Beatty v. Lycoming Co. Mutual Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1870
• Citation: 66 Pa. 9
• Parties: Beatty <I>versus</I> The Lycoming County Mutual Insurance Co. The Lycoming County Mutual Insurance Co. <I>versus</I> Beatty.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 9

66 Pa. 9

Beatty versus The Lycoming County Mutual Insurance Co.

The Lycoming County Mutual Insurance Co. versus Beatty.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 16 and 17, 1870.

July 7, 1870.

May 16th and 17th 1870.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., READ, AGNEW and SHARSWOOD, JJ.

Writs of error to the Court of Common Pleas of Blair county: No. 74 and 87, to May Term 1868.

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S. S. Blair, for Beatty.—The condition as to notice should be construed liberally: Bartlett v. Union Ins. Co., 46 Maine 500; Walsh v. Washington Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 427. Whether the account Beatty gave was as particular as the nature of the case allowed was for the jury: Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 7 Wright 350. Whether the condition was waived was for the jury: Inland Ins. Co. v. Stauffer, 9 Casey 402; Tayloe v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 6 Wright 188; West Branch Ins. Co. v. Helfenstein, 4 Id. 290; Francis v. Ocean Ins. Co., 6 Cowen 404; Allegree v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Harris & Johnson 408; Etna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wendell 385; Kimball v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 8 Bosworth 495; Hall v. The Ins. Co., 3 Phila. R. 332; Child v. The Ins. Co., 3 Sanford 26; Kervochan v. The New York Bay Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 428.

L. W. Hall and S. Calvin (with whom was D. J. Neff), for the Insurance Company.—As to waiver: Diehl v. Adams Co. Mutual Ins. Co., 8 P. F. Smith 452; Mitchell v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 1 Id. 402; Lycoming Mutual Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 4 Wright 312; Same v. Schreffler, supra.

The opinion of the court was delivered, July 7th 1870, by SHARSWOOD, J.

Daniel Beatty prosecuted in the court below an action of covenant against the Lycoming County Mutual Insurance Company, to recover for losses by fire on two policies of insurance, one covering his household furniture and groceries, and the other his dwelling-house. Under the charge of the learned judge below he recovered a verdict upon the policy on the dwelling-house, but the jury gave him nothing for his household furniture and groceries. Both parties have sued out writs of error to the judgment.

There are several assignments of error, but all may be disposed of by the resolution of three questions, arising upon the application of an article or condition of each policy requiring that in the case of a loss the insured shall forthwith give notice thereof to the secretary, and within thirty days of the fire a particular account of such loss or damage signed, &c.

The three errors assigned by the insurance company relate to the first question. The learned judge instructed the jury that there was sufficient evidence of notice forthwith given by the assured of the occurrence of the fire, to fulfil the requirement of the policies in that respect. It appears that the fire occurred August 31st 1858, and that the morning after, the local agent of the company, in company with counsel, visited the premises and made an examination of the circumstances attending it. Daniel Beatty, the insured, was himself examined as a witness under oath, his testimony or statement reduced to writing and signed by him. It was forwarded by the agent to the secretary of the insurance company on the following day, and was received by him. We think the learned judge was perfectly right in holding this a sufficient notice of the loss within the terms of the policy. It was held in The West Branch Insurance Company v. Helfenstein, 4 Wright 289, in a case in which the policy contained a condition expressed in the same words as this, that a written notice to the secretary from the local agent upon information conveyed to him by the assured is sufficient. There is nothing to prevent the assured from constituting the agent of the company his attorney to give the notice, and if he does give the notice accordingly, the company cannot object without a rule or condition prohibiting the agent from being employed for such purpose. But this case is stronger than that. The statement of the fact and circumstances of the fire was signed by the assured himself, and transmitted through the local agent to the secretary of the company. How it reached the proper destination is entirely immaterial, provided it was for warded in due and reasonable time, which in this instance is not denied. This disposes of the writ of error of the insurance company.

The second question which is raised by the first assignment of error of the plaintiff below is, whether there was any evidence of such a particular statement of the loss under the policy upon household furniture and groceries as was required by its terms. The learned judge instructed the jury that there was not. The plaintiff maintains that the sufficiency of the statement was for the jury, upon the authority of The Franklin Insurance Company v. Updegraff, 7 Wright 350. The report of that case does not furnish us with the statement. It is said...