Beaty v. State, 042220 AKCA, A-12516
|Opinion Judge:||WOLLENBERG, JUDGE|
|Party Name:||JOSHUA BEATY, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.|
|Attorney:||Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.|
|Case Date:||April 22, 2020|
|Court:||Court of Appeals of Alaska|
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District No. 3PA-13-01329 CI, Palmer, Eric Smith, Judge.
Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
Joshua Beaty appeals from the superior court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the court's judgment.
Underlying facts and proceedings
Between 2010 and 2011, Beaty was arrested and charged with numerous counts of burglary, felony-level theft, and trespass, in addition to one count of controlled substance misconduct. Beaty was eventually released on bail. His bail conditions required him to have a third-party custodian and submit to random drug testing twice a week.
Beaty's case proceeded to trial in late January 2012. Shortly after the jury was sworn, however, the prosecutor informed Beaty's attorney that she had just received additional discovery from the troopers - a police report from an uncharged burglary describing the records of the cell phone found in the car that Beaty was driving at the time of his arrest. The cell phone records apparently put Beaty in the vicinity of the uncharged burglary. Beaty's attorney stated that he thought this evidence was important - as it might show that Beaty was not near one of the charged burglaries - and that he needed more than a few days to review it.
The attorney had a murder trial scheduled for February, so he informed the court that he could not resume trial until March. The attorney therefore requested a mistrial. After extended discussion and a break to review the new discovery, the court granted the mistrial and rescheduled the trial for March. The parties later stipulated to continuing the trial to mid-April.
On the eve of trial call in April, Beaty's attorney asked a colleague to set Beaty's case for a change of plea. The court scheduled a change of plea hearing for May 23.
In mid-May, Beaty's attorney requested a bail hearing to approve a new third-party custodian, as Beaty's current third-party custodian would soon be unavailable. Before a bail hearing was held, the court held the change of plea hearing as scheduled on May 23. At that hearing, Beaty's attorney explained the terms of the plea agreement: Beaty would plead guilty to one count of first-degree burglary, and he would receive a sentence of 6 years flat, with a 30-day delayed remand. The remaining charges would be dismissed.
The court advised Beaty of the rights he would be relinquishing by pleading guilty. Beaty's attorney informed the court that Beaty was comfortable proceeding with the change of plea but hesitant to proceed with the sentencing at that time. Accordingly, the court continued the change of plea hearing and set a bail hearing for two days later.
At the bail hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that Beaty had not submitted documentation showing that he had been complying with the drug testing required by his bail conditions. After an off-record discussion, the parties agreed that Beaty would proceed with the change of plea and sentencing that day (sooner than originally scheduled) and that, as part of the agreement, he would receive the 30-day delayed remand contemplated in the original agreement and remain on bail during that time with his new third-party custodian. The parties also agreed that the State would not pursue a new charge for violating conditions of release or for the...
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