Beatty v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 10-12034
| Decision Date | 02 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-12034 |
| Parties | EANN C. BEATTY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
United States District Judge
Michael Hluchaniuk
United States Magistrate Judge
On May 20, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), District Judge Sean F. Cox referred this matter to the undersigned for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claim for a period of supplemental security income benefits. (Dkt. 4). This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 10, 13).
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) benefitson October 14, 1993. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 113-115). In a decision by the state disability determination service on February 7, 1994, plaintiff was found disabled and entitled to SSI as of October 1, 1993. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 55). On August 20, 2002, after subsequent continuing disability review, the agency determined that plaintiff's disability ended on August 1, 2002. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 69-72). Plaintiff requested reconsideration of this decision on August 27, 2002. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 73). After hearing before a hearing officer, on April 3, 2003, the decision was upheld. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 97-102). Plaintiff requested a hearing and on August 8, 2007, plaintiff appeared without counsel before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Henry Perez, Jr., who considered the case de novo. In a decision dated September 22, 2008, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 14- 26). Plaintiff requested a review of this decision on October 31, 2008. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 12-13). The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, after the review of additional exhibits1 (AC-1, Dkt. 7, Tr. at 9), the AppealsCouncil, on May 6, 2010, denied plaintiff's request for review. (Dkt. 7, Tr. 6-8).
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, defendant's motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the findings of the Commissioner be REVERSED, and that this matter be REMANDED for further proceedings.
Plaintiff was 29 years of age at the time of the most recent administrative hearing. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 113). In denying plaintiff's claims, the ALJ considered a mental impairment as a possible base of disability. (Dkt. 7, Tr. 121). The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to plaintiff's claim and found at step one that plaintiff had never engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. At step two, the ALJ found that the most recent favorable medical decision finding that plaintiff was disabled, or the "comparison point decision" (CPD), was on February 7, 1994. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 23). Plaintiff was found to have mental retardation, a medically determinable impairment that met Listing 12.05C, at the time of the CPD. Id. However, it was found as of August 1, 2002, there had been a decrease in the medical severity of the impairment present at the time of the CPD. Id. Plaintiff's current impairments were found to include mild mental retardation, depression, and a marijuana abuse disorder. Id. The ALJ found that these impairment were"severe" within the meaning of the second sequential step. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 24). At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff's current impairments, including the substance abuse disorder, met listing 12.05C in the regulations. Id. However, the ALJ also found that if plaintiff stopped using marijuana, he would no longer meet listing 12.05C or, alternatively, listings 12.04 or 12.09. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 25-26). At step four, the ALJ found that, beginning August 1, 2002, if plaintiff stopped his substance abuse, he would have the residual functioning capacity to perform a full range of work at the light and medium exertional levels with the following limitations: routine production and stress; simple job assignments; and occasional contact with the public. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 26). At step five, the ALJ denied plaintiff benefits because plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs available in the national economy. (Dkt. 7, Tr. at 29).
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because the ALJ cited and applied the five step procedure applicable to initial disability claims, instead of the seven step procedure applicable to re-assessments of disability. Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously relied on evidence pertaining to plaintiff's mental capacity after age 22, when the Listing clearly requires evidence of an impaired mental capacity prior to age 22. Third, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's marijuana use affected hisdepression and therefore, the conclusion he failed to satisfy the Listing in the absence of marijuana abuse is not supported by substantial evidence.
The Commissioner asserts that although the ALJ did not always cite the correct regulations, and the decision is not the model of clarity, the remainder of the ALJ's decision shows that he applied the correct standard used for determining whether a claimant's SSI benefits should be terminated. (Tr. 19-26). For example, the ALJ found that if plaintiff stopped using marijuana, his impairment would not meet or equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 21-22). In addition, the ALJ found that plaintiff had medical improvement on August 1, 2002, as defined at 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(I). (Tr. 19-20). The ALJ further found that plaintiff's medical improvement was related to his ability to do work. (Tr. 20). The ALJ stated that plaintiff continued to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. (Tr. 20). The ALJ then assessed plaintiff's residual functional capacity and determined that he had no past relevant work. (Tr. 22-24). Finally, the ALJ found that considering plaintiff's vocational profile and past work experience, he was not disabled because he could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 25-26). The Commissioner asserts that while the ALJ decision contained errors with respect to his citations to the controlling standards, plaintiff has failed to identify any reversible errorbecause it is plain from the decision that the ALJ applied the correct standard for termination of SSI benefits.
Although there are flaws in the ALJ's analysis, the Commissioner asserts that substantial evidence supports his ultimate finding that plaintiff demonstrated medical improvement due to increases in his IQ scores. The ALJ noted that plaintiff was last found disabled on February 7, 1994, but found that there had been a decrease in the severity of his impairment since that date based on more recent IQ test scores. (Tr. 19-20). The ALJ noted that plaintiff met a Listing in February 1994, and had a verbal IQ score of 58, a performance IQ score of 65, and a full-scale IQ score of 58. (Tr. 19). Although the ALJ stated that plaintiff's condition had previously been found to have met Listing 12.05C, the record shows that the state DDS found that he met Listing 112.05C. (Tr. 19, 55). In order to be found disabled under Listing 112.05C, a claimant must have mental retardation characterized by significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning and a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ score of 59 or less. The ALJ correctly noted that an IQ test performed on June 1, 2002, showed that plaintiff had a verbal IQ score of 73, a full scale score of 73, and a performance score of 77. (Tr. 212). Dr. Jeter, the examining psychologist, noted that the scores placed plaintiff in the borderline range of cognitive functioning with potential observed in the low average range. (Tr. 212).According to the Commissioner, this improvement in plaintiff's IQ scores demonstrates an improvement in his condition because his more recent scores exceeded 59, meaning that his condition would not meet Listing 112.05C had he been a child or Listing 12.05B, which is the equivalent listing for adults. According to the Commissioner, although the ALJ mistakenly concluded that plaintiff had previously met Listing 12.05C, but experienced improvement as of June 1, 2002, his ultimate conclusion that plaintiff's increased IQ scores demonstrated improvement was well supported.
The Commissioner also asserts that the ALJ reasonably found that plaintiff's mild mental retardation met the criteria for Listing 12.05C, but that if he stopped abusing marijuana, his condition would not meet that listing. (Tr. 20-22). The ALJ found that plaintiff's July 2008 IQ test results showed that he had an IQ in the applicable range and that his substance abuse and dysthymic disorder imposed additional and significant work-related limitations. (Tr. 20). The ALJ therefore found that plaintiff met Listing 12.05C. (Tr. 20). As required by the statute and regulations, the ALJ then assessed whether plaintiff would still be found disabled without his use of drugs. (Tr. 21-26). The ALJ found that if plaintiff abstained from drugs, his only remaining limitations would be due to his mild mental retardation. (Tr. 21). Given this conclusion, according to the Commissioner, plaintiff could not be disabled under the "C" criteria of Listing12.05 because it requires a claimant to show that he had mental retardation and another physical or mental impairment imposing additional and significant work-related limitations.
The Commissioner asserts that even though there is very little evidence in the record concerning plaint...
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