Beason v. United Technologies Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 3:97CV2654(CFD).,CIV. A. 3:97CV2654(CFD).
• Parties: Donald BEASON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., HAMILTON STANDARD DIVISION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

37 F.Supp.2d 127

Donald BEASON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., HAMILTON STANDARD DIVISION, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 3:97CV2654(CFD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

February 10, 1999.

Gregg D. Adler, Peter D. Goselin, Livingston, Adler, Pulda & Meiklejohn, Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.

Henry A. Platt, Gary L. Lieber, Schmeltzer, Aptaker & Shepard, Washington, D.C., Edward J. Dempsey, United Technologies Corporation, Hartford, CT, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DRONEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Donald Beason ("plaintiff" or "Beason"), brings this action against his employer, United Technologies Corporation, Hamilton Standard Division ("defendant" or "Hamilton Standard"), asserting claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-58, et seq. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), Hamilton Standard has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. # 12] arguing that Beason's claims are barred by the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Hamilton Standard and the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Lodge 743, Affiliated with District Lodge 91 ("Union"). For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS¹

Donald Beason worked at Hamilton Standard from December, 1979, until he was injured on the job in September, 1992. After he was injured, Beason received workers' compensation benefits and remained on medical leave until he was laid off in March, 1993, due to lack of work. Following his layoff, Beason's health improved to the point where he was able to return to work. In September, 1995, Beason was recalled to work by Hamilton Standard, but was instructed to first report to Hamilton Standard's medical center for a medical evaluation. After his evaluation, Beason was informed by Hamilton Standard that he could not return to work because of his medical restrictions. Beason disputed Hamilton Standard's findings concerning his ability to work.

At all times relevant to this dispute, Beason was a member of the bargaining unit covered by the CBA. On November 1, 1995, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of Beason and four other Hamilton Standard employees who were not recalled to work, alleging that Hamilton Standard violated the non-discrimination clause contained in the CBA. The CBA non-discrimination clause states:

The Company and the Union recognize that employees covered by this Agreement may not be discriminated against in violation of the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended; and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973; or any other state or federal statute which effects the employment of employees covered by this Agreement.

The Union grievance was submitted to arbitration in July, 1996, in accordance with the arbitration provisions of the CBA. The arbitration provisions set forth in the CBA provide, in pertinent part:

(a) Any contractual grievance not settled ... shall be submitted to arbitration upon the request of either party ....

(b) Other grievances arising under this contract which are not settled ... may be referred to arbitration if the company and Union mutually agree in writing.

(c) Except for the grievances which can be arbitrated under [(a) or (b)], no disputes, misunderstandings, differences or grievances arising between the parties as to the meaning, interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement shall be submitted to any Arbitrator for decision.

In October, 1996, the arbitrator denied the Union's grievance and found that Hamilton Standard had not violated the ADA.

While the Union grievance was pending, Beason filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The CCHRO investigation concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Beason had been discriminated against by Hamilton Standard in violation of the ADA and the CFEPA. Beason then filed this action.

After filing its answer and affirmative defenses to Beason's complaint, Hamilton Standard moved for judgment on the pleadings. Hamilton Standard argues that Beason's complaint must be dismissed because he is required to arbitrate his employment discrimination claims in accordance with the mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the CBA. Hamilton Standard also argues that Beason's claims are barred by the prior decision of the arbitrator which denied the Union grievance brought on behalf of Beason and the four other employees.

Beason responds that his ADA and CFEPA claims are not subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of the CBA and that he is not barred by the previous decision of the arbitrator from pursuing this lawsuit.

II. STANDARD

When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings made pursuant to Rule 12(c), a court must accept the non-movant's allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.1985). Judgment on the pleadings shall not be awarded to the defendant unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Sheppard, 18 F.3d at 151; Bloor, 754 F.2d at 61. See also Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. International Union, 47 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir.1995) ("Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, from the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. The CBA Grievance and Arbitration Provisions

The CBA does not require Beason to submit his ADA and CFEPA claims to the grievance and arbitration process. The relevant grievance and arbitration sections of the CBA do not mention statutory discrimination claims. The grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA apply to "contractual" disputes, not statutory claims under the ADA or CFEPA. In addition, the CBA provides that no dispute, other than a "contractual dispute," shall be submitted to arbitration. Since the plaintiff's employment discrimination claims are statutory, not contractual, and do not arise under the CBA, Hamilton Standard's argument that Beason must bring his claims through the grievance and arbitration process is unavailing. See Zarzycki v. Hamilton Standard, No. 3:96CV1782, 1997 WL 380434 at *2 (D.Conn. June 12, 1997) (arriving at same conclusion after interpreting the same CBA provisions).

This approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court decisions in Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998), Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). The first of these three cases, Gardner-Denver, held that a union member's statutory cause of action under Title VII was not waived by the prior arbitration of his claim under a collective bargaining agreement. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 49-51, 94 S.Ct. 1011. Gilmer, however, held that an employee's claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., was subject to compulsory arbitration under an arbitration provision in a securities registration form signed by the individual employee. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647. In Wright, the Court determined that the collective-bargaining agreement in question did not contain a valid waiver of an employee's right to a federal judicial forum for his ADA claim because the waiver was not "clear and unmistakable." Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 396 ("[W]e will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is `explicitly stated.' More succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable.") (citations omitted). The majority opinion in Wright, however, declined to address the more fundamental question of whether a "clear and unmistakable" waiver in a collective bargaining agreement can be enforceable. See Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395, 397 & n. 2.

In Wright the Supreme Court recognized the "tension" which exists between its decisions in Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. The majority opinion in Wright noted that Gardner-Denver held that under a collective bargaining agreement "an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver," while Gilmer held that an arbitration clause waiving an employee's right to a federal judicial forum for an ADEA claim could be enforceable if contained in an individual employment contract. Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395. Rather than resolve the question of whether an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement could ever waive an employee's right to a federal judicial forum for statutory employment claims, the Court in Wright determined that the waiver contained in the collective bargaining agreement was too general and did not explicitly incorporate statutory antidiscrimination requirements.² Id. at 396-97. The Court did state, however, that the broad arbitration clause in Gilmer would not be explicit enough to apply to collective bargaining agreement waivers.³ Id. at 397.

As previously discussed, the CBA here requires arbitration for "contractual" disputes, not statutory claims under the ADA or CFEPA. Although the non-discrimination language in the CBA — contained in a different section than the arbitration clause — states that employees may not be discriminated against in violation of any state or federal statut...