Beatty v. Rawski
Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:13–3045–MGL–SVH. |
Citation | 97 F.Supp.3d 768 |
Parties | Gena BEATTY, Petitioner, v. Warden Angelia RAWSKI, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Tara D. Shurling, Columbia, SC, for Petitioner.
James Anthony Mabry, Donald John Zelenka, South Carolina Attorney General's Office, Columbia, SC, for Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PETITIONER'S HABEAS PETITION WITH PREJUDICE
This case was filed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action. Petitioner is represented by excellent counsel. The matter is before this Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the United States Magistrate Judge suggesting that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and Petitioner's habeas petition be dismissed with prejudice. The Report was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on January 29, 2015, and Petitioner filed her objections on March 16, 2015.
Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in her § 2254 petition:
Petition Attachment One 6.
First, the Magistrate Judge asserts that Petitioner failed to file her habeas petitioner before the expiration of the statute of limitations had run under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which states, in relevant part:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In the Magistrate Judge's Report, she sets out in detail both (1) her view of the law as it pertains to when Petitioner's statute of limitations was tolled as it relates to AEDPA and (2) the procedural history of the case. This Court sees no reason to repeat that material here.
Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate Judge's recitation of the procedural history. And, the only portion of the Magistrate Judge's legal analysis that Petitioner disagrees with are the Magistrate Judge's statements that Report 11. Thus, according to the Magistrate Judge, because Petitioner failed to file her habeas petition until November 7, 2013, forty-six days after the statute of limitations had run, “Petitioner's habeas petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).” Id.
According to Petitioner, however, the statute of limitations was tolled until November 8, 2012, the date that the South Carolina Court of Appeals issued the remittitur in the case. So, this disagreement is of grave importance. If the Magistrate Judge is correct, then Petitioner's habeas petition is barred by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. But, if the Petitioner is correct, then it is not.
Subsection 2244(d)(1)(A) encompasses review of a State conviction by the Supreme Court and § 2244(d)(2) is exclusively concerned with “State post-conviction or other [State] collateral review.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007) () (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal alteration omitted). It is for that reason that the Court is unpersuaded by any argument that Gonzalez v. Thaler, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012), essentially overruled the Florida mandate requirement discussed in Lawrence. Gonzalez is concerned with when a State conviction becomes final under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Id. at 646. But Lawrence is concerned with when a State post-conviction habeas petition is final under § 2244(d)(2). See Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 654 n. 10 () ; Gonzalez v. Thaler, 623 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir.2010) () (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).
Both the Magistrate Judge and Petitioner agree that the outcome of this case is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (). The Fourth Circuit has “construed a state post-conviction proceeding to include all state-court proceedings ‘from initial filing [in the trial court] to final disposition by the highest state court.’ ” Harris v....
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McKinnon v. Warden at Kershaw Corr. Inst.
... ... appellate court issues the remittitur, or the date that the ... lower court files the remittitur) (collecting cases); ... Beatty v. Rawski , 97 F.Supp.3d 768, 774 (D.S.C ... 2015) (“South Carolina law states that the final ... disposition of ... an appeal ... ...
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McGaha v. Stirling
...Petitioner's time was tolled once his PCR application was filed till the remittitur was filed in the circuit court. Beatty v. Rawski, 97 F. Supp.3d 768, 780 (D.S.C. 2015). The tolling period ended on March 12, 2018 when the Greenville County Clerk of Court filed the remittitur in the PCR ap......
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McCray v. Warden at Lieber Corr. Inst.
... ... application is filed in the state circuit court.”) ... (citing Beatty v. Rawski, 97 F.Supp.3d 768, 780 ... (D.S.C. 2015) (finding that final disposition of a PCR appeal ... in South Carolina occurs when the ... ...