359, 360, 235 N.W.2d 357 (1975), the Supreme Court stated the following regarding inconsistent verdicts:

"The trial judge in a civil case can correct a verdict which is defective or erroneous as to a mere matter of form not affecting the merits or rights of the parties so as to give effect to what the jury unmistakably found. 76 Am Jur 2d, Trial, Sec. 1208.

"However, the general rule is that where a verdict[169 MICHAPP 658] in a civil case is inconsistent and contradictory, it will be set aside and a new trial granted.

" 'Ordinarily, a verdict may and should be set aside and a new trial granted where it is self-contradictory, inconsistent, or incongruous, and such relief should, as a rule, be granted where more than one verdict are [sic ] returned in the same action and they are inconsistent and irreconcilable.' 66 CJS, New Trial, Sec. 66, pp 197-198."

In this case, the jury found plaintiff's total damages to be $40,000 after finding plaintiff did not suffer injury resulting in permanent serious disfigurement or serious impairment of body function. In order to reconcile the verdict, one needs to assume either that the jury did not understand the threshold requirement under the no-fault act or that they erred in completing the form. We conclude that this verdict was inconsistent.

The proper remedy to correct a defective verdict is to either reinstruct the jury or order a new trial....

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Phillips v. Deihm
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 15 Septiembre 1995
    ...not constitute error requiring reversal unless the error operated to substantially prejudice the party's case. Beasley v. Washington, 169 Mich.App. 650, 660, 427 N.W.2d 177 (1988). Several panels of this Court have reversed on the basis of this error. See, e.g., id.; Eley v. Turner, 155 Mic......
  • Treib v. Kern
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 1 Diciembre 1993
    ...submit exhibits to the jury for deliberation when the trial court has not accepted those exhibits into evidence. Beasley v. Washington, 169 Mich.App. 650, 427 N.W.2d 177 (1988). A party alleging error on appeal must show such error affirmatively by the record and not only must the error be ......
  • Poe v. City of Detroit
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 20 Octubre 1989
    ...v. Richard's Industries, Inc., 170 Mich.App. 665, 672, 428 N.W.2d 734 (1988), lv. den., 432 Mich. 856 (1989); Beasley v. Washington, 169 Mich.App. 650, 659, 427 N.W.2d 177 (1988); Schanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 165 Mich.App. 395, 418 N.W.2d 478 (1988), lv. den., 431 Mich. 865 (1988). Thi......
  • Mitchell v. Cole
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 18 Mayo 1989
    ...of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ, the court did not err in presenting the issues to the jury. Beasley v. Washington, 169 Mich.App. 650, 659, 427 N.W.2d 177 (1988). Similarly, if having given plaintiffs the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evid......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT