Beatty v. Kauffman
| Decision Date | 12 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-184 |
| Parties | PAUL WILLIAM BEATTY, Petitioner v. KEVIN KAUFFMAN, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENSYLVANIA, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF VENANGO COUNTY, Respondents |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
PAUL WILLIAM BEATTY, Petitioner
v.
KEVIN KAUFFMAN, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENSYLVANIA, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF VENANGO COUNTY, Respondents
No. 1:19-cv-184
United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
October 12, 2021
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]
RIGHARD A. LANZILLO (UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be denied and that no certificate of appealability issue.
II. Report
A. Background and Procedural History
Before the Court is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Paul William Beatty pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Beatty is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County, Pennsylvania.
A review of the record and the criminal docket sheet for Beatty's underlying convictions in Commonwealth v. Beatty, No. CP-61-CR-0000666-2010 (Venango Cnty. Com. Pl.), [1] reveals
the following relevant facts. Following a jury trial, Beatty was convicted of one count each of rape of a child, indecent assault, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors. The victim of Beatty's crimes was A.S., the daughter of his paramour. On January 5, 2012, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years. He filed a direct appeal; the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on October 28, 2013. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 87 A.3d 895 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum). Beatty did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On January 22, 2014, Beatty filed a petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. This petition was dismissed on July 23, 2014. Beatty filed an appeal from the dismissal. On December 1, 2015, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the order dismissing the petition because Beatty had waived his appellate issue by failing to file a court-ordered statement of matters complained of on appeal. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 135 A.3d 648 (Pa. Super. 2015). On May 3, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Beatty's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 138 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2016).
On September 8, 2014, while his first PCRA petition was on appeal, Beatty filed a second PCRA petition, which the PCRA court held in abeyance pending resolution of the appeal. On July 14, 2016, Beatty filed a motion to “reinstate” his second PCRA petition, which the PCRA court granted on July 22, 2016. On December 28, 2017, following multiple evidentiary hearings, the PCRA court denied the petition. On April 8, 2019, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief on the basis that the second PCRA petition was untimely and thus the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to address its merits. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957 (Pa. Super. 2019). Beatty filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which was denied by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on October 16, 2019. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 218 A.3d 850 (Pa. 2019).
The instant petition was filed on June 28, 2019. ECF No. 1. Respondents filed a response thereto on September 30, 2019. ECF No. 14. Beatty filed a Traverse on December 14, 2019. ECF No. 19.[2]
Upon review, the undersigned found that, in large part, Beatty's petition appeared to be untimely. Because the Court may raise the issue of timeliness sua sponte as long as the petitioner is given fair notice and an opportunity to respond and is not prejudiced, Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006); United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 161-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc), the undersigned issued an Order to Show Cause why the identified claims should not be dismissed for failure to file them without the applicable limitations period, thus providing Beatty with the required notice and opportunity to respond. ECF No. 21. Respondents were also invited to submit a response setting forth their position. Id. Beatty filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 24. Respondents did not submit a response., The petition is now ripe for review.
B. Analysis
1. Timeliness of Grounds 1-15
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Caldwell v. Mahally, et al., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192046, *17 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for postconviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. at *17-18. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id. at * 18.
a. Grounds 1-12, 15
Beatty asserts sixteen grounds for relief in his petition, fifteen of which are related to his trial (Grounds 1-15). ECF No. 1 at 5-24. Thirteen of these claims do not implicate newly
enunciated constitutional rights or facts that were discovered later (Grounds 1-12, 15). Furthermore, it does not appear that there were any state-created impediments that prevented Beatty from raising these claims sooner. Consequently, the “trigger date” for the claims set forth in Grounds 1-12 and 15 is the date on which Beatty's judgment of sentence became final.
Beatty's judgment of sentence became final on or about November 27, 2013, at the expiration of the time for filing with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court a petition for allowance of appeal from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's affirmance of the judgment of sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that ajudgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review).[3] The one-year limitations period for filing a habeas corpus petition began to run on that date. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Beatty had to file any federal habeas petition concerning these trial-related claims by November 27, 2014. Because the instant habeas petition was filed on June 28, 2019, after the one-year limitations period had expired, these claims are statutorily time-barred. Given this deficiency, the Court must determine whether Beatty can take advantage of the statutory tolling provision set out in Section 2244(d)(2).
Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed” state post-conviction proceeding. Beatty filed his first PCRA petition on January 22, 2014, by which time 56 days of his one-year limitations period had expired. Those proceedings were “properly filed, ” and, thus, tolled the statute of limitations until they were
concluded on May 3, 2016, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Beatty's petition for allowance of appeal.[4] At that time, Beatty had 309 days remaining in the limitations period.
As the Pennsylvania Superior Court held in its April 8, 2019 decision, Beatty's second PCRA proceeding was not a “properly fded application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” under the terms of § 2244(d)(2). Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d at 963-64. Thus, that proceeding did not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) (quotation marks and brackets deleted); id. at 417 (“Because the state court rejected petitioner's PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,' and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”).
The Court will consider the applicability of equitable tolling infra.
b. Ground 13
As for Ground 13, Beatty raises a due process claim therein, alleging that “[o]ver two years after his January 2012 sentencing, ” he “was made aware” that the prosecutor had given gifts to the victim during the trial. ECF No. 1 at 19-20. In support of this claim, Beatty attaches to his Traverse the letter by...
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