Beatty v. State

• Decision Date: 13 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 49S00-8804-CR-00411,49S00-8804-CR-00411
• Parties: Stan Richard BEATTY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1134

567 N.E.2d 1134

Stan Richard BEATTY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49S00-8804-CR-00411.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 13, 1991.

Belle T. Choate, Choate Visher & Haith, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Gary Damon Secrest, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Stan Richard Beatty, was convicted of three counts of kidnapping, a Class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-2; three counts of criminal recklessness, a Class D felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-2-2; and one count of carrying a handgun without a license, Ind.Code Sec. 35-47-2-1, as a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code Sec. 35-47-2-23. In this direct appeal, he raises four issues:

1. the admissibility of statements regarding criminal history;

2. the granting of a recess to permit a witness to listen to a tape recording;

3. the constitutionality of his sentence; and

4. the sufficiency of evidence.

The trial evidence indicated that the defendant had a stormy romantic relationship with Kathy Hall which resulted in a final breakup in May, 1987. On June 15, 1987, the defendant armed himself and entered Hall's place of employment in a downtown Indianapolis office building. Beatty allowed several employees to leave, and then held hostage Hall and two other female employees, demanding large sums of cash and air transportation out of the country. After 16 hours and extensive telephone negotiations, Beatty was persuaded to release all three women and surrender.

1. Admissibility of Statements About Criminal History

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting portions of tape recordings in which the defendant made statements concerning his criminal history.

Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from the jury all matters related to the defendant's prior criminal history. In the course of an ensuing hearing on the motion, the State advised of its intention to introduce tape recorded conversations with the defendant in which he made references to his prior criminal history. The trial court ruled that the taped conversations would be admissible.

At trial, Indianapolis Police dispatcher Frederick M. Williamson testified that on June 15, 1987, he received a call from the defendant, who claimed to be holding hostages. A tape recording of this conversation, State's Exhibit 4, was admitted into evidence and played for the jury notwithstanding the defendant's timely objection. The tape recorded conversation began with the defendant announcing that he was holding several hostages and that he had two guns and dynamite, and if the police were sent, he would "blow somebody away." The recording vividly documents the happening of the charged kidnappings, reflecting that as the dispatcher sought to calm the situation, the defendant's rambling comments expressed unhappiness regarding his relationship with Hall, threatened death to his hostages and anyone attempting their rescue, and made demands for money and air transportation, interspersing numerous voluntary references to prior criminal history. These latter references were often in the context of seeking to convince the police dispatcher of his determination and capacity to follow through on his threats.

The general rule is that evidence showing the commission of other crimes is inadmissible to prove guilt. Penley v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806; Biggerstaff v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 148, 361 N.E.2d 895. However, exceptions to the rule are recognized. Such evidence may be proper to show a defendant's intent or state of mind at the time of the charged offense. McCormick v. State (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 993; Choctaw v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 545, 387 N.E.2d 1305. Furthermore, evidence of unrelated criminal activity may be admissible under the res gestae exception to complete the story of the crime by proving its immediate context. Forehand v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 552; Beasley v. State (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 982; Clemons v. State (1981), Ind., 424 N.E.2d 113. In addition, when, as here, a defendant asserts the defense of insanity, evidence otherwise inadmissible may be proper to show mental state at the time of the offense. Rogers v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1259; Wood v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 1094.

For each of these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit 4, including the defendant's references to his previous criminal history.

2. Allowing Witness Review of Tape Recording

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by granting a recess to permit a State witness to review the tape recording, Exhibit 4, in order to lay a foundation for its admission into evidence. Officer Williamson testified that he could not positively identify the cassette by its labelling, whereupon the trial court granted a recess to permit the witness, out of the jury's presence, to listen to the cassette. After doing so, Williamson was able to positively identify the cassette recording, and the State was thus able to show a proper foundation for its admission into evidence.

The defendant argues that this procedure violated his right to a fair trial by impartial judge and jury, thereby violating his right to due process of law. He urges that this procedure constituted an intervention by the trial court analogous to that found improper in Kennedy v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 211, 280 N.E.2d 611 and Decker v. State (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 1129, which both held that it was improper for a trial judge to question witnesses in a manner calculated to impeach or discredit. The State argues that witnesses are routinely permitted to inspect documents in the course of laying a foundation for the admission of evidence.

A trial judge must maintain an impartial manner and refrain from acting as an advocate for either party. Peek v. State (1983), Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 450. However, in granting a recess and permitting the witness to listen to the cassette tape recording for possible authentication as an exhibit, the trial court was completely impartial and in no way impaired the defendant's rights to a fair trial and due process. There is no error on this issue.

3. Sentence Constitutionality and Reasonableness

Imposing the maximum possible sentence on each count, the trial court enhanced the 30 year presumptive sentence for Class A felonies by 20 years and sentenced the defendant to 50 years imprisonment on each of the three counts of kidnapping. Similarly, the two year presumptive sentence for Class D felonies was enhanced by two years for sentences of four years on each of the three counts of criminal recklessness. In addition the trial court imposed the maximum one year sentence for the Class A misdemeanor handgun violation. The court ordered the three 50-year sentences to be served consecutively with the other sentences to run concurrently resulting in an aggregate sentence of 150 years.

The defendant argues that the enhancement of the presumptive sentence on multiple counts, coupled with imposition of consecutive sentences, constitutes disproportionate sentencing as well as cruel and unusual punishment. He also contends that the sentences are manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 17, formerly Ind. Appellate Review of Sentences Rules 1 and 2.

The defendant claims that the enhancements to the maximum on each count, coupled with imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, particularly when the offenses arise from a single continuous transaction, failed to comply with the requirements of Ind.Code Secs. 35-38-1-3, 35-38-1-7, and 35-50-2-5. This assertion is not supported by cogent argument or citation to authority, and we are aware of none. In fact, there is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against using the same factors to both enhance a sentence and impose consecutive sentences. Bish v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 608; Abercrombie v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 407, 417 N.E.2d 316. Moreover, a court may properly rely on prior and distinct offenses to enhance and impose consecutive sentences. Sage v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 699, 419 N.E.2d 1286; Jackson v. State (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 29.

The defendant further argues that the Court failed to consider evidence of his mental state and motive as mitigating factors. The presumptive sentences were enhanced upon the trial court's finding of aggravating circumstances from prior convictions for crimes of violence including robbery, 1978; rape, 1985; escape, 1974; and sexual battery, 1985. As a separate basis for ordering Counts I, II, and III served consecutively, the trial court identified as further aggravating circumstances that any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and that the defendant was in need of rehabilitative services as provided in an institution. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressly stated that he had "listened for mitigating factors and I've not really heard any." Record at 1993.

Failure to find mitigating circumstances when clearly supported by the record may imply that they were overlooked and not properly considered. Jones v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 681. However, there is no duty on the trial court to make an affirmative finding expressly negating each potentially mitigating circumstance. Stout v. State (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 476; Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43. In Hammons v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1254-55, we observed:

When a defendant argues mitigating circumstances to the trial court, the sentencing judge is not obligated to explain why he has chosen not to make a finding of mitigation. This is particularly true when an examination of the underlying record shows the highly disputable nature of the...