Beason v. Beason
| Decision Date | 11 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 82992 |
| Citation | 460 N.W.2d 207,435 Mich. 791 |
| Parties | Kenneth P. BEASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary L. BEASON, Defendant-Appellee. 435 Mich. 791, 460 N.W.2d 207 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
We consider whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial court's decision to terminate alimony under an express provision in the parties' divorce judgment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard in reviewing the decision of the trial court.
After some twenty-eight years of marriage, the parties were divorced by a judgment of the Monroe Circuit Court dated, April 23, 1985, which was taken by settlement of the parties. Pursuant to the divorce judgment, plaintiff Kenneth Beason was to pay alimony of $320 per month to defendant, Mary Beason. The divorce judgment provided, however, "that said alimony payments shall terminate upon the re-marriage of the said Mary L. Beason or when the said Mary L. Beason should reside with an unrelated adult male person." On April 8, 1986, plaintiff filed a motion for the permanent termination of alimony, alleging that defendant was residing with an unrelated male person, John Robinson, in defendant's house at 15475 Dayton Road in Monroe, Michigan.
At a hearing on plaintiff's motion, John Robinson testified that as a long-distance truck driver, he often made trips lasting several days and that he was outside of Monroe County most of the time. According to Robinson, he considered his residence to be a mobile home which he had purchased in January or February of 1986. Before that, he considered his residence to be an apartment which he rented until the purchase of the mobile home. Robinson stated that "on occasion" he used the mobile home as a mailing address, but that he would have important mail such as paychecks or credit card bills sent to a post office box. He testified that he never used the Dayton Road address as a mailing address. Robinson's thirty-two-year-old niece also lived in the mobile home free of rent and, according to Robinson, performed services such as doing laundry and taking care of the mobile home for him. Robinson testified that he did not keep any clothing or personal articles at defendant's home. He did change clothes at the Dayton Road address after work and before going out to dinner with the defendant, but he changed into clothes that he brought with him. Because of the nature of his work, Robinson carried a change of clothing at all times.
Robinson kept his Trans-Am automobile at defendant's house when he was out of town. Robinson stated that when he went to work he sometimes drove his own car and sometimes drove defendant's, a green Thunderbird. According to Robinson, defendant probably drove his car to work more often than she drove her own.
Robinson testified that he did not help defendant with her bills or give her money. He did maintain her lawn and shrubbery, and would sometimes come over to mow the lawn when defendant was not at home. However, he testified that defendant had not given him a key to the Dayton Road address and had not given him permission to be there when she was not at home. On one occasion, Robinson performed a repair inside the house when defendant was not there. Defendant stated that on this occasion she told Robinson where the spare key was so that he could let himself into the house.
Defendant Mary Beason testified that Robinson was a very frequent visitor to her home and had spent the night there. She stated that they spent most of the time together on weekends, and when Robinson was not out of town, she would see him a lot. Every Friday night he took her out to dinner. Robinson would occasionally pay for groceries if he and defendant went to the store to get something to prepare for dinner. The parties stipulated, however, that defendant paid her own bills for gas, water, electricity, cable television, garbage pickup, and telephone. Defendant testified that she never received mail for Robinson at Dayton Road. According to defendant, Robinson did not keep personal effects such as clothing, a razor, or a toothbrush at her house. Defendant testified that Robinson spent as many as two consecutive nights in a row at her house, and when he had long weekends he generally spent them with her.
There was testimony from Sandra Chittum, the adult daughter of the parties, who stated that she had seen no evidence of anyone other than defendant living at the Dayton Road address. She had seen no male clothing in the house and when she used items from the bathroom cabinet had never noticed any toothbrushes other than those of defendant and Mrs. Chittum's own sons.
Plaintiff Kenneth Beason hired a private investigator to make observations of defendant's residence on Dayton Road. The surveillance revealed that on three nights, March 21, 22, and 28, 1986 (a Friday, Saturday, and Friday, respectively), defendant and Robinson were seen entering the Dayton Road address and thereafter all the lights went out.
Defendant and Robinson testified that defendant had accompanied Robinson on an over-the-road trip to Texas, and defendant testified that she "might have" accompanied Robinson on a trip to Indiana. Defendant and Robinson both stated their intention to marry, although defendant had doubts because of Robinson's drinking. Because of these doubts and other unexpected events, defendant and Robinson had postponed their wedding at the time of the hearing on plaintiff's motion to terminate alimony.
The trial court in its opinion found John Robinson to be "less than candid" and concluded that his testimony was not to be believed. The court considered the definition of the term "reside" as used in the divorce judgment and concluded, after reference to dictionary definitions of the term and case law in the area of jurisdiction and venue, that "a common meaning of the word is ... a place where one remains for a time either permanently or continuously ... a place where a person makes his home." The trial court found Robinson was in the closest telephone contact with defendant, and that since his vehicle was stored at her home it was logical that upon return from his trips he would go there to secure the vehicle. The court specially noted that Robinson did not leave the vehicle at his mobile home. The court further found that while Robinson did not regularly pay defendant's bills, he did assist her by regularly taking her out to eat. The court noted that although Robinson denied having a key to defendant's house, he had done work there in her absence. The court found this, together with the parties' stated intention to marry, the fact that they had traveled cross-country together, and the fact that Robinson had on numerous occasions stayed overnight at the Dayton Road address, sufficient to show that defendant did reside with an unrelated adult male.
In an opinion by two members of the panel, the Court of Appeals reversed, stating, "We are convinced that we would have reached a different result had we occupied the position of the trial court." Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided January 13, 1988 (Docket No. 98716).
Divorce cases are equitable actions that historically were heard and decided by a chancellor rather than a jury. Although Michigan no longer has separate equity courts, 1 divorce actions continue to be decided by judges rather than by juries. 2
In a divorce case, the trial judge performs two distinct functions. First, the court must find facts on the basis of the evidence presented, and then the court must exercise its discretion in fashioning a disposition. In its fact-finding role, the trial court must hear the evidence, choose which witnesses to credit when the evidence conflicts, and, pursuant to MCR 2.517, must place findings of fact on the record or in a written opinion. Upon the basis of the facts, the trial court must then make a disposition of the case. Before the advent of no-fault divorce, the ultimate dispositional ruling was whether a divorce should be granted. Today, the court still must exercise its discretion in fixing the amount of alimony or child support, in dividing property between the parties, or in modifying provisions of the divorce judgment. All of these are dispositional rulings. The trial court's disposition is of course intimately related to its findings of fact, yet it is distinct.
We are not asked here to review a dispositional ruling such as an award of alimony or a modification of such award. Plaintiff Kenneth Beason moved to enforce the terms of the divorce judgment which provided that alimony would terminate if defendant should reside with an unrelated adult male. To rule on plaintiff's motion, the court was required to make a factual determination regarding the living arrangements of the parties. Then, the court was required to construe the word "reside" in the divorce judgment. 3 Finally, the trial court had to apply the definition of the term "reside" as used in the divorce judgment to the facts as it found them, to determine whether defendant's alimony should be terminated.
Equity actions historically were treated differently from law cases on appeal. It is frequently said that divorce cases are reviewed de novo. Stratmann v. Stratmann, 287 Mich. 94, 95, 282 N.W. 914 (1938); Westgate v. Westgate, 291 Mich. 18, 23, 288 N.W. 860 (1939); Wells v. Wells, 330 Mich. 448, 452, 47 N.W.2d 687 (1951).
However, in examining Michigan case law to determine the meaning of "de novo" review, we find such a variety of terminology and application that a single clear standard of appellate review does not emerge. Mindful of our distance from the trial bench function, we do see one clear and consistent historical theme: appellate courts...
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