Beason v. United Technologies Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 3:97CV2654 (CFD).,Civ.A. 3:97CV2654 (CFD).
• Citation: 213 F.Supp.2d 103
• Parties: Donald BEASON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., Hamilton Standard Division, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

213 F.Supp.2d 103

Donald BEASON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., Hamilton Standard Division, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 3:97CV2654 (CFD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 15, 2002.

Reconsideration Denied April 25, 2002.

Gregg D. Adler, Peter D. Goselin, Livington, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

U.S. Court of Appeals, Office of the Clerk, New York City, Notice only.

Henry A. Platt, Gary L. Lieber, Schmeltzer, Aptaker & Shepard, Washington, DC, Edward J. Dempsey, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DRONEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Donald Beason, brings this action against his former employer, United Technologies Corporation, Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation, formerly Hamilton Standard Division ("Hamilton Standard"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn.Gen.Stat. 46a-51 et seq. Specifically, Beason claims that Hamilton Standard perceived him as disabled and discriminated against him on that basis when it did not recall him to work following a medical evaluation and report that placed restrictions on his ability to work. Hamilton Standard has filed a motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 40].

For the following reasons, Hamilton Standard's motion is GRANTED.

I. Background¹

Donald Beason ("Beason") began working at Hamilton Standard in December 1979. Beason was employed as a "Drill Press Operator" from 1979 until 1984, as a "Tooling and Material Expeditor" from 1984 to 1990, and thereafter as a "Shop Expeditor." In 1986, while a "Tooling and Material Expeditor," Beason was treated by a physician for a "systemic reaction to irritating fumes at work." Subsequently, while a "Shop Expeditor," Beason injured his right hand in a milling machine. The surgery to correct this injury resulted in the limited mobility of Beason's right thumb. In September 1992, a falling mirror struck Beason on the head, causing injury to various parts of his body, including his spine, back, and head. After this injury, Beason applied for, and received, workers' compensation benefits and took medical leave until he was laid off in March 1993, due to lack of work.

In October 1993, Beason's physician, Dr. Gary Belt, sent a letter to the defendant's medical department indicating that Beason had continued headaches and neck pain, was limited in performing tasks which would require him to keep his neck extended or flexed for long periods of time, was limiting to lifting less than 25 pounds, and had reached a maximum level of medical improvement. On May 26, 1994 and August 12, 1994, pursuant to his claim for workers' compensation, Beason was examined by two doctors, Dr. Norman Kaplan and Dr. Stephen Selden. After examining Beason, Dr. Kaplan recommended Beason's employment be limited to sedentary work that allowed him to stand, sit, or stretch when he needed to, and did not involve lifting more than 25-30 pounds, the use of vibrating machinery, or standing for long periods of time. Dr. Selden, however, concluded after his examination that Beason was "capable of working, without any specific restrictions."

In September 1995, Hamilton Standard contacted Beason regarding his possible recall for the position of "Commuter Blade Worker," a job involving the production of commuter aircraft blades. Although the plaintiff had been working as a "Shop Expediter" at the time of his layoff in 1993, the "Commuter Blade Worker" position fell within the "Composite Technician III" job code, a job code in which his previous position had been incorporated under the Joint Enrichment Technology ("JET") program entered into by the defendant and its employees' union. Thus, Beason could be recalled to the "Commuter Blade Worker" position under the union's collective bargaining agreement. The "Composite Technician III" job code contains jobs that have a physical demand rating of 3, as they require sustained lifting up to forty pounds, occasional lifting of objects greater than forty pounds, and a "continuity of effort in exerting substantial force or pressure in the use of hand tools or equipment, or in holding objects which are generally light in weight against a rotating surface with a resulting jarring transmitted through the arms or body."

To determine his eligibility for recall, Beason was instructed to report to Hamilton Standard's medical center for a medical evaluation. On September 26, 1995, the staff of defendant's on-site medical center asked Beason to fill out a "Pre-placement Assessment Examination" regarding his medical history² and gave him a physical examination, including blood, hearing, urine, and pulmonary function tests. Beason also underwent an assessment by a physical therapist, Joanne Sanborn, and an interview with the director of the defendant's on-site medical center, Dr. Walter Wiechetek ("Dr.Wick"). Based on her examination of Beason's neck, back, and legs, Sanborn did not recommend any restrictions on Beason's employment. Dr. Wick, however, based on his interview of Beason and his review of Beason's "Pre-placement Assessment Examination," Sanborn's physical therapy assessment, and Beason's prior medical history,³ recommended Beason's work be limited to a sedentary job that allowed him to change positions frequently and did not involve lifting more than 25-30 pounds, the use of vibrating machinery, the use of heavy machinery after taking medicine, or the prolonged exposure to chemical fumes. Dr Wick thereafter drafted a "Medical Placement Record" ("MPR") setting forth those restrictions. After reviewing Beason's MPR and speaking with the medical center staff, Richard Scorzafava, the supervisor for the "Commuter Blade Worker" position, determined that Beason could not be recalled to the position. Hamilton Standard then contacted Beason and informed him that he was not being recalled to work because of his medical restrictions. Beason subsequently provided Hamilton Standard with a note from Dr. Kaplan stating that Beason could return to work without any medical restrictions, but Hamilton Standard refused to recall him nevertheless.

On November 1, 1995, Beason's union filed a grievance for him and four other Hamilton Standard employees who were not recalled to work, alleging that Hamilton Standard violated the non-discrimination clause contained in the union's collective bargaining agreement. The grievance was submitted to arbitration in July 1996, in accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. In October 1996, the arbitrator denied the Union's grievance and found that Hamilton Standard had not violated the ADA. While the grievance was pending, Beason filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. A CHRO investigation concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Beason had been discriminated against by Hamilton Standard in violation of the ADA and the CFEPA by failing to recall him to work. Beason then filed this action.

After filing its answer and affirmative defenses to Beason's complaint, Hamilton Standard moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Beason's complaint must be dismissed because he was required to arbitrate his employment discrimination claims in accordance with the mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. Hamilton Standard also argued that Beason's claims were barred by the prior decision of the arbitrator which denied Beason's grievance. The Court denied the motion to for judgment on the pleadings, and the defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the merits of Beason's ADA and CFEPA claims.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, but omitting internal quotation marks), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

"The nonmovant must do more than present evidence that is merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative and must present `concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.'" Alteri v. General Motors Corp., 919 F.Supp. 92, 94-95 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505). A party may not create its own "genuine" issue of fact simply by presenting contradictory or unsupported statements. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1978). When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits, the nonmoving party must present "significant probative evidence to create a genuine issue of material...