Beatty v. Isle of Capri Casino, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 September 2002
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:00-CV-00803.
• Citation: 234 F.Supp.2d 651
• Parties: Jennie BEATTY, Plaintiff, v. ISLE OF CAPRI CASINO, INC., f/k/a Casino America, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

234 F.Supp.2d 651

Jennie BEATTY, Plaintiff, v. ISLE OF CAPRI CASINO, INC., f/k/a Casino America, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:00-CV-00803.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

September 23, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rand Allen Mintzer, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Anna Reed Gray, Attorney at Law, Wade Thomas Visconte, Gray Law Firm, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RADFORD, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court are Defendant St. Charles Gaming Company, Inc.'s ("SCGC") Motion For Summary Judgment [# 40] and Motion to Determine Applicable State Law [# 20]. The Court has considered these motions and responsive pleadings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of a "slip and fall" incident that occurred on February 18, 1999, on the premises of SCGC d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was negligent in maintaining the premises, thereby resulting in her injuries. The case was removed from the 136th Judicial District Court, Jefferson County, Texas, by SCGC on November 22, 2000.¹ [# 1] This matter has been transferred to the undersigned by consent of the parties per 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) by the order of United States District Judge Howell Cobb. [# 7] Defendant has filed its Motion for Summary Judgment [# 40], Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [# 43], Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [# 51] and its Motion to Determine Applicable State Law [# 20], contending:

1) Louisiana law applies to Plaintiff's tort claims;

2) the Louisiana statute governing a one-year prescription period bars Plaintiff's claims, and alternatively 3) Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof under Louisiana law because she cannot prove that SCGC had "actual or constructive knowledge" as required by La. R.S. 9:2800.6, Louisiana's "slip and fall" statute.

Plaintiff has filed her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof [# 46]. She contends the following:

1) Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.031 applies to the choice of law issue;

2) Plaintiff's claims are therefore not barred by the Louisiana prescription period under application of section 71.031; and alternatively;

3) Genuine issues of material fact under both Texas and Louisiana law exist on the "actual or constructive notice" issue of Plaintiff's claims.

The parties have also filed briefs and various responsive pleadings on the issue of which state's law applies [# 21, 22]. Those pleadings are also before the Court for purposes of this opinion.

DISCUSSION

A) Application of Choice of Law Principles: Which State's Substantive Law Applies?²

Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum state and federal procedural law. Rosenberg v. Celotex Corp., 767 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1985)(citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). State substantive law includes a state's conflict of laws rules. Id. (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). Thus, in diversity cases, federal courts are obliged to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir.2000)(citing Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020). As Texas is the forum state in this matter, the court will apply Texas choice of law rules. Both parties agree with this application in their pleadings.

Texas courts use the ALI Restatement (Second) of Conflicts "most significant relationship test" for all civil choice of law cases except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex.1979); Crisman v. Cooper Indus., 748 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied). Section 6 of the Restatement contains the general principles involved in the conflicts analysis whereas Restatement Section 145 lists the factual matters to be considered when applying the Section 6 principles to a given case. Perez v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base), 81 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir.1996). These factual matters are determinative as to which state has the most significant relationship with the case. Under the "most significant relationship test," courts consider: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties, if any, is centered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145(2); Access Telecomm., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 704 (5th Cir. 1999). The parties agree with application of the "most significant relationship" test in their pleadings but they disagree with the outcome upon its application to the facts of this matter.

Defendant argues that Louisiana law should apply to all of Plaintiff's claims. At one stage in the litigation, both parties conceded that Louisiana law should apply to Plaintiff's tort claims. See Defendant SCGC's Memorandum on Applicable State Law [# 32] and Plaintiff Beatty's Brief Regarding Choice of Law [# 34]. However, there seems to be some confusion in Plaintiff's pleadings as to which causes of action she is arguing that Texas law should apply. While she agrees that Louisiana law will apply to her tort claims, but disagrees as to its application to her warranty claims in her Brief Regarding Choice of Law, she later argues in her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 46] that Texas law should apply to all causes of action under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 71.031. The Court will attempt to resolve this confusion by determining that Louisiana law applies to all of Plaintiff's claims for breach of warranty and tort under the "most significant relationship" test.

Texas requires that a choice of law determination be done on an issue by issue basis. Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 311 n. 6 (5th Cir.2000)(citing Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421). Therefore, the warranty and tort issues should be addressed in turn for choice of law analytical purposes.

In this case, the alleged breach of implied warranty arises out of the tort. No contractual cause of action is asserted. The warranty claims are one in the same with those based in negligence claims because all of Plaintiff's claims sound in theories of premises liability. The breach of warranty claims are based on the same allegedly tortious conduct that gives rise to her negligence claims. These types of warranty claims are delictual or tortious, not contractual, in nature. See McDaniel v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 308 (5th Cir.1993); Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841, 846 (5th Cir.1975); Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1968). Therefore, because all of Plaintiff's claims essentially sound in tort, rather than some in tort and some in contract, the Court will apply the "most significant relationship" test to Plaintiff's causes of action as a whole.

The "most significant relationship" factors under Section 145 apply to the facts of this case as follows:

1) Place of injury.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff's injuries occurred in Lake Charles, Louisiana.

2) Place where conduct causing the injury occurred.

It is also undisputed that the "wet carpet" which allegedly caused Plaintiff's injuries was located on Defendant's premises in Lake Charles, Louisiana.

3) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.

Plaintiff resides in Beaumont, Texas. Defendant's principal place of business is located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Defendant is a Louisiana corporation. Thus, for purposes of residency, Defendant is considered a resident of Louisiana. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

4) The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

The relationship shared by the parties consists of Plaintiff's attendance of the casino. Plaintiff traveled to Louisiana to visit the Casino. Although the Casino advertises in Texas, this solicitation did not create an individual relationship with Plaintiff specifically. The relationship arose out of Plaintiff's visitation to Defendant's premises and her patronage of the Casino in Louisiana. Thus, the Court concludes that the "relationship" was centered in Louisiana, where the casino is located.

As illustrated above, under the most significant relationship analysis, the only relevant contacts that Texas has with this case is the fact that the plaintiff is domiciled there. Because both the case law and the Restatement instruct this court to place more emphasis on the place of the alleged misconduct than on the residential preference of the plaintiff, it is concluded that the third factor, domicile of the parties, will not weigh in favor of the plaintiff to overcome the fact that all of the relevant conduct took place in Louisiana. See Jackson v. West Telemarketing Corp., 245 F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir.2001); Perez v. Lockheed (In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base), 81 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir.1996). Consequently, Louisiana has the "most significant relationship" with the case under the Texas choice of law analysis and Louisiana substantive law therefore applies.

Plaintiff argues that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 71.031 is the "applicable Texas choice of law statute." See Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment [# 46], at pp. 2-3. Section 71.031 is the Texas wrongful death statute, which gives rise to a cause of action for "death or personal...