Beattie v. Nat'l Bank of Illinois

• Citation: 174 Ill. 571,51 N.E. 602
• Parties: BEATTIE v. NATIONAL BANK OF ILLINOIS.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

174 Ill. 571

51 N.E. 602

BEATTIE

v.NATIONAL BANK OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by C. Stuart Beattie against the National Bank ofIllinois. From a judgment of the appellate court (69 Ill. App. 632) affirming a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Harry Vincent, for appellant.

Arnold Heap, for appellee.

This suit was originally begun before a justice of the peace, and taken by appeal to the circuit court of Cook county. In the circuit court the cause was submitted by agreement to be tried by the court without a jury. The finding of the court was against the appellant here, who was the plaintiff below, and in favor of the appellee here, who was the defendant below. Judgment was rendered upon the finding, which was for an amount less than $1,000. An appeal was taken to the appellate court. The appellate court has affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, and granted a certificate of importance. There is no controversy as to the facts. The case was tried upon a stipulation as to the facts, which were substantially as follows: On September 15, 1891, one George P. Bent, of No. 223 Canal street, Chicago, sent for collection to the First National Bank of Council Bluffs, Iowa, a note for $133.50, made by a man by the name of Max Bournicus. On September 28, 1891, the First National Bank of Council Bluffs collected the note, and on the same day made its draft for $133.25 on the National Bank of Chicago, Illinois, to the order of George A. Bent, Chicago. The draft was made payable to the order of George A. Bent, instead of George P. Bent, by mistake. It was mailed to George A. Bent, Chicago, Ill. George P. Bent was intended to be made the payee in the draft. George A. Bent never had any business transactions with appellee, the drawee, or with the First National Bank of Council Bluffs, the drawer of the draft. The latter bank was never indebted to George A. Bent. A man named George A. Bent received the draft from the post office, and indorsed upon it his own name, George A. Bent, and sold it to the appellant. The facts tend to show that the appellant purchased the draft in good faith, relying upon one Beach, a broker, whom he knew, although he was not acquainted with George A. Bent, the supposed payee in the draft. After purchasing the draft the appellant deposited it for his own account in the Bank of Commerce in Chicago, which cleared through the Union National Bank of Chicago. The draft was paid by the appellee bank through the Union National Bank. The appellee returned the draft to the National Bank of Council Bluffs, and it was there discovered that George A. Bent had received the draft intended for George P. Bent. Affidavits setting up the facts and the mistake which had occurred were made and attached to the draft, and the draft, with the affidavits so attached, was returned to the appellee. The appellee returned the draft to the Union National Bank, which redeemed it, under the rules of the clearing house. The Union National Bank presented it to the Bank of Commerce, and the latter bank took it up, and required the appellant to make the same good. The appellant took the draft to the appellee bank, and, ascertaining that the appellee had funds in its hands belonging to the First National Bank of Council Bluffs, the drawer of the draft, demanded payment, but payment was refused by appellee on the alleged ground that the indorsement of the payee was a forgery. Six propositions were submitted by the appellant (the plaintiff below) to the trial court to be held as law in the decision of the case. Two of these were marked ‘Held,’ two were marked ‘Refused,’ and two were modified, and marked ‘Held’ after being thus modified. The trial court, of its own motion, made in writing, and held affirmatively, a proposition holding that no right of action existed against the appellee, the National Bank of Illinois, and declined to hold whether or not the First National Bank of Council Bluffs was liable. Proper exceptions were taken to the action of the court.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

The question presented by the record is within a very narrow compass. It is whether a party holding a draft under a forged indorsement of the payee therein, or what amounts to a forged indorsement, can compel the drawee to pay him the draft. It is established clearly by the evidence that the George A. Bent who took the draft from the post office, and indorsed his name upon the back of it, was not the real payee, to whom the drawer of the draft intended to make it payable. It is true that the real and intended payee and real owner of the draft was named George P. Bent; but the fact that the name of the real owner and the name of the fraudulent possessor of the draft differ, so far as the middle letter of the name is concerned, does not make the case other than a case where the name of the real payee and the name of the assumed payee are the same. This is so because the law does not regard the middle initial letter as a part of a person's name, but only recognizes one Christian name of a party. Thompson v. Lee, 21 Ill. 241;Erskine v. Davis, 25 Ill. 251;Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457;Bletch v. Johnson, 40 Ill. 116;Humphrey v. Phillips, 57 Ill. 132. Where a bill is payable to the order of a person, and another person of the name of the payee gets hold of it, and indorses it to a party who takes it in good faith and for value, such party acquires no title to the bill. Conchran v. Atchison, 27 Kan. 728. If the indorsement so made by a person who is not the real payee, but has the same name as the real payee, is made by such person with full knowledge that he is not the real payee, and with intent to perpetrate a fraud, his indorsement cannot be regarded otherwise than as a forgery. In Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127, it was held that where there were two persons of the same name, and one of them signed that name to certain notes with the intention that the notes might be used in trade as the notes of the other, it was a foregery. Blackstone (4 Comm. 247) defines forgery to be the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right. ‘One may be guilty of forgery if he fraudulently signs his name, although it is identical with that of the person who should have signed. Thus, if a bill of exchange is payable to A. B. or order, and it comes to the hand of a person named A. B., who is not the payee, and who fraudulently indorses it for the purpose of obtaining the money, this is a forgery.’ U. S. v. Long, 30 Fed. 678. Where an indorsement is made for the purpose of being fraudulently used as the indorsement of another person, it is falsely made. The falsity of the act consists in the intent that the indorsement shall pass and be received as that of some other party, and in such case the charge of forgery can be maintained, although the signature is of a name which might lawfully be used by the person who put it on the draft or bill of exchange. Com. v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311. In People v. Peacock, 6 Cow. 73, where certain coal was consigned to George Peacock, of New York, and arrived there, and was claimed by another of the same name, who resided in the same city, but was not the true consignee, and he, knowing this, obtained an advance of money on indorsing the permit for the delivery of the coal with his own proper name, it was held that this was forgery. Nothing is better settled than that a forged indorsement does...