Beaton v. LG Chem, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 26 August 2021
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-06806-BRM-ESK
• Parties: CONNOR BEATON, Plaintiff, v. LG CHEM, LTD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

CONNOR BEATON, Plaintiff, v. LG CHEM, LTD, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-06806-BRM-ESK

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

August 26, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

HON BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant LG Chem Ltd. (“LG”) seeking to dismiss Plaintiff Connor Beaton's (“Beaton”) Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (ECF No. 7.) Beaton opposed LG's motion. (ECF No. 13.) Also before this Court is Beaton's Cross Motion to Transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (ECF No. 12.) LG filed a reply in support of its motion and in opposition to Beaton's cross motion. (ECF No. 15.) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing, LG's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Beaton's Cross Motion to Transfer is DENIED.

I. Background

Beaton, at relevant times, resided at 6 John Drive in Annandale, New Jersey with his family. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) LG is a South Korean company based in Seoul, South Korea. (Id. ¶ 2.) In or about January 2016, Beaton purchased a battery-powered temperature controlled vaporizer and several 18650 lithium ion batteries from the retail store known as “Speakeasy Vapes” in Flemington, New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 7.) Beaton purchased these batteries to use them with the temperature controlled vaporizer. (Id. ¶ 8.) At the time of purchase, the batteries were wrapped and boxed with a label of “MXJO, ” which is a Chinese business entity. (Id. ¶ 11.) On September 20, 2016, in Hunterdon County, New Jersey, one of the batteries spontaneously exploded and/or caught fire while in Beaton's right front pants pocket. (Id. ¶ 11.) This incident caused Beaton physical injuries, including burns and scarring on his right leg. (Id. ¶ 10.) On or around June 4, 2018, Beaton's battery expert determined the batteries were designed and manufactured by LG. (Id. ¶ 12.)

LG alleges it: (1) does not design, manufacture, distribute, advertise, or sell 18650 lithium ion battery cells directly to consumers in New Jersey, or anywhere else, for use as standalone, removable batteries, (2) has never conducted any business with Speakeasy Vapes or MXJO, and (3) has never authorized MXJO, Speakeasy Vapes, or anyone else to sell its 18650 lithium ion cells directly to consumers for use as standalone batteries in New Jersey, or anywhere else, whether sold as “LG” brand or re-wrapped in another company's exterior wrapper. (ECF No. 7-1 at 6.)

In December 2016, Beaton filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, asserting product liability claims against Speakeasy Vapes and the related owner individuals/entities (the “State Court Lawsuit”). (ECF No. 7-2 at 34; ECF No. 1312 at 5.) In July 2018, Beaton amended the complaint to add LG as a defendant. (ECF No. 13-12 at 5.) On April 24, 2020, the Superior Court granted LG's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Id. at 6.)

On June 3, 2020, Beaton filed a Complaint in this Court, asserting claims for strict liability (Count I) and negligence (Count II) against LG and fictitious John Doe defendants. (ECF No. 1.) On November 10, 2020, LG filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (ECF No. 7.) On December 8, 2020, Beaton opposed LG's motion (ECF No. 13) and filed a Cross Motion to Transfer the case to Eastern District of California or Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (ECF No. 12.) On December 14, 2020, LG filed a rely in support of its motion and in opposition to Beaton's cross motion. (ECF No. 15.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

“A Rule 12(b)(2) motion . . . is inherently a matter which requires resolution of factual issues outside the pleadings, i.e., whether in personam jurisdiction actually lies.” Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 67 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984)). “If an issue is raised as to whether a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that personal jurisdiction exists.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing GE v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001)). “To sustain that burden, a plaintiff must establish jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits and competent evidence, ” and may not “rely on the bare pleadings alone.” CMC Food, Inc. v. Mitlitsky Eggs, LLC, Civ. A. No. 18-8939, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178902, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2019) (citing Benitez v. JMC Recycling Sys., Ltd., 97 F.Supp.3d 576, 581 (D.N.J. 2015)). “[W]hen the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “[I]n reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), [the court] ‘must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.'” Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992)).

“A district court sitting in diversity may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed under the law of the forum state.” Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “[T]o exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a federal court sitting in diversity must undertake a two-step inquiry.” IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert, AG, 155 F.3d 254, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1998). “First, the court must apply the relevant state long-arm statute to see if it permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction; then, the court must apply the precepts of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.” Id. at 259.

There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). “General jurisdiction . . . extends to ‘any and all claims' brought against a defendant.” Id. (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). “To achieve general jurisdiction over an individual or corporation, affiliations with the forum state must be so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Koch v. Pechota, 744 Fed.Appx. 105, 110 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)) (internal quotations omitted). “For a corporation, ‘the place of incorporation and principal place of business' are where it is ‘at home' and are, therefore, the paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Malik v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 710 Fed.Appx. 561, 563 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “[I]n an exceptional case, a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (citations omitted).

“Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor, 141 S.Ct. at 1024. “The inquiry as to whether specific jurisdiction exists has three parts:” (1) “the defendant must have purposefully directed [its] activities at the forum;” (2) “the litigation must arise out of or relate to at least one of those activities;” and (3) “if the prior two requirements are met, a court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.” O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.'” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).

B. Motion to Transfer

“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “A civil action may be brought in:”

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). “The burden of establishing the need for transfer . . . rests with the movant.” Jumara v. State Farm Ins., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The moving party must “show the proposed forum is not only adequate, but also more convenient than the present forum.” Rappoport v. Steven Spielberg, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 481, 499 (D.N.J. 1998) (citations omitted).

“Th...