Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 66779

Decision Date21 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 66779,66779
Citation700 S.W.2d 831
PartiesRichard BEATTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The METROPOLITAN ST. LOUIS SEWER DISTRICT, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Lewis C. Green, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Donald J. Stohr, Mary Bonacorsi, Vicki M. Barnell, Charles B. Kaiser, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., James J. Wilson, City Counselor, Timothy G. Noble, Associate City Counselor, Michelle C. Clay, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.

Kenneth M. Romines, Robert A. Hutton, Jr., St. Louis, for defendant-respondent County Election Bd.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

This is a direct appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of appellant's First Amended Petition. The trial court ruled that the statute of limitations for election contests barred appellant's petition. § 115.577, RSMo 1978. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The facts are these: The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (hereafter MSD) adopted Ordinance 5630 on May 23, 1984, calling for a special election on the proposition of whether MSD could issue clean water revenue bonds in the amount of $60 million. Approval of the bonds would, among other things, authorize MSD to construct additions to its sewage treatment system and fix rates and charges to provide funds to pay the cost of operation and maintenance of the sewage system and service the proposed bonds. 1

Because MSD operates within both the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County, the Boards of Election Commissioners in the City of St. Louis (hereafter the City Board) and St. Louis County (hereafter the County Board) had responsibility for the conduct of the election on the MSD proposition. 2 On August 7, 1984, more than four-sevenths of the voters approved MSD issuing the revenue bonds. On August 14, the City Board certified the abstract of all the votes cast on the proposition in the City of St. Louis. On August 16, the County Board certified the abstract of votes cast on the proposition in St. Louis County. Appellant filed his Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction against MSD as the sole defendant on September 14. 3 MSD moved to dismiss appellant's petition arguing that appellant had failed to comply with the election contest provisions of § 115.527, et seq., RSMo 1978 (as amended).

On November 15, appellant filed his First Amended Petition for Election Contest, Declaratory Judgment and Injunction, naming the City Board and County Board as additional defendants. 4 Each of the defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Petition, arguing that appellant's petition was barred by the statute of limitations for election contests. § 115.577. The trial court sustained the motions to dismiss.

I.

This is a direct appeal. Appellant's Point III argues that:

The court below erred in holding that the election contest statute, as applied to bar this suit, is constitutional, because the election contest statute, as applied by the court below to bar this suit, violates Article I, §§ 10 and 14 of the Missouri Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, in that the election contest statute as so applied is so vague and indefinite as to deprive appellant of due process of law.

This Court has jurisdiction "in all cases involving the validity ... of a statute or provision of the constitution of this state...." Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. Appellant's Point III questions the constitutional validity of the election contest provisions of Chapter 115. We believe that appellant raises the constitutional issue in good faith. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over all of the issues raised in this case. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 687 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. banc 1985).

II.

Section 115.553.2 provides in pertinent part:

The result of any election on any question may be contested by one or more registered voters from the area in which the election was held. The petitioning voter or voters shall be considered the contestant and the officer or election authority responsible for issuing the statement setting forth the result of the election shall be considered the contestee....

Section 115.577 provides in pertinent part:

Not later than thirty days after the official announcement of the election result by the election authority, any person authorized by section 115.553 who wishes to contest the election ... on any question provided in section 115.575 shall file a verified petition in the office of the clerk of the appropriate circuit court....

Appellant filed his original petition on September 14, 1984, thirty-one days after the City Board, and twenty-nine days after the County Board, certified the election results on the MSD proposition in their respective jurisdictions. Respondents argue that the statute of limitations for election contests expired thirty days after the City Board certified the votes on the proposition. 5

The policy of The Comprehensive Election Act of 1977, § 115.001, et seq., RSMo 1978 (as amended) (hereafter "the Act") is to require the prompt resolution of questions relating to elections. Election authorities must announce election results expeditiously. § 115.507.1, RSMo 1978. Legal actions contesting elections must be brought within thirty days of such announcement. § 115.577. Summons must be served without unnecessary delay. § 115.579.1. The contestee must answer within fifteen days. § 115.579.3. The Court is to try the case "[i]mmediately upon the filing of a petition and answer...." § 115.581, RSMo 1978.

This is an election on a special district question conducted by more than one election authority. The election authorities did not choose to contract for the conduct of the election by one of them. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to determine the outcome of the election until all election results are certified. To require that the time for contesting an election contest begin before the results of an election are fully known would effectively shorten the thirty day statute of limitations provided by the Act. Further, we perceive no diversion from the policy of the Act if the statute of limitations begins to run from the announcement of election results of the last announcing election authority.

Therefore, we hold that when an election is conducted on a question for a special district by more than one election authority, the statute of limitations for filing an election contest does not expire until thirty days after all of the election authorities have certified their election results. The original petition was timely filed.

Appellant next argues that MSD is the proper contestee. Section 115.553.2 defines the contestee as "the officer or election authority responsible for issuing the statement setting forth the result of the election...."

There are four statutory provisions which bear directly on responsibility for issuing "a statement setting forth the result of" elections. The first of these is that "[n]ot later than the second Tuesday after the election, the verification board shall issue a statement announcing the results of each election held within its jurisdiction...." § 115.507. In cities or counties having an election board, that entity serves as the verification board, in all other jurisdiction, the verification board is comprised of the county clerk and two verification judges. §§ 115.015, .499, RSMo 1978.

The second of these provisions is that "the board of state canvassers ... shall ... issue a statement announcing the results of the primary election for federal officers, governor, lieutenant governor, state senators and respresentatives, [etc.]." § 115.511.1, RSMo 1978. The third is essentially identical to this, except in reference to the general election for those offices, and the fourth similarly addresses special elections and elections to consider initiatives, referenda and constitutional amendments. § 115.511.2, .3.

The statutes identify two classes of entities charged with the responsibility of "announcing election results": verification boards for local elections and a board of state canvassers for state and federal offices and statewide questions. Appellant's argument seems to be that these statutes do not provide for a single entity charged with announcing the result of an election held within more than one jurisdiction but not included in the statewide categories for which § 115.511 controls. Thus, he urges, there is no entity denominated a contestee under the statute, and this vacuum must be filled by MSD.

The policy of the election law is that "[t]he result of any election on any question may be contested...." § 115.553.2. If there is a reasonable interpretation of a statute which will give effect to its policy and purpose, it will be employed. BCI Corp. v. Charlebois Construction Co., 673 S.W.2d 774, 780 (Mo. banc 1984).

It is reasonable to interpret the phrase "officer or election authority" in the definition of contestee as allowing for the plural of both of its constituent terms. This is especially so in light of the statutory commandment that "[w]hen any subject matter, party or person is described or referred to by words importing the singular number ... several matters and persons ... and bodies corporate as well as individuals, are included." § 1.030.2, RSMo 1978.

It is further reasonable to define the phrase "the statement setting forth the result of the election," § 115.553.2, as meaning a summary of the votes cast in favor of and against a candidate or question and not a declaration of whether a particular candidate has been elected or, as in this case, a question has received the required (here four-sevenths) majority to stand approved. Under the statutory scheme, then, the announcement of the verification board is a summary of the abstract of votes and is designed to...

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